20150523011959I

Incident · No damage

FAA incident report · Dehavilland DHC-6-200 · Eloy, AZ · May 23, 2015

Date
May 23, 2015 · 15:00 local
Place
Eloy, AZ
Airport
Eloy Municipal
Phase of flight
Other, Specify
Operating rules
Parachute jumping (Part 105)
Damage
No damage
Aircraft
N204BD
Reported as
Dehavilland DHC-6-200
Reported engine
Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-60A
People aboard
24
Fatal injuries
1
Other injuries
0

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

Skydiver was participating in a 16 man formation jump which was practice for a larger 100 way attempt. The exit from the aircraft and formation portion of the jump was videotaped by another skydiver on the load. The video shows the jumper was fully alert during the formation and subsequent break off for deployment of his parachute. After break off the video was shut down and no further recording was made of the jump. Witnesses on the ground as well as in the air stated they saw no indication of a canopy deployment made by the jumper during the descent. One observer on the ground watched the jumper descend till just above the ground. They saw no visual indication of the jumper attempting to deploy his parachute.

Witnesses who responded to the site stated the jumper had not survived the impact.

When police arrived at the spot where the jumper contacted the ground they observed the main parachute within its bag, main risers, and pilot chute laying within a couple feet of the jumper. The main canopy was unopened and still stowed in its bag. They also found a cutaway handle located approximately 200 ft from the impact site. When removing the equipment it was noted that the reserve portion of the container was still closed and the reserve handle had not been removed from the harness pocket.

Historical info:

The jumper had over 17 years in the sport and over 4000 jumps experience. He was an active jumper and used to jumping anywhere between 5 to 12 jumps in one day. The jump he was participating in was his 7th jump of the day. The equipment he was wearing was his own equipment which he had been jumping for many years. He was observed by his wife packing his main canopy prior to the last jump.

Investigation of the jumper?s equipment was conducted. The equipment involved is identified as follows:

Harness & container: mirage systems mt, built 3/2001

Main canopy: crossfire 109 (109 sq ft canopy)

Reserve canopy: performance design PR-126 built 11/2000. Reserve packing card indicates reserve last packed feb. 26, 2015.

Aad equipment: cypress originally installed in equipment was no longer installed.

Findings during the equipment inspection concluded the following:

1. The cut-away handle being located away from the body along the previous flight path indicates a conscious effort to make a "cut away" of the main parachute from the harness. This could indicate the jumper was aware that he had some type of malfunction.

2. The main parachute container closing loop had been cut/sheared off just below the area where the pin would have engaged in the loop and above the container grommets. The closing pin was slightly bent and had marks which correspond to excessive force being applied against the container closing flap grommets. The top closing flap grommet was deformed as well to match the imprint of the closing pin. These findings are indicators that the pin holding the main parachute in the harness/container was still engaged (holding the container closed) at the time of impact.

3. The main parachute pilot chute had indications that it may have been in a partially cocked condition. This would have caused the pilot chute to not produce optimum drag if it had been in the airstream. There was no conclusive evidence the pilot chute had been deployed, but if it had been it either did not have sufficient time to inflate to pull the main container closing pin, or was not effective in pulling the main container closing pin.

4. The reserve ripcord handle had not been activated, and the reserve pin & seal were still in place. This indicates the jumper did not initiate deployment of his reserve parachute.

5. The harness/container originally had an aad installed. Sometime after 2013 this equipment was removed, according to the jumpers wife because it had ?turned into a pumpkin? (Exceeded its life limit). No automatic opening device was installed in the equipment at the time of the accident.

6. The equipment was in service

As the FAA filed it

SKYDIVER WAS PARTICIPATING IN A 16 MAN FORMATION JUMP WHICH WAS PRACTICE FOR A LARGER 100 WAY ATTEMPT. THE EXIT FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND FORMATION PORTION OF THE JUMP WAS VIDEOTAPED BY ANOTHER SKYDIVER ON THE LOAD. THE VIDEO SHOWS THE JUMPER WAS FULLY ALERT DURING THE FORMATION AND SUBSEQUENT BREAK OFF FOR DEPLOYMENT OF HIS PARACHUTE. AFTER BREAK OFF THE VIDEO WAS SHUT DOWN AND NO FURTHER RECORDING WAS MADE OF THE JUMP. WITNESSES ON THE GROUND AS WELL AS IN THE AIR STATED THEY SAW NO INDICATION OF A CANOPY DEPLOYMENT MADE BY THE JUMPER DURING THE DESCENT. ONE OBSERVER ON THE GROUND WATCHED THE JUMPER DESCEND TILL JUST ABOVE THE GROUND. THEY SAW NO VISUAL INDICATION OF THE JUMPER ATTEMPTING TO DEPLOY HIS PARACHUTE.

WITNESSES WHO RESPONDED TO THE SITE STATED THE JUMPER HAD NOT SURVIVED THE IMPACT.

WHEN POLICE ARRIVED AT THE SPOT WHERE THE JUMPER CONTACTED THE GROUND THEY OBSERVED THE MAIN PARACHUTE WITHIN ITS BAG, MAIN RISERS, AND PILOT CHUTE LAYING WITHIN A COUPLE FEET OF THE JUMPER. THE MAIN CANOPY WAS UNOPENED AND STILL STOWED IN ITS BAG. THEY ALSO FOUND A CUTAWAY HANDLE LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 200 FT FROM THE IMPACT SITE. WHEN REMOVING THE EQUIPMENT IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESERVE PORTION OF THE CONTAINER WAS STILL CLOSED AND THE RESERVE HANDLE HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED FROM THE HARNESS POCKET.

HISTORICAL INFO:

THE JUMPER HAD OVER 17 YEARS IN THE SPORT AND OVER 4000 JUMPS EXPERIENCE. HE WAS AN ACTIVE JUMPER AND USED TO JUMPING ANYWHERE BETWEEN 5 TO 12 JUMPS IN ONE DAY. THE JUMP HE WAS PARTICIPATING IN WAS HIS 7TH JUMP OF THE DAY. THE EQUIPMENT HE WAS WEARING WAS HIS OWN EQUIPMENT WHICH HE HAD BEEN JUMPING FOR MANY YEARS. HE WAS OBSERVED BY HIS WIFE PACKING HIS MAIN CANOPY PRIOR TO THE LAST JUMP.

INVESTIGATION OF THE JUMPER?S EQUIPMENT WAS CONDUCTED. THE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IS IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

HARNESS & CONTAINER: MIRAGE SYSTEMS MT, BUILT 3/2001

MAIN CANOPY: CROSSFIRE 109 (109 SQ FT CANOPY)

RESERVE CANOPY: PERFORMANCE DESIGN PR-126 BUILT 11/2000. RESERVE PACKING CARD INDICATES RESERVE LAST PACKED FEB. 26, 2015.

AAD EQUIPMENT: CYPRESS ORIGINALLY INSTALLED IN EQUIPMENT WAS NO LONGER INSTALLED.

FINDINGS DURING THE EQUIPMENT INSPECTION CONCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE CUT-AWAY HANDLE BEING LOCATED AWAY FROM THE BODY ALONG THE PREVIOUS FLIGHT PATH INDICATES A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO MAKE A "CUT AWAY" OF THE MAIN PARACHUTE FROM THE HARNESS. THIS COULD INDICATE THE JUMPER WAS AWARE THAT HE HAD SOME TYPE OF MALFUNCTION.

2. THE MAIN PARACHUTE CONTAINER CLOSING LOOP HAD BEEN CUT/SHEARED OFF JUST BELOW THE AREA WHERE THE PIN WOULD HAVE ENGAGED IN THE LOOP AND ABOVE THE CONTAINER GROMMETS. THE CLOSING PIN WAS SLIGHTLY BENT AND HAD MARKS WHICH CORRESPOND TO EXCESSIVE FORCE BEING APPLIED AGAINST THE CONTAINER CLOSING FLAP GROMMETS. THE TOP CLOSING FLAP GROMMET WAS DEFORMED AS WELL TO MATCH THE IMPRINT OF THE CLOSING PIN. THESE FINDINGS ARE INDICATORS THAT THE PIN HOLDING THE MAIN PARACHUTE IN THE HARNESS/CONTAINER WAS STILL ENGAGED (HOLDING THE CONTAINER CLOSED) AT THE TIME OF IMPACT.

3. THE MAIN PARACHUTE PILOT CHUTE HAD INDICATIONS THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN IN A PARTIALLY COCKED CONDITION. THIS WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE PILOT CHUTE TO NOT PRODUCE OPTIMUM DRAG IF IT HAD BEEN IN THE AIRSTREAM. THERE WAS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THE PILOT CHUTE HAD BEEN DEPLOYED, BUT IF IT HAD BEEN IT EITHER DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO INFLATE TO PULL THE MAIN CONTAINER CLOSING PIN, OR WAS NOT EFFECTIVE IN PULLING THE MAIN CONTAINER CLOSING PIN.

4. THE RESERVE RIPCORD HANDLE HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVATED, AND THE RESERVE PIN & SEAL WERE STILL IN PLACE. THIS INDICATES THE JUMPER DID NOT INITIATE DEPLOYMENT OF HIS RESERVE PARACHUTE.

5. THE HARNESS/CONTAINER ORIGINALLY HAD AN AAD INSTALLED. SOMETIME AFTER 2013 THIS EQUIPMENT WAS REMOVED, ACCORDING TO THE JUMPERS WIFE BECAUSE IT HAD ?TURNED INTO A PUMPKIN? (EXCEEDED ITS LIFE LIMIT). NO AUTOMATIC OPENING DEVICE WAS INSTALLED IN THE EQUIPMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.

6. THE EQUIPMENT WAS IN SERVICE

Other reports on N204BD · 4

Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.