What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
Weather data: 1453Z winds 5 kt @ 150, clr 10 sm visibility, temp 14 c / dewpoint 07, alt 30.25
From the GL07 ops inspector:
1. Why did the deviation occur? Failure to control aircraft on touchdown due to foot on rudder prior to nose wheel touchdown
2. What are the results of the root cause analysis (rca)? Initial CFI training did not include touchdown hazard training
3. What were the identified hazards or ineffective risk controls, including behaviors that led to the deviation? CFI made a last-minute decision to instruct student on a forward slip to landing while on final approach to 9R. The maneuver was not briefed prior to the lesson and possible hazards were not discussed prior to the maneuver. Both CFI and student were low time. Student was also shorter in stature than the CFI and was unable to view runway over aircraft nose on touchdown.
4. What was done to communicate or transfer any non-regulatory concerns or potential risks? I initiated an sit-down conference with the chief and assistant chief instructors at osu along with the CFI and the student to discuss concerns, causes and corrective actions for all involved (flight was conducted under 141 training)
5. Mitigations/corrective actions taken by the airman/organization: retraining for both the CFI and student were accomplished. 141 school is adding touchdown hazards to their CFI curriculum.
6. Mitigations/corrective actions taken by the federal aviation administration (FAA): counseling provided to CFI, student, and flight school
7. Controls, monitoring, and feedback required to mitigate risks and ensure compliance: retraining for both the CFI and student are needed. 141 school needs to add touchdown hazards to their CFI curriculum.
8. How was the problem corrected? Retraining for both the CFI and student were accomplished. 141 school is adding touchdown hazards to their CFI curriculum.
As the FAA filed it
WEATHER DATA: 1453Z WINDS 5 KT @ 150, CLR 10 SM VISIBILITY, TEMP 14 C / DEWPOINT 07, ALT 30.25
FROM THE GL07 OPS INSPECTOR:
1. WHY DID THE DEVIATION OCCUR? FAILURE TO CONTROL AIRCRAFT ON TOUCHDOWN DUE TO FOOT ON RUDDER PRIOR TO NOSE WHEEL TOUCHDOWN
2. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF THE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS (RCA)? INITIAL CFI TRAINING DID NOT INCLUDE TOUCHDOWN HAZARD TRAINING
3. WHAT WERE THE IDENTIFIED HAZARDS OR INEFFECTIVE RISK CONTROLS, INCLUDING BEHAVIORS THAT LED TO THE DEVIATION? CFI MADE A LAST-MINUTE DECISION TO INSTRUCT STUDENT ON A FORWARD SLIP TO LANDING WHILE ON FINAL APPROACH TO 9R. THE MANEUVER WAS NOT BRIEFED PRIOR TO THE LESSON AND POSSIBLE HAZARDS WERE NOT DISCUSSED PRIOR TO THE MANEUVER. BOTH CFI AND STUDENT WERE LOW TIME. STUDENT WAS ALSO SHORTER IN STATURE THAN THE CFI AND WAS UNABLE TO VIEW RUNWAY OVER AIRCRAFT NOSE ON TOUCHDOWN.
4. WHAT WAS DONE TO COMMUNICATE OR TRANSFER ANY NON-REGULATORY CONCERNS OR POTENTIAL RISKS? I INITIATED AN SIT-DOWN CONFERENCE WITH THE CHIEF AND ASSISTANT CHIEF INSTRUCTORS AT OSU ALONG WITH THE CFI AND THE STUDENT TO DISCUSS CONCERNS, CAUSES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR ALL INVOLVED (FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED UNDER 141 TRAINING)
5. MITIGATIONS/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE AIRMAN/ORGANIZATION: RETRAINING FOR BOTH THE CFI AND STUDENT WERE ACCOMPLISHED. 141 SCHOOL IS ADDING TOUCHDOWN HAZARDS TO THEIR CFI CURRICULUM.
6. MITIGATIONS/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA): COUNSELING PROVIDED TO CFI, STUDENT, AND FLIGHT SCHOOL
7. CONTROLS, MONITORING, AND FEEDBACK REQUIRED TO MITIGATE RISKS AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE: RETRAINING FOR BOTH THE CFI AND STUDENT ARE NEEDED. 141 SCHOOL NEEDS TO ADD TOUCHDOWN HAZARDS TO THEIR CFI CURRICULUM.
8. HOW WAS THE PROBLEM CORRECTED? RETRAINING FOR BOTH THE CFI AND STUDENT WERE ACCOMPLISHED. 141 SCHOOL IS ADDING TOUCHDOWN HAZARDS TO THEIR CFI CURRICULUM.