What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
The accident occurred during a training flight on 08/18/2020 at dvt. The private pilot certificated student was practicing short approaches, accompanied by a CFI, in preparation for a progress check as part of a 14 CFR part 141 commercial course. During one of multiple short approaches, the pilot misjudged the aiming point and flared too early, resulting in a hard landing. The student and CFI exited the aircraft, inspected the aircraft for damage and having found none, did not report the hard landing. On 08/19/2020, another flight crew, while performing a pre-flight inspection, squawked the aircraft due to difficulty moving the elevator and not being able to install the gust lock. A subsequent inspection by maintenance personnel revealed damage to the firewall and tunnel structure behind the firewall. The damage to the structure behind the firewall caused binding of the elevator cables.
Both the do and the chief flight instructor counseled the flight crew of the accident flight on 08/26/2020. This counseling was not documented.
On 09/11/2020, at the suggestion of the FAA iic, the chief flight instructor of the flight school provided additional counseling to the crew of the subject aircraft. This counseling was documented and submitted to the fso via a document signed and dated by the pilot, CFI, and the chief flight instructor. This counseling covered the following topics:
? What happened: a hard landing while attempting the power off 180* accuracy approach required by the commercial single-engine acs.
? Cause: the student attempted to stretch his glide to ?make his spot?, flared too high and had a hard landing.
? Prevention discussed for the instructor and student: pay more attention to the ?feel? Of the aircraft. Be aware that if ?sinking? Is felt, it is time to lower the nose, add power, and perform a go-around. Also be aware of the pitch attitude of the aircraft, knowing that in the flare it should never go beyond an approximate vy pitch attitude.
? As stated in the student and instructor statements, after the hard landing they went to a full stop, got out and looked at the aircraft and determined it was okay to fly. Today we discussed that pilots cannot see everything that needs to be observed in order to determine if an aircraft is safe to fly after a hard landing.
We discussed the fact that by not being qualified to determine the extent of the damage, and not squawking the aircraft for a hard landing, the pilot and instructor jeopardized the safety of those who were scheduled to fly in the aircraft after them.
After conferring with an ops flm, FAA iic has decided that no further action is needed and that the counseling provide by the flight school is an adequate corrective action for this training mistake.
As the FAA filed it
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED DURING A TRAINING FLIGHT ON 08/18/2020 AT DVT. THE PRIVATE PILOT CERTIFICATED STUDENT WAS PRACTICING SHORT APPROACHES, ACCOMPANIED BY A CFI, IN PREPARATION FOR A PROGRESS CHECK AS PART OF A 14 CFR PART 141 COMMERCIAL COURSE. DURING ONE OF MULTIPLE SHORT APPROACHES, THE PILOT MISJUDGED THE AIMING POINT AND FLARED TOO EARLY, RESULTING IN A HARD LANDING. THE STUDENT AND CFI EXITED THE AIRCRAFT, INSPECTED THE AIRCRAFT FOR DAMAGE AND HAVING FOUND NONE, DID NOT REPORT THE HARD LANDING. ON 08/19/2020, ANOTHER FLIGHT CREW, WHILE PERFORMING A PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION, SQUAWKED THE AIRCRAFT DUE TO DIFFICULTY MOVING THE ELEVATOR AND NOT BEING ABLE TO INSTALL THE GUST LOCK. A SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REVEALED DAMAGE TO THE FIREWALL AND TUNNEL STRUCTURE BEHIND THE FIREWALL. THE DAMAGE TO THE STRUCTURE BEHIND THE FIREWALL CAUSED BINDING OF THE ELEVATOR CABLES.
BOTH THE DO AND THE CHIEF FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR COUNSELED THE FLIGHT CREW OF THE ACCIDENT FLIGHT ON 08/26/2020. THIS COUNSELING WAS NOT DOCUMENTED.
ON 09/11/2020, AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE FAA IIC, THE CHIEF FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR OF THE FLIGHT SCHOOL PROVIDED ADDITIONAL COUNSELING TO THE CREW OF THE SUBJECT AIRCRAFT. THIS COUNSELING WAS DOCUMENTED AND SUBMITTED TO THE FSO VIA A DOCUMENT SIGNED AND DATED BY THE PILOT, CFI, AND THE CHIEF FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR. THIS COUNSELING COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:
? WHAT HAPPENED: A HARD LANDING WHILE ATTEMPTING THE POWER OFF 180* ACCURACY APPROACH REQUIRED BY THE COMMERCIAL SINGLE-ENGINE ACS.
? CAUSE: THE STUDENT ATTEMPTED TO STRETCH HIS GLIDE TO ?MAKE HIS SPOT?, FLARED TOO HIGH AND HAD A HARD LANDING.
? PREVENTION DISCUSSED FOR THE INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT: PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE ?FEEL? OF THE AIRCRAFT. BE AWARE THAT IF ?SINKING? IS FELT, IT IS TIME TO LOWER THE NOSE, ADD POWER, AND PERFORM A GO-AROUND. ALSO BE AWARE OF THE PITCH ATTITUDE OF THE AIRCRAFT, KNOWING THAT IN THE FLARE IT SHOULD NEVER GO BEYOND AN APPROXIMATE VY PITCH ATTITUDE.
? AS STATED IN THE STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR STATEMENTS, AFTER THE HARD LANDING THEY WENT TO A FULL STOP, GOT OUT AND LOOKED AT THE AIRCRAFT AND DETERMINED IT WAS OKAY TO FLY. TODAY WE DISCUSSED THAT PILOTS CANNOT SEE EVERYTHING THAT NEEDS TO BE OBSERVED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF AN AIRCRAFT IS SAFE TO FLY AFTER A HARD LANDING.
WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT BY NOT BEING QUALIFIED TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE, AND NOT SQUAWKING THE AIRCRAFT FOR A HARD LANDING, THE PILOT AND INSTRUCTOR JEOPARDIZED THE SAFETY OF THOSE WHO WERE SCHEDULED TO FLY IN THE AIRCRAFT AFTER THEM.
AFTER CONFERRING WITH AN OPS FLM, FAA IIC HAS DECIDED THAT NO FURTHER ACTION IS NEEDED AND THAT THE COUNSELING PROVIDE BY THE FLIGHT SCHOOL IS AN ADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THIS TRAINING MISTAKE.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.