What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
N759DL a Cessna 182Q s/n 18265910 lost all roll authority when the flaps were extending during a normal approach to land at kxsa. This is not the first time this type of incident has occurred (see ac 43-16A pdf pg. 5) which presents an urgent concern for public safety. The scenario described in the attached ac is almost a carbon copy of what occurred to N759DL except that it occurred on the right flap. The flap track support brackets (p/n 1221010-13 & -14) are inherently hard to examine during preventative maintenance due their location inside the flap cove. As FAR as I can tell, an undetected crack developed on the right hand flap support bracket, thus sufficient clearance between the upper radiuses of the flap attach arm and the bracket was reduced. It appears that the upper radius of the flap attach arm chaffed on the lower side of the flap support bracket for an unknown amount of cycles prior to the flap arm upper radius migrated above the bracket causing the flap to jam. This premature jamming caused the deformation of the flap skins and lateral movement of the flap as the flap motor continued until it reached its stop limit switch. The deformation was of such extent that the outboard end of the r/h flap bound with the inboard side of the r/h aileron. Fortunately, the ailerons were seized in the neutral position in this case and the pilot was able to land utilizing only the rudder for directional control. The flap tracks and rollers were dimensionally checked and found within limits. Additionally, sb SEB95-3 kit sk 180-44 was complied with on N759DL in the past which provides shoulder washers for improved flap alignment, but pertains to the flap rollers potentially damaging the flap assembly support arms and does not address potential damage to the support brackets affected here. This case was sent to: privacy data omitted
Continued operational safety, wichita aco branch
Compliance & airworthiness division
Aircraft certification service
Tel: privacy data omitted
Email: privacy data omitted
privacy data omitted Stated he sent my email to the flight control and airframe engineers whom cover this model of aircraft. I have not received any further correspondence as of 07/13/2021.
As the FAA filed it
N759DL A CESSNA 182Q S/N 18265910 LOST ALL ROLL AUTHORITY WHEN THE FLAPS WERE EXTENDING DURING A NORMAL APPROACH TO LAND AT KXSA. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED (SEE AC 43-16A PDF PG. 5) WHICH PRESENTS AN URGENT CONCERN FOR PUBLIC SAFETY. THE SCENARIO DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED AC IS ALMOST A CARBON COPY OF WHAT OCCURRED TO N759DL EXCEPT THAT IT OCCURRED ON THE RIGHT FLAP. THE FLAP TRACK SUPPORT BRACKETS (P/N 1221010-13 & -14) ARE INHERENTLY HARD TO EXAMINE DURING PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE DUE THEIR LOCATION INSIDE THE FLAP COVE. AS FAR AS I CAN TELL, AN UNDETECTED CRACK DEVELOPED ON THE RIGHT HAND FLAP SUPPORT BRACKET, THUS SUFFICIENT CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE UPPER RADIUSES OF THE FLAP ATTACH ARM AND THE BRACKET WAS REDUCED. IT APPEARS THAT THE UPPER RADIUS OF THE FLAP ATTACH ARM CHAFFED ON THE LOWER SIDE OF THE FLAP SUPPORT BRACKET FOR AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF CYCLES PRIOR TO THE FLAP ARM UPPER RADIUS MIGRATED ABOVE THE BRACKET CAUSING THE FLAP TO JAM. THIS PREMATURE JAMMING CAUSED THE DEFORMATION OF THE FLAP SKINS AND LATERAL MOVEMENT OF THE FLAP AS THE FLAP MOTOR CONTINUED UNTIL IT REACHED ITS STOP LIMIT SWITCH. THE DEFORMATION WAS OF SUCH EXTENT THAT THE OUTBOARD END OF THE R/H FLAP BOUND WITH THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE R/H AILERON. FORTUNATELY, THE AILERONS WERE SEIZED IN THE NEUTRAL POSITION IN THIS CASE AND THE PILOT WAS ABLE TO LAND UTILIZING ONLY THE RUDDER FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL. THE FLAP TRACKS AND ROLLERS WERE DIMENSIONALLY CHECKED AND FOUND WITHIN LIMITS. ADDITIONALLY, SB SEB95-3 KIT SK 180-44 WAS COMPLIED WITH ON N759DL IN THE PAST WHICH PROVIDES SHOULDER WASHERS FOR IMPROVED FLAP ALIGNMENT, BUT PERTAINS TO THE FLAP ROLLERS POTENTIALLY DAMAGING THE FLAP ASSEMBLY SUPPORT ARMS AND DOES NOT ADDRESS POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE SUPPORT BRACKETS AFFECTED HERE. THIS CASE WAS SENT TO: ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^
CONTINUED OPERATIONAL SAFETY, WICHITA ACO BRANCH
COMPLIANCE & AIRWORTHINESS DIVISION
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE
TEL: ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^
EMAIL: ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^
^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ STATED HE SENT MY EMAIL TO THE FLIGHT CONTROL AND AIRFRAME ENGINEERS WHOM COVER THIS MODEL OF AIRCRAFT. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE AS OF 07/13/2021.