What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
The aircraft had crashed approximately a mile short of runway 9L at the Bartow municipal airport, Bartow, Florida (kbow). The aircraft tail # was N100CP, serial #: 310Q0219, a 1971 Cessna CE-310Q. The aircraft is equipped with Continental IO-520NB turbocharged, fuel injected, six cylinder, air cooled engines that develop a maximum of 310 brake horse power (bhp) per side. Weather at the time was VFR. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The PIC received minor injuries and was released from the hospital the same day.
The pic's account of events leading up to the accident are as follows:
"Take-off and climb to 13,500'MSL were normal. Cruise was normal with power settings of 27" mp and 2200 RPM. Flight following was through miami center. About 2 hours into the flight I started a descent and return to kbow. Descent was normal at about 1000-1500 fpm, with power settings of 20-22"mp and 2200RPM. Flight following was terminated and I contacted Bartow tower east of the airport and at about 7000' MSL. I negotiated to continue descending and circling the airspace. I made one "lap" around the outer edge of the airspace to enter the left traffic pattern for runway 9L. Reaching mid-field I reported my position, as requested, and received landing clearance. At this time I extended approach flaps and landing gear; power settings were 20" mp and 2200RPM; airspeed about 120KIAS; altitude about 1400' MSL and descending about 500 fpm. I made a turn to base, and as I rolled out of that moved the prop levers to a higher RPM. As I did, the right engine lost power, so began to return the prop levers to their previous position and checked the fuel gauges. Fuel gauges indicated available fuel. There was no improvement to the power on the right engine, so I moved engine controls for both engines to their maximum, full forward position (open throttle, maximum RPM, rich mixture) and turned toward the runway threshold. At this time I recognized that there was also no power from the left engine. I realized I would not make the airport and began navigating to a suitable landing area. As I continued toward that area, I made a "mayday" call. There was no stall or spin, but I don't remember the impact. My first memory after impact was kneeling in the co-pilot seat, facing the rear of the aircraft."
A fuel receipt for 118.2 gallons with instructions to "top off all tanks" before the accident flight was received from the FBO.
The aircraft was inspected at Florida air recovery in jacksonville, FL with NTSB, textron/Cessna and Continental motors representatives in attendance. The Continental rep. Checked the engines for obvious issues with nothing found, all inspected engine parameters appeared to be normal. No other obvious causes for dual engine failure were discovered during the aircraft teardown.
The Cessna 310 pilot operating handbook (POH) indicates all takeoffs and landings should be accomplished with fuel selectors on the main tanks. After takeoff main tanks are to be used for the first 60 minutes and before any auxiliary tank use. Main tanks have a usable capacity of 50 gallons per side. The PIC stated he uses 30 gallons an hour total fuel flow as a planning factor. The aircraft was equipped with auxiliary tanks which have a usable capacity of 15 gallons a side. The POH further elaborates on the post takeoff auxiliary tank use limitation as such: since the auxiliary fuel tanks are designed for cruising flight, they are not equipped with pumps and operations near the ground (below 1000 feet) using auxiliary fuel tanks is not recommended because of this limitation.
It was noted that both fuel selectors appeared to be in the auxiliary tank position during post-crash investigation/photos. The PIC was queried as to fuel sequences/tanks used prior to the accident but has not commented to date.
Pilot induced fuel starvation due to a fuel selector or other switch error cannot be ruled out.
As the FAA filed it
THE AIRCRAFT HAD CRASHED APPROXIMATELY A MILE SHORT OF RUNWAY 9L AT THE BARTOW MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, BARTOW, FLORIDA (KBOW). THE AIRCRAFT TAIL # WAS N100CP, SERIAL #: 310Q0219, A 1971 CESSNA CE-310Q. THE AIRCRAFT IS EQUIPPED WITH CONTINENTAL IO-520NB TURBOCHARGED, FUEL INJECTED, SIX CYLINDER, AIR COOLED ENGINES THAT DEVELOP A MAXIMUM OF 310 BRAKE HORSE POWER (BHP) PER SIDE. WEATHER AT THE TIME WAS VFR. THE AIRCRAFT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED. THE PIC RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES AND WAS RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL THE SAME DAY.
THE PIC'S ACCOUNT OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ACCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
"TAKE-OFF AND CLIMB TO 13,500'MSL WERE NORMAL. CRUISE WAS NORMAL WITH POWER SETTINGS OF 27" MP AND 2200 RPM. FLIGHT FOLLOWING WAS THROUGH MIAMI CENTER. ABOUT 2 HOURS INTO THE FLIGHT I STARTED A DESCENT AND RETURN TO KBOW. DESCENT WAS NORMAL AT ABOUT 1000-1500 FPM, WITH POWER SETTINGS OF 20-22"MP AND 2200RPM. FLIGHT FOLLOWING WAS TERMINATED AND I CONTACTED BARTOW TOWER EAST OF THE AIRPORT AND AT ABOUT 7000' MSL. I NEGOTIATED TO CONTINUE DESCENDING AND CIRCLING THE AIRSPACE. I MADE ONE "LAP" AROUND THE OUTER EDGE OF THE AIRSPACE TO ENTER THE LEFT TRAFFIC PATTERN FOR RUNWAY 9L. REACHING MID-FIELD I REPORTED MY POSITION, AS REQUESTED, AND RECEIVED LANDING CLEARANCE. AT THIS TIME I EXTENDED APPROACH FLAPS AND LANDING GEAR; POWER SETTINGS WERE 20" MP AND 2200RPM; AIRSPEED ABOUT 120KIAS; ALTITUDE ABOUT 1400' MSL AND DESCENDING ABOUT 500 FPM. I MADE A TURN TO BASE, AND AS I ROLLED OUT OF THAT MOVED THE PROP LEVERS TO A HIGHER RPM. AS I DID, THE RIGHT ENGINE LOST POWER, SO BEGAN TO RETURN THE PROP LEVERS TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION AND CHECKED THE FUEL GAUGES. FUEL GAUGES INDICATED AVAILABLE FUEL. THERE WAS NO IMPROVEMENT TO THE POWER ON THE RIGHT ENGINE, SO I MOVED ENGINE CONTROLS FOR BOTH ENGINES TO THEIR MAXIMUM, FULL FORWARD POSITION (OPEN THROTTLE, MAXIMUM RPM, RICH MIXTURE) AND TURNED TOWARD THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD. AT THIS TIME I RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS ALSO NO POWER FROM THE LEFT ENGINE. I REALIZED I WOULD NOT MAKE THE AIRPORT AND BEGAN NAVIGATING TO A SUITABLE LANDING AREA. AS I CONTINUED TOWARD THAT AREA, I MADE A "MAYDAY" CALL. THERE WAS NO STALL OR SPIN, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER THE IMPACT. MY FIRST MEMORY AFTER IMPACT WAS KNEELING IN THE CO-PILOT SEAT, FACING THE REAR OF THE AIRCRAFT."
A FUEL RECEIPT FOR 118.2 GALLONS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO "TOP OFF ALL TANKS" BEFORE THE ACCIDENT FLIGHT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE FBO.
THE AIRCRAFT WAS INSPECTED AT FLORIDA AIR RECOVERY IN JACKSONVILLE, FL WITH NTSB, TEXTRON/CESSNA AND CONTINENTAL MOTORS REPRESENTATIVES IN ATTENDANCE. THE CONTINENTAL REP. CHECKED THE ENGINES FOR OBVIOUS ISSUES WITH NOTHING FOUND, ALL INSPECTED ENGINE PARAMETERS APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. NO OTHER OBVIOUS CAUSES FOR DUAL ENGINE FAILURE WERE DISCOVERED DURING THE AIRCRAFT TEARDOWN.
THE CESSNA 310 PILOT OPERATING HANDBOOK (POH) INDICATES ALL TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH FUEL SELECTORS ON THE MAIN TANKS. AFTER TAKEOFF MAIN TANKS ARE TO BE USED FOR THE FIRST 60 MINUTES AND BEFORE ANY AUXILIARY TANK USE. MAIN TANKS HAVE A USABLE CAPACITY OF 50 GALLONS PER SIDE. THE PIC STATED HE USES 30 GALLONS AN HOUR TOTAL FUEL FLOW AS A PLANNING FACTOR. THE AIRCRAFT WAS EQUIPPED WITH AUXILIARY TANKS WHICH HAVE A USABLE CAPACITY OF 15 GALLONS A SIDE. THE POH FURTHER ELABORATES ON THE POST TAKEOFF AUXILIARY TANK USE LIMITATION AS SUCH: SINCE THE AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS ARE DESIGNED FOR CRUISING FLIGHT, THEY ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH PUMPS AND OPERATIONS NEAR THE GROUND (BELOW 1000 FEET) USING AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS IS NOT RECOMMENDED BECAUSE OF THIS LIMITATION.
IT WAS NOTED THAT BOTH FUEL SELECTORS APPEARED TO BE IN THE AUXILIARY TANK POSITION DURING POST-CRASH INVESTIGATION/PHOTOS. THE PIC WAS QUERIED AS TO FUEL SEQUENCES/TANKS USED PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT BUT HAS NOT COMMENTED TO DATE.
PILOT INDUCED FUEL STARVATION DUE TO A FUEL SELECTOR OR OTHER SWITCH ERROR CANNOT BE RULED OUT.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.