What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
N145KK, a CE-560 aircraft operating under part 135 as LAK761, flew the ILS approach to rwy 29 at gnv, landing shortly after the closure of the control tower for the evening. The aircraft came to a stop along the left side of the runway, with the nose of the aircraft resting on the pavement, with a broken nose gear assembly and damage to the left main gear tire and the underside of the aircraft. No evacuation of the aircraft was initiated.
The flight crew reported that they touched down normally in the touchdown zone of the runway, but immediately lost directional control of the aircraft due to hydroplaning under wet runway conditions, and subsequently slid off the runway. However, examination of the tire tracks in the sod off the left runway edge did not bear this explanation out as described by the flight crew. The left main gear track began in the sod, on the left side of rwy 29, 1852 feet down from the runway threshold, and 58 inches from the edge of the runway pavement. The first evidence of nose gear track began approximately 2176 feet down the runway, apparently as the nose wheel left the pavement. The first evidence of the main wheel leaving the pavement begins 2338 feet down the runway. The three tire tracks gradually became deeper ruts as the aircraft sank into the soft sod, which was saturated by heavy rains at the time of the incident. At the end of the aircraft?s travel, 2587 feet down the runway, the nose of the aircraft slewed quickly to the right, and the nose gear broke off the aircraft as it contacted the edge of the pavement (the wheel had already sunk into the sod and could not roll back onto the runway at the surface grade). The flight crew subsequently shut the engines down and contacted the local FBO by radio on the emergency battery bus to request assistance.
I interviewed the flight crew together in person the following day, and they simply described the event as a hydroplaning loss of control. When I later contacted the PIC by telephone to discuss the implications of the tire tracks, she declined to offer any explanation, and basically conveyed her desire to simply ?move on? From this experience and proceed with requalification flight training by her employer. I stated that, under the circumstances of this case, I would need to request a reexamination of her airline transport pilot certificate under U.S.c. 44709, and she did not seem surprised by my decision.
As the FAA filed it
N145KK, A CE-560 AIRCRAFT OPERATING UNDER PART 135 AS LAK761, FLEW THE ILS APPROACH TO RWY 29 AT GNV, LANDING SHORTLY AFTER THE CLOSURE OF THE CONTROL TOWER FOR THE EVENING. THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO A STOP ALONG THE LEFT SIDE OF THE RUNWAY, WITH THE NOSE OF THE AIRCRAFT RESTING ON THE PAVEMENT, WITH A BROKEN NOSE GEAR ASSEMBLY AND DAMAGE TO THE LEFT MAIN GEAR TIRE AND THE UNDERSIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT. NO EVACUATION OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS INITIATED.
THE FLIGHT CREW REPORTED THAT THEY TOUCHED DOWN NORMALLY IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE OF THE RUNWAY, BUT IMMEDIATELY LOST DIRECTIONAL CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT DUE TO HYDROPLANING UNDER WET RUNWAY CONDITIONS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SLID OFF THE RUNWAY. HOWEVER, EXAMINATION OF THE TIRE TRACKS IN THE SOD OFF THE LEFT RUNWAY EDGE DID NOT BEAR THIS EXPLANATION OUT AS DESCRIBED BY THE FLIGHT CREW. THE LEFT MAIN GEAR TRACK BEGAN IN THE SOD, ON THE LEFT SIDE OF RWY 29, 1852 FEET DOWN FROM THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD, AND 58 INCHES FROM THE EDGE OF THE RUNWAY PAVEMENT. THE FIRST EVIDENCE OF NOSE GEAR TRACK BEGAN APPROXIMATELY 2176 FEET DOWN THE RUNWAY, APPARENTLY AS THE NOSE WHEEL LEFT THE PAVEMENT. THE FIRST EVIDENCE OF THE MAIN WHEEL LEAVING THE PAVEMENT BEGINS 2338 FEET DOWN THE RUNWAY. THE THREE TIRE TRACKS GRADUALLY BECAME DEEPER RUTS AS THE AIRCRAFT SANK INTO THE SOFT SOD, WHICH WAS SATURATED BY HEAVY RAINS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. AT THE END OF THE AIRCRAFT?S TRAVEL, 2587 FEET DOWN THE RUNWAY, THE NOSE OF THE AIRCRAFT SLEWED QUICKLY TO THE RIGHT, AND THE NOSE GEAR BROKE OFF THE AIRCRAFT AS IT CONTACTED THE EDGE OF THE PAVEMENT (THE WHEEL HAD ALREADY SUNK INTO THE SOD AND COULD NOT ROLL BACK ONTO THE RUNWAY AT THE SURFACE GRADE). THE FLIGHT CREW SUBSEQUENTLY SHUT THE ENGINES DOWN AND CONTACTED THE LOCAL FBO BY RADIO ON THE EMERGENCY BATTERY BUS TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE.
I INTERVIEWED THE FLIGHT CREW TOGETHER IN PERSON THE FOLLOWING DAY, AND THEY SIMPLY DESCRIBED THE EVENT AS A HYDROPLANING LOSS OF CONTROL. WHEN I LATER CONTACTED THE PIC BY TELEPHONE TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TIRE TRACKS, SHE DECLINED TO OFFER ANY EXPLANATION, AND BASICALLY CONVEYED HER DESIRE TO SIMPLY ?MOVE ON? FROM THIS EXPERIENCE AND PROCEED WITH REQUALIFICATION FLIGHT TRAINING BY HER EMPLOYER. I STATED THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, I WOULD NEED TO REQUEST A REEXAMINATION OF HER AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT CERTIFICATE UNDER U.S.C. 44709, AND SHE DID NOT SEEM SURPRISED BY MY DECISION.