20170129005389A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Cessna 180B · Chakachchakacha, AK · January 29, 2017

Date
January 29, 2017 · 15:00 local
Place
Chakachchakacha, AK
Phase of flight
Landing: Rollout
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N5222E
NTSB investigation
NTSBGAA17CA134
Reported as
Cessna 180B
Reported engine
Continental O-470 series
People aboard
3
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0
Pilot’s certificate
Private pilot
Pilot’s flight hours
300 total80 in this make and model10 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

List of events 29JAN2017

I departed lake hood strip with my daughter and father in law for kenai. My departure notification to family via text failed to include expected route or ETA and I chose not to file a VFR flight plan with fss. I diverted from my routine flight profile to sightsee and test conditions at the Mt. Spur unimproved strip on the north side of chakachamna valley, I failed to notify family of the change.

I dragged the landing area 3 times before deciding on the fourth pass to attempt a full stop landing. This decision to transition from inspecting the strip to full stop landing at the site was a critical decision that should have been given intense risk management consideration.

On 3 point touchdown at flaps 40 and estimated 40MPH I found that the snow was drifted deeper than expected and deceleration was too rapid. My initial increase in power was not effective and I pulled power off as we began to dig in. The unexpected depth of snow drift did not allow me to keep the tail down as we rolled out and began to nose over.

The propeller and nose cone dug in for about 2-3 feet until we inverted and slid the final 8-10 inches to full stop. Initial assessment of damage was brief and did not reveal anything beyond propeller, tail strobe and trim cap of vertical stabilizer. I manually activated the ELT as soon as we had all checked for injury and checked for fire hazard. All 3 of us were uninjured. VHF com radio and cell phone were attempted to contact multiple aircraft. Sheltering in the airplane with shared sleeping bag augmented by engine cover was chosen after a fire was established away from the plane. Coast guard rescue helicopter was estimated 27 hrs later after extensive search efforts.

I have identified areas for improvement in my personal training and preparation as:

1. Flight plan quality

2. Verbal risk assessment

3. Soft field landing

4. Survival gear quality and familiarity

Sincerely,

As the FAA filed it

LIST OF EVENTS 29JAN2017

I DEPARTED LAKE HOOD STRIP WITH MY DAUGHTER AND FATHER IN LAW FOR KENAI. MY DEPARTURE NOTIFICATION TO FAMILY VIA TEXT FAILED TO INCLUDE EXPECTED ROUTE OR ETA AND I CHOSE NOT TO FILE A VFR FLIGHT PLAN WITH FSS. I DIVERTED FROM MY ROUTINE FLIGHT PROFILE TO SIGHTSEE AND TEST CONDITIONS AT THE MT. SPUR UNIMPROVED STRIP ON THE NORTH SIDE OF CHAKACHAMNA VALLEY, I FAILED TO NOTIFY FAMILY OF THE CHANGE.

I DRAGGED THE LANDING AREA 3 TIMES BEFORE DECIDING ON THE FOURTH PASS TO ATTEMPT A FULL STOP LANDING. THIS DECISION TO TRANSITION FROM INSPECTING THE STRIP TO FULL STOP LANDING AT THE SITE WAS A CRITICAL DECISION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN INTENSE RISK MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATION.

ON 3 POINT TOUCHDOWN AT FLAPS 40 AND ESTIMATED 40MPH I FOUND THAT THE SNOW WAS DRIFTED DEEPER THAN EXPECTED AND DECELERATION WAS TOO RAPID. MY INITIAL INCREASE IN POWER WAS NOT EFFECTIVE AND I PULLED POWER OFF AS WE BEGAN TO DIG IN. THE UNEXPECTED DEPTH OF SNOW DRIFT DID NOT ALLOW ME TO KEEP THE TAIL DOWN AS WE ROLLED OUT AND BEGAN TO NOSE OVER.

THE PROPELLER AND NOSE CONE DUG IN FOR ABOUT 2-3 FEET UNTIL WE INVERTED AND SLID THE FINAL 8-10 INCHES TO FULL STOP. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE WAS BRIEF AND DID NOT REVEAL ANYTHING BEYOND PROPELLER, TAIL STROBE AND TRIM CAP OF VERTICAL STABILIZER. I MANUALLY ACTIVATED THE ELT AS SOON AS WE HAD ALL CHECKED FOR INJURY AND CHECKED FOR FIRE HAZARD. ALL 3 OF US WERE UNINJURED. VHF COM RADIO AND CELL PHONE WERE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT MULTIPLE AIRCRAFT. SHELTERING IN THE AIRPLANE WITH SHARED SLEEPING BAG AUGMENTED BY ENGINE COVER WAS CHOSEN AFTER A FIRE WAS ESTABLISHED AWAY FROM THE PLANE. COAST GUARD RESCUE HELICOPTER WAS ESTIMATED 27 HRS LATER AFTER EXTENSIVE SEARCH EFFORTS.

I HAVE IDENTIFIED AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MY PERSONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION AS:

1. FLIGHT PLAN QUALITY

2. VERBAL RISK ASSESSMENT

3. SOFT FIELD LANDING

4. SURVIVAL GEAR QUALITY AND FAMILIARITY

SINCERELY,

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.

Other reports on N5222E · 1

Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.