What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
On August 23, 2014, privacy data omitted and privacy data omitted were operating N567TR into Saltillo Mexico (mmio) from south carolina via laredo, Texas, on a part 135 flight. The first officer, privacy data omitted, was flying the leg. The pilots set up the vor/dme to runway 17 but expected to circle to land runway 35 because of the wind?s direction. Visibility and cloud cover were VFR and no factor at mmio so the crew began the approach until the airport was in sight and then transitioned into a visual approach. The crew entered a right downwind for runway 35. The crew flew the approach and traffic pattern with ¼ flaps. Pakwest airlines visual approach profile calls for ½ flaps abeam the landing numbers and gear down before turning base. On this day as the privacy data omitted called for ½ flaps, the Saltillo air traffic controller radioed that N567TR was cleared to land. The captain did not hear the first officer call for ½ flaps because of the radio call, and the captain continued communication with the air traffic controller. When the captain was done with the radio call, the captain asked the first officer what he had said. This delayed the application of ½ flaps and subsequently the call for gear down. The gear down call came while on the right base leg to runway 35. The lack of ½ flaps and gear did not help the aircraft slow down as is practiced. The first officer did not do a sufficient job of turning to final and overshot the final approach path slightly. The captain became distracted by the overshoot and rushed the landing checklist. The gear handle was placed in the down position but it did not make it past the down detent. The gear did not travel to the down position and the crew did not recheck the gear down lights. The first officer made constant corrections for speed and altitude and made an approach that ?would have been a normal landing, maybe a little fast but there was plenty of runway?. As the aircraft started to flair the captain thought the aircraft did not feel correct. Both airmen heard a whooshing sound. The captain, already feeling that the aircraft did not feel correct, took the controls and initiated a go around. The first officer remembers putting the gear handle in the up position but does not remember looking at the green lights. The go-around and landing were conducted by the captain and the aircraft taxied to parking without incident. During the post flight walk around the first officer called the captain out to look at the propellers. The propeller tips on both engines were damaged, approximately 1 inch.
The crew had plenty of rest before the flight, and had only flown 5.5 hours at the time of the accident
As the FAA filed it
ON AUGUST 23, 2014, ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ AND ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ WERE OPERATING N567TR INTO SALTILLO MEXICO (MMIO) FROM SOUTH CAROLINA VIA LAREDO, TEXAS, ON A PART 135 FLIGHT. THE FIRST OFFICER, ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^, WAS FLYING THE LEG. THE PILOTS SET UP THE VOR/DME TO RUNWAY 17 BUT EXPECTED TO CIRCLE TO LAND RUNWAY 35 BECAUSE OF THE WIND?S DIRECTION. VISIBILITY AND CLOUD COVER WERE VFR AND NO FACTOR AT MMIO SO THE CREW BEGAN THE APPROACH UNTIL THE AIRPORT WAS IN SIGHT AND THEN TRANSITIONED INTO A VISUAL APPROACH. THE CREW ENTERED A RIGHT DOWNWIND FOR RUNWAY 35. THE CREW FLEW THE APPROACH AND TRAFFIC PATTERN WITH ¼ FLAPS. PAKWEST AIRLINES VISUAL APPROACH PROFILE CALLS FOR ½ FLAPS ABEAM THE LANDING NUMBERS AND GEAR DOWN BEFORE TURNING BASE. ON THIS DAY AS THE ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ CALLED FOR ½ FLAPS, THE SALTILLO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER RADIOED THAT N567TR WAS CLEARED TO LAND. THE CAPTAIN DID NOT HEAR THE FIRST OFFICER CALL FOR ½ FLAPS BECAUSE OF THE RADIO CALL, AND THE CAPTAIN CONTINUED COMMUNICATION WITH THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER. WHEN THE CAPTAIN WAS DONE WITH THE RADIO CALL, THE CAPTAIN ASKED THE FIRST OFFICER WHAT HE HAD SAID. THIS DELAYED THE APPLICATION OF ½ FLAPS AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE CALL FOR GEAR DOWN. THE GEAR DOWN CALL CAME WHILE ON THE RIGHT BASE LEG TO RUNWAY 35. THE LACK OF ½ FLAPS AND GEAR DID NOT HELP THE AIRCRAFT SLOW DOWN AS IS PRACTICED. THE FIRST OFFICER DID NOT DO A SUFFICIENT JOB OF TURNING TO FINAL AND OVERSHOT THE FINAL APPROACH PATH SLIGHTLY. THE CAPTAIN BECAME DISTRACTED BY THE OVERSHOOT AND RUSHED THE LANDING CHECKLIST. THE GEAR HANDLE WAS PLACED IN THE DOWN POSITION BUT IT DID NOT MAKE IT PAST THE DOWN DETENT. THE GEAR DID NOT TRAVEL TO THE DOWN POSITION AND THE CREW DID NOT RECHECK THE GEAR DOWN LIGHTS. THE FIRST OFFICER MADE CONSTANT CORRECTIONS FOR SPEED AND ALTITUDE AND MADE AN APPROACH THAT ?WOULD HAVE BEEN A NORMAL LANDING, MAYBE A LITTLE FAST BUT THERE WAS PLENTY OF RUNWAY?. AS THE AIRCRAFT STARTED TO FLAIR THE CAPTAIN THOUGHT THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT FEEL CORRECT. BOTH AIRMEN HEARD A WHOOSHING SOUND. THE CAPTAIN, ALREADY FEELING THAT THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT FEEL CORRECT, TOOK THE CONTROLS AND INITIATED A GO AROUND. THE FIRST OFFICER REMEMBERS PUTTING THE GEAR HANDLE IN THE UP POSITION BUT DOES NOT REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE GREEN LIGHTS. THE GO-AROUND AND LANDING WERE CONDUCTED BY THE CAPTAIN AND THE AIRCRAFT TAXIED TO PARKING WITHOUT INCIDENT. DURING THE POST FLIGHT WALK AROUND THE FIRST OFFICER CALLED THE CAPTAIN OUT TO LOOK AT THE PROPELLERS. THE PROPELLER TIPS ON BOTH ENGINES WERE DAMAGED, APPROXIMATELY 1 INCH.
THE CREW HAD PLENTY OF REST BEFORE THE FLIGHT, AND HAD ONLY FLOWN 5.5 HOURS AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT