What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
The pilot planned a VFR taking off from runway 3R @ pdk airport. There were 5 persons on board, including the pilot.
During the take-off roll, the pilot tried to rotate at vr, yet the aircraft did not rotate, as expected. He then applied moderate to heavy braking where the aircraft's left tire seemed to lock-up and left a skid mark approximately 3500 ft on the runway. The aircraft departed the runway to the left at the intersection rwy 3R & taxiway juliet.
When the aircraft came to a stop, there was minor damage to left wheel assembly and one white taxiway light assembly.
Further investigation of the "ruddervator-system" indicated that a faulty actuator could of been a problem during rotation.
The part was locally tested 2 times. It passed the first test and failed the second test.
The part (a pitch trim actuator, p/n: 2018A10-5) was sent to a 145 repair station (OJ2R) where the part testing was observed by a local FAA inspector.
Once again, the actuator passed the original test, yet it failed the newer/secondary test (which the newer aircraft are subject to during assembly and testing when manufactured).
A service advisory (sa) was issued: Cirrus-SF50, number SA19-21, dated 27 sept 2019, subject: pitch trim tab position. This document
As the FAA filed it
THE PILOT PLANNED A VFR TAKING OFF FROM RUNWAY 3R @ PDK AIRPORT. THERE WERE 5 PERSONS ON BOARD, INCLUDING THE PILOT.
DURING THE TAKE-OFF ROLL, THE PILOT TRIED TO ROTATE AT VR, YET THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT ROTATE, AS EXPECTED. HE THEN APPLIED MODERATE TO HEAVY BRAKING WHERE THE AIRCRAFT'S LEFT TIRE SEEMED TO LOCK-UP AND LEFT A SKID MARK APPROXIMATELY 3500 FT ON THE RUNWAY. THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED THE RUNWAY TO THE LEFT AT THE INTERSECTION RWY 3R & TAXIWAY JULIET.
WHEN THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO A STOP, THERE WAS MINOR DAMAGE TO LEFT WHEEL ASSEMBLY AND ONE WHITE TAXIWAY LIGHT ASSEMBLY.
FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE "RUDDERVATOR-SYSTEM" INDICATED THAT A FAULTY ACTUATOR COULD OF BEEN A PROBLEM DURING ROTATION.
THE PART WAS LOCALLY TESTED 2 TIMES. IT PASSED THE FIRST TEST AND FAILED THE SECOND TEST.
THE PART (A PITCH TRIM ACTUATOR, P/N: 2018A10-5) WAS SENT TO A 145 REPAIR STATION (OJ2R) WHERE THE PART TESTING WAS OBSERVED BY A LOCAL FAA INSPECTOR.
ONCE AGAIN, THE ACTUATOR PASSED THE ORIGINAL TEST, YET IT FAILED THE NEWER/SECONDARY TEST (WHICH THE NEWER AIRCRAFT ARE SUBJECT TO DURING ASSEMBLY AND TESTING WHEN MANUFACTURED).
A SERVICE ADVISORY (SA) WAS ISSUED: CIRRUS-SF50, NUMBER SA19-21, DATED 27 SEPT 2019, SUBJECT: PITCH TRIM TAB POSITION. THIS DOCUMENT