20160906018209A

Accident · Destroyed

FAA accident report · Sikorsky S-61N · Palm Bay, FL · September 6, 2016

Date
September 6, 2016 · 13:40 local
Place
Palm Bay, FL
Airport
Melbourne Interational Airport
Phase of flight
Unknown
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Operator
39LA
Damage
Destroyed
Aircraft
N805AR
NTSB investigation
NTSBERA16FA311
Reported as
Sikorsky S-61N
Reported engine
General Electric CT-58
People aboard
2
Fatal injuries
3
Other injuries
0
Pilot’s certificates
Airline transport, commercial pilot, flight instructor
Pilot’s flight hours
6,053 total1,533 in this make and model39 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

On September 6, 2016, at approximately 1340 eastern daylight time, a Sikorsky S-61N, N805AR, was destroyed when it impacted the ground near Palm Bay, Florida. The accident site was located approximately 8 NM southwest of the Melbourne international airport. The aircraft was registered to ep aviation, LLC and operated by aar airlift group, inc. according to the company, and maintenance records, the purpose of the flight was to conduct a functional check flight (fcf) because the aircrafts fore/aft pitch servo was recently removed and replaced.

The FAA iic arrived on scene at approximately 1530 eastern daylight time, on September 6, 2016. Upon arrival on scene the aircraft wreckage was situated upright in a field with little to no debris path noted. The wreckage was confined to one central location. The main fuselage, cockpit, and all areas forward of the tail boom were consumed by fire. There were three occupants on board who were all fatally injured. The main and tail rotor blades were still attached at their respective root hubs. The flight control positions were considered to be unreliable due to extensive impact forces, and fire damage. Continuity between the transmission and the tail-rotor gearbox was established.

The Sikorsky S-61N, serial number 61717, was manufactured in 1974. It was powered by two general electric, CT58-140-2, 1500-horsepower turbo shaft engines. The helicopter was maintained under a continuous airworthiness program. Its most recent inspection was a phase five check, which was completed on August 25, 2016. The helicopter had flown about 1.2 hours, from the time of the last inspection, until the accident flight. Those hours comprised of two previous uneventful fcf flights during the day of the accident.

The second-in-command's (SIC)regulatory check ride date could not be verified due to the fact that records were not available to review. The SIC was a new hire with the company who recently seperated from the armed services. According to company officials at aar, and a signed memo (included in the accident package) training was completed with the SIC.

There were several witnesses that provided statements and videos to the Palm Bay police department; however, none had actually witnessed the accident sequence of the flight. The witnesses provided video of the accident aircraft performing low altitude hovers and maneuvers in the local area prior to the accident sequence taking place.

On October 12, 2016 the cockpit voice recorder was analyzed at the NTSB in Washington d.c. the transcript has not yet been released.

Aar is required to maintain N805AR under a continuous aircraft maintenance program (camp) which is mandated by 14 CFR part 135.425. As a result of a thorough review of recent maintenance records, several deficiencies were noted with the documentation of maintenance performed, as well as some maintenance being performed contrary to aar's camp and the aircraft maintenance manual. A comprehensive list of deficiencies are included with the accident package.

On January 17, 2017 this report was amended to include the primary factor, which is noted as "loss of power". Following a review of the sound spectrum data, received from the cockpit voice recorder, approximately 9 seconds before the end of the recording, both engines noise levels began to decay rapidly; subsequently the rotor speed RPM sound declined in a similar fashion.

As of this time, information is still being gathered. As more information is received this report will be updated.

As the FAA filed it

ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2016, AT APPROXIMATELY 1340 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME, A SIKORSKY S-61N, N805AR, WAS DESTROYED WHEN IT IMPACTED THE GROUND NEAR PALM BAY, FLORIDA. THE ACCIDENT SITE WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 8 NM SOUTHWEST OF THE MELBOURNE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE AIRCRAFT WAS REGISTERED TO EP AVIATION, LLC AND OPERATED BY AAR AIRLIFT GROUP, INC. ACCORDING TO THE COMPANY, AND MAINTENANCE RECORDS, THE PURPOSE OF THE FLIGHT WAS TO CONDUCT A FUNCTIONAL CHECK FLIGHT (FCF) BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFTS FORE/AFT PITCH SERVO WAS RECENTLY REMOVED AND REPLACED.

THE FAA IIC ARRIVED ON SCENE AT APPROXIMATELY 1530 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME, ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2016. UPON ARRIVAL ON SCENE THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE WAS SITUATED UPRIGHT IN A FIELD WITH LITTLE TO NO DEBRIS PATH NOTED. THE WRECKAGE WAS CONFINED TO ONE CENTRAL LOCATION. THE MAIN FUSELAGE, COCKPIT, AND ALL AREAS FORWARD OF THE TAIL BOOM WERE CONSUMED BY FIRE. THERE WERE THREE OCCUPANTS ON BOARD WHO WERE ALL FATALLY INJURED. THE MAIN AND TAIL ROTOR BLADES WERE STILL ATTACHED AT THEIR RESPECTIVE ROOT HUBS. THE FLIGHT CONTROL POSITIONS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE UNRELIABLE DUE TO EXTENSIVE IMPACT FORCES, AND FIRE DAMAGE. CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE TRANSMISSION AND THE TAIL-ROTOR GEARBOX WAS ESTABLISHED.

THE SIKORSKY S-61N, SERIAL NUMBER 61717, WAS MANUFACTURED IN 1974. IT WAS POWERED BY TWO GENERAL ELECTRIC, CT58-140-2, 1500-HORSEPOWER TURBO SHAFT ENGINES. THE HELICOPTER WAS MAINTAINED UNDER A CONTINUOUS AIRWORTHINESS PROGRAM. ITS MOST RECENT INSPECTION WAS A PHASE FIVE CHECK, WHICH WAS COMPLETED ON AUGUST 25, 2016. THE HELICOPTER HAD FLOWN ABOUT 1.2 HOURS, FROM THE TIME OF THE LAST INSPECTION, UNTIL THE ACCIDENT FLIGHT. THOSE HOURS COMPRISED OF TWO PREVIOUS UNEVENTFUL FCF FLIGHTS DURING THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT.

THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND'S (SIC)REGULATORY CHECK RIDE DATE COULD NOT BE VERIFIED DUE TO THE FACT THAT RECORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO REVIEW. THE SIC WAS A NEW HIRE WITH THE COMPANY WHO RECENTLY SEPERATED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES. ACCORDING TO COMPANY OFFICIALS AT AAR, AND A SIGNED MEMO (INCLUDED IN THE ACCIDENT PACKAGE) TRAINING WAS COMPLETED WITH THE SIC.

THERE WERE SEVERAL WITNESSES THAT PROVIDED STATEMENTS AND VIDEOS TO THE PALM BAY POLICE DEPARTMENT; HOWEVER, NONE HAD ACTUALLY WITNESSED THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE OF THE FLIGHT. THE WITNESSES PROVIDED VIDEO OF THE ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT PERFORMING LOW ALTITUDE HOVERS AND MANEUVERS IN THE LOCAL AREA PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE TAKING PLACE.

ON OCTOBER 12, 2016 THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER WAS ANALYZED AT THE NTSB IN WASHINGTON D.C. THE TRANSCRIPT HAS NOT YET BEEN RELEASED.

AAR IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN N805AR UNDER A CONTINUOUS AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (CAMP) WHICH IS MANDATED BY 14 CFR PART 135.425. AS A RESULT OF A THOROUGH REVIEW OF RECENT MAINTENANCE RECORDS, SEVERAL DEFICIENCIES WERE NOTED WITH THE DOCUMENTATION OF MAINTENANCE PERFORMED, AS WELL AS SOME MAINTENANCE BEING PERFORMED CONTRARY TO AAR'S CAMP AND THE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL. A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF DEFICIENCIES ARE INCLUDED WITH THE ACCIDENT PACKAGE.

ON JANUARY 17, 2017 THIS REPORT WAS AMENDED TO INCLUDE THE PRIMARY FACTOR, WHICH IS NOTED AS "LOSS OF POWER". FOLLOWING A REVIEW OF THE SOUND SPECTRUM DATA, RECEIVED FROM THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER, APPROXIMATELY 9 SECONDS BEFORE THE END OF THE RECORDING, BOTH ENGINES NOISE LEVELS BEGAN TO DECAY RAPIDLY; SUBSEQUENTLY THE ROTOR SPEED RPM SOUND DECLINED IN A SIMILAR FASHION.

AS OF THIS TIME, INFORMATION IS STILL BEING GATHERED. AS MORE INFORMATION IS RECEIVED THIS REPORT WILL BE UPDATED.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.