What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
I received notification of N465TM (beechjet 400A) incident at pdk airport on Friday 03/07/2014 at 1:13PM. The incident report on 03/07/2014 at 1838Z stated ?during take-off roll ry 3R, the left main tire blew out after hitting FOD on the ry. The pilot aborted take-off and the aircraft came to a stop prior to the departure end of the ry. The trailing edge of the left flap behind the tire was also damaged when the tire flew off?. Another FAA inspector worked with me on this incident by handling the field work at pdk and gathering evidence.
I researched N465TM records in edrs to get contact information as to who operates the aircraft. I contacted travel management group ltd out of elkhart Indiana and spoke with bob minegar. Bob informed me that the company was already aware of the incident and he got me the contact information for the crew. I contacted the crew. Both of their statements were consistent with the incident report but they added that there was also damage to the LH engine cowling and LH wheel assembly. The aircraft is part of a 135 air carrier (designator T17A) but the incident flight was conducted under part 91 with no passengers onboard.
The airport operations officer at pdk and a crew member conducted a FOD walk and discovered two large pieces of steel on the runway. It was later discovered that these were vortex generators that came off of N500GF, which was a Gulfstream 1159A that had taken off prior to the incident. The Gulfstream was being operated in experimental status for research and development and operated under part 91. The r&d was for obtaining smoother airflow through the installed hubbard hush kit (STC#01567LA).
I am also working N500GF?s dropped part as a separate incident investigation. Although they are separate incidents I feel it is necessary to cover the facts of N500GF in this report to show how the FOD issue will be resolved. I contacted the engineer at hubbard, Mr. Stephen marinshaw, and he sent me supporting data. He also informed me that the maintenance group at pdk had performed the installation at the direction of Mr. Hugh hays (dar). I traveled to pdk on 3/14/2014 and met with Mr. Hays who gave me all of the supporting documentation.
Summary and recommendation: in this inspector?s opinion, the major factor that led to the incident was the insufficient attachment method (tape) of the vortex generators on N500GF causing detachment and subsequent damage to N465TM. After further investigation of the N500GF aircraft, I am turning that investigation over to the pmi for the designee that approved the experimental r&d certificate and operational limitations and the repair station that signed off the installation.
The crew of N465TM, did a good job keeping the aircraft under control and getting it stopped. They demonstrated good piloting and aeronautical decision making by their fast reaction and handling of the incident from evacuation, to the FOD walk, while demonstrating good reporting, communication, and cooperation.
It will be up to the pmi, or whoever is assigned to the N500GF incident, in determining the proper action and resolution to the incident in regards to the dropped parts (FOD) off of N500GF.
As the FAA filed it
I RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF N465TM (BEECHJET 400A) INCIDENT AT PDK AIRPORT ON FRIDAY 03/07/2014 AT 1:13PM. THE INCIDENT REPORT ON 03/07/2014 AT 1838Z STATED ?DURING TAKE-OFF ROLL RY 3R, THE LEFT MAIN TIRE BLEW OUT AFTER HITTING FOD ON THE RY. THE PILOT ABORTED TAKE-OFF AND THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO A STOP PRIOR TO THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RY. THE TRAILING EDGE OF THE LEFT FLAP BEHIND THE TIRE WAS ALSO DAMAGED WHEN THE TIRE FLEW OFF?. ANOTHER FAA INSPECTOR WORKED WITH ME ON THIS INCIDENT BY HANDLING THE FIELD WORK AT PDK AND GATHERING EVIDENCE.
I RESEARCHED N465TM RECORDS IN EDRS TO GET CONTACT INFORMATION AS TO WHO OPERATES THE AIRCRAFT. I CONTACTED TRAVEL MANAGEMENT GROUP LTD OUT OF ELKHART INDIANA AND SPOKE WITH BOB MINEGAR. BOB INFORMED ME THAT THE COMPANY WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE INCIDENT AND HE GOT ME THE CONTACT INFORMATION FOR THE CREW. I CONTACTED THE CREW. BOTH OF THEIR STATEMENTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE INCIDENT REPORT BUT THEY ADDED THAT THERE WAS ALSO DAMAGE TO THE LH ENGINE COWLING AND LH WHEEL ASSEMBLY. THE AIRCRAFT IS PART OF A 135 AIR CARRIER (DESIGNATOR T17A) BUT THE INCIDENT FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED UNDER PART 91 WITH NO PASSENGERS ONBOARD.
THE AIRPORT OPERATIONS OFFICER AT PDK AND A CREW MEMBER CONDUCTED A FOD WALK AND DISCOVERED TWO LARGE PIECES OF STEEL ON THE RUNWAY. IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT THESE WERE VORTEX GENERATORS THAT CAME OFF OF N500GF, WHICH WAS A GULFSTREAM 1159A THAT HAD TAKEN OFF PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. THE GULFSTREAM WAS BEING OPERATED IN EXPERIMENTAL STATUS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATED UNDER PART 91. THE R&D WAS FOR OBTAINING SMOOTHER AIRFLOW THROUGH THE INSTALLED HUBBARD HUSH KIT (STC#01567LA).
I AM ALSO WORKING N500GF?S DROPPED PART AS A SEPARATE INCIDENT INVESTIGATION. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE SEPARATE INCIDENTS I FEEL IT IS NECESSARY TO COVER THE FACTS OF N500GF IN THIS REPORT TO SHOW HOW THE FOD ISSUE WILL BE RESOLVED. I CONTACTED THE ENGINEER AT HUBBARD, MR. STEPHEN MARINSHAW, AND HE SENT ME SUPPORTING DATA. HE ALSO INFORMED ME THAT THE MAINTENANCE GROUP AT PDK HAD PERFORMED THE INSTALLATION AT THE DIRECTION OF MR. HUGH HAYS (DAR). I TRAVELED TO PDK ON 3/14/2014 AND MET WITH MR. HAYS WHO GAVE ME ALL OF THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION: IN THIS INSPECTOR?S OPINION, THE MAJOR FACTOR THAT LED TO THE INCIDENT WAS THE INSUFFICIENT ATTACHMENT METHOD (TAPE) OF THE VORTEX GENERATORS ON N500GF CAUSING DETACHMENT AND SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE TO N465TM. AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE N500GF AIRCRAFT, I AM TURNING THAT INVESTIGATION OVER TO THE PMI FOR THE DESIGNEE THAT APPROVED THE EXPERIMENTAL R&D CERTIFICATE AND OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND THE REPAIR STATION THAT SIGNED OFF THE INSTALLATION.
THE CREW OF N465TM, DID A GOOD JOB KEEPING THE AIRCRAFT UNDER CONTROL AND GETTING IT STOPPED. THEY DEMONSTRATED GOOD PILOTING AND AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING BY THEIR FAST REACTION AND HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT FROM EVACUATION, TO THE FOD WALK, WHILE DEMONSTRATING GOOD REPORTING, COMMUNICATION, AND COOPERATION.
IT WILL BE UP TO THE PMI, OR WHOEVER IS ASSIGNED TO THE N500GF INCIDENT, IN DETERMINING THE PROPER ACTION AND RESOLUTION TO THE INCIDENT IN REGARDS TO THE DROPPED PARTS (FOD) OFF OF N500GF.