What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
On 14 aug 2019, the PIC on aircraft N19AM, was instructing a student of aviation performance solutions (a part 141 school), on a part 91 flight. The PIC stated that he departed kiwa at 0625 MST. The flight was conducted in a designated training area and the aircraft engine failure occurred at approximately 0715 MST, roughly 9NM ese of kiwa. Weather was vfr/vmc and altitude at the time of engine failure was approximately 6700? AGL. The PIC had just completed a rolling maneuver demonstration as part of the upset training profile. Upon roll-out, the PIC stated that the engine suddenly lost power. He immediately switched the fuel selector valve from the wings position to the center acrobatic (acro) fuel tank position, which was reading just below full fuel. He then stated that he turned the aircraft towards kiwa, gained as much altitude as the remaining airspeed and engine performance would allow, and set up a glide profile at 80 KIAS. The PIC assessed that the engine was still operating under partial power (~1800 RPM) so he performed the poh-prescribed emergency procedures for engine failure in flight, contacted kiwa tower and declared an emergency. The PIC stated that he noted that there was sufficient fuel on-board for the airplane to safely return to the airport. The emergency fuel boost pump was confirmed to be on. The PIC also attempted to get engine power back by switching the fuel selector back and forth between both fuel tanks (acro and wings), with no effect. The PIC then left the selector valve on the fullest tank (acro). The PIC stated that he confirmed the mixture was set to full rich and the ignition both position was selected. Other than an apparent loss of power response experienced by the aircraft, the engine instruments otherwise indicated normal operating temperatures, pressures, and quantities consistent with a lower engine speed (~1800 RPM). The PIC attempted to ascertain power status and response by manipulating the throttle. There was no indicated engine response when moving the throttle from idle to full power and back (several times). Approximately 4 minutes after power loss was encountered, and approximately one minute prior to touchdown, an unexpected further reduction in engine performance began to occur (to ~1500 RPM). The PIC concluded further remedial action would be required to sustain the glide profile required to land at kiwa. The PIC placed the propeller control in the ?feather? Position (coarse pitch/low drag). However, it was noted that when this was attempted, the propeller RPM reduced but the propeller blades remained in the high pitch/high drag position. The PIC felt the aircraft slow and noted an increase in rate of altitude loss. The PIC returned the propeller control to full forward and reestablished the 80 KIAS glide profile (this also slowed the descent rate). Propeller RPM continued to decay below 1500 RPM with a subsequent assessment that the kiwa runway could no longer be reached. The pilot immediately transitioned to an off-field emergency forced landing profile, and notified kiwa tower of the situation. After the aircraft had come to a stop, both crew members egressed the aircraft. However, the PIC stated that before exiting the aircraft, he confirmed that all electrics, fuel and power switches were placed in the off/safe/normal positions and that the fuel selector valve was placed in the emergency fuel shutoff position (per the POH). The aircraft was substantially damaged during the landing, including collapsing both main landing gear. Damages to the aircraft also include; substantial to propeller, skin damage to the wings and right wing fuel tank, substantial gear damage.
As the FAA filed it
ON 14 AUG 2019, THE PIC ON AIRCRAFT N19AM, WAS INSTRUCTING A STUDENT OF AVIATION PERFORMANCE SOLUTIONS (A PART 141 SCHOOL), ON A PART 91 FLIGHT. THE PIC STATED THAT HE DEPARTED KIWA AT 0625 MST. THE FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED IN A DESIGNATED TRAINING AREA AND THE AIRCRAFT ENGINE FAILURE OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 0715 MST, ROUGHLY 9NM ESE OF KIWA. WEATHER WAS VFR/VMC AND ALTITUDE AT THE TIME OF ENGINE FAILURE WAS APPROXIMATELY 6700? AGL. THE PIC HAD JUST COMPLETED A ROLLING MANEUVER DEMONSTRATION AS PART OF THE UPSET TRAINING PROFILE. UPON ROLL-OUT, THE PIC STATED THAT THE ENGINE SUDDENLY LOST POWER. HE IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE FROM THE WINGS POSITION TO THE CENTER ACROBATIC (ACRO) FUEL TANK POSITION, WHICH WAS READING JUST BELOW FULL FUEL. HE THEN STATED THAT HE TURNED THE AIRCRAFT TOWARDS KIWA, GAINED AS MUCH ALTITUDE AS THE REMAINING AIRSPEED AND ENGINE PERFORMANCE WOULD ALLOW, AND SET UP A GLIDE PROFILE AT 80 KIAS. THE PIC ASSESSED THAT THE ENGINE WAS STILL OPERATING UNDER PARTIAL POWER (~1800 RPM) SO HE PERFORMED THE POH-PRESCRIBED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR ENGINE FAILURE IN FLIGHT, CONTACTED KIWA TOWER AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY. THE PIC STATED THAT HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT FUEL ON-BOARD FOR THE AIRPLANE TO SAFELY RETURN TO THE AIRPORT. THE EMERGENCY FUEL BOOST PUMP WAS CONFIRMED TO BE ON. THE PIC ALSO ATTEMPTED TO GET ENGINE POWER BACK BY SWITCHING THE FUEL SELECTOR BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN BOTH FUEL TANKS (ACRO AND WINGS), WITH NO EFFECT. THE PIC THEN LEFT THE SELECTOR VALVE ON THE FULLEST TANK (ACRO). THE PIC STATED THAT HE CONFIRMED THE MIXTURE WAS SET TO FULL RICH AND THE IGNITION BOTH POSITION WAS SELECTED. OTHER THAN AN APPARENT LOSS OF POWER RESPONSE EXPERIENCED BY THE AIRCRAFT, THE ENGINE INSTRUMENTS OTHERWISE INDICATED NORMAL OPERATING TEMPERATURES, PRESSURES, AND QUANTITIES CONSISTENT WITH A LOWER ENGINE SPEED (~1800 RPM). THE PIC ATTEMPTED TO ASCERTAIN POWER STATUS AND RESPONSE BY MANIPULATING THE THROTTLE. THERE WAS NO INDICATED ENGINE RESPONSE WHEN MOVING THE THROTTLE FROM IDLE TO FULL POWER AND BACK (SEVERAL TIMES). APPROXIMATELY 4 MINUTES AFTER POWER LOSS WAS ENCOUNTERED, AND APPROXIMATELY ONE MINUTE PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN, AN UNEXPECTED FURTHER REDUCTION IN ENGINE PERFORMANCE BEGAN TO OCCUR (TO ~1500 RPM). THE PIC CONCLUDED FURTHER REMEDIAL ACTION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN THE GLIDE PROFILE REQUIRED TO LAND AT KIWA. THE PIC PLACED THE PROPELLER CONTROL IN THE ?FEATHER? POSITION (COARSE PITCH/LOW DRAG). HOWEVER, IT WAS NOTED THAT WHEN THIS WAS ATTEMPTED, THE PROPELLER RPM REDUCED BUT THE PROPELLER BLADES REMAINED IN THE HIGH PITCH/HIGH DRAG POSITION. THE PIC FELT THE AIRCRAFT SLOW AND NOTED AN INCREASE IN RATE OF ALTITUDE LOSS. THE PIC RETURNED THE PROPELLER CONTROL TO FULL FORWARD AND REESTABLISHED THE 80 KIAS GLIDE PROFILE (THIS ALSO SLOWED THE DESCENT RATE). PROPELLER RPM CONTINUED TO DECAY BELOW 1500 RPM WITH A SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT THAT THE KIWA RUNWAY COULD NO LONGER BE REACHED. THE PILOT IMMEDIATELY TRANSITIONED TO AN OFF-FIELD EMERGENCY FORCED LANDING PROFILE, AND NOTIFIED KIWA TOWER OF THE SITUATION. AFTER THE AIRCRAFT HAD COME TO A STOP, BOTH CREW MEMBERS EGRESSED THE AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, THE PIC STATED THAT BEFORE EXITING THE AIRCRAFT, HE CONFIRMED THAT ALL ELECTRICS, FUEL AND POWER SWITCHES WERE PLACED IN THE OFF/SAFE/NORMAL POSITIONS AND THAT THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE WAS PLACED IN THE EMERGENCY FUEL SHUTOFF POSITION (PER THE POH). THE AIRCRAFT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED DURING THE LANDING, INCLUDING COLLAPSING BOTH MAIN LANDING GEAR. DAMAGES TO THE AIRCRAFT ALSO INCLUDE; SUBSTANTIAL TO PROPELLER, SKIN DAMAGE TO THE WINGS AND RIGHT WING FUEL TANK, SUBSTANTIAL GEAR DAMAGE.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.