What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
On 6/12/2021,privacy data omitted a Boeing 737-800, was departing Guadalajara, Mexico (Mmgl). During takeoff roll, a master caution and amber pack light presented at 139 KTS. V1 was 151 KTS. The captain performed a rejected takeoff (rto). This caused all four brakes, six tires, and one axle to be replaced due to heat exposure damage. The aircraft ferried back to seattle, WA for additional maintenance.
The captain had a 13,000 foot runway and more than enough time to mentally analyze the problem and continue as per the Boeing training. The captain made the rejected takeoff correctly except for the wrong reason. Due to the previous training coming into play on the Airbus he rejected the takeoff, because of the light. It was a reaction and not a thought process, which brought up the transition training and the gaps that existed at the time of the incident. Both he and the first officer realize the seriousness of their actions without thinking first and what ?could? Have happened had there been a fire from the hot brakes.
The captain was debriefed by numerous privacy data omitted management. Director of flight standards had a very in depth discussion as to the Boeing philosophy and why it is the way it is. The captain self-identified the problem which brought up an issue to the carrier that the transition training from Airbus to Boeing had gaps in it because of aircraft manufacture philosophies. Aqp, quarterly, and transition training were immediately changed to accommodate the training gaps that the two aircraft have.
The identified gaps: the Airbus inhibits any caution lights above 80 KTS, unless it is mandatory for an abort. Boeing aircraft does not inhibit any light and leaves that up to the crews decision to abort. Boeing's philosophy is after 80 knots, only a red light or any un-flyable condition should be aborted for, privacy data omitted leaves the final abort decision up to the caption.
Captain was asked by the director of standards is there any amber light in the qrh that is worthy to abort for, the answer was emphatically no! The pack light that came on, they could have continued on a one pack operation all the way to ksea at altitude. They talked about the big 4 red lights (engine failure, engine fire, engine fire/failure, and takeoff warning). Company flight handbook section 4.020 was thoroughly dissected and discussed at length. The point in reviewing the entire qrh, there is no amber light above 80 KTS. Worth rejecting for. What could have happened, and what is the safe thing to do. Management did discuss taking the crew into the simulator, but to what end, as the abort was completed properly, and the captain realizing the seriousness of the reject.
The captain had a new self-awareness and also brought up the fact that these differences needed a heightened awareness in transition training. The company within a day had an outline and plan to change training for not only transition crews from the Airbus to the Boeing but for both aircraft on rejected takeoffs above 80 KTS. For an amber caution light.
The two different philosophies from Boeing and Airbus were thoroughly discussed by privacy data omitted training and safety departments. An privacy data omitted safety flash went out.
Items accomplished by the ch:
1. Crew was thoroughly debriefed.
2. Safety flash was been published and sent out to all pilots.
3. Takeoff go/no-go and Boeing rto philosophy to be put into Q4 cbts
4. Adding to mts ?go? Malfunctions above 80KTS in aqp
5. Adding immediately to this year?s cq during day 1-2. If extra time (which there should be) at end of sessions to give a ?first look? Takeoff with a master caution above 80KTS.
6. Adding to cq 2022 same as above during day 1-2.
As the FAA filed it
ON 6/12/2021,^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ A BOEING 737-800, WAS DEPARTING GUADALAJARA, MEXICO (MMGL). DURING TAKEOFF ROLL, A MASTER CAUTION AND AMBER PACK LIGHT PRESENTED AT 139 KTS. V1 WAS 151 KTS. THE CAPTAIN PERFORMED A REJECTED TAKEOFF (RTO). THIS CAUSED ALL FOUR BRAKES, SIX TIRES, AND ONE AXLE TO BE REPLACED DUE TO HEAT EXPOSURE DAMAGE. THE AIRCRAFT FERRIED BACK TO SEATTLE, WA FOR ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE.
THE CAPTAIN HAD A 13,000 FOOT RUNWAY AND MORE THAN ENOUGH TIME TO MENTALLY ANALYZE THE PROBLEM AND CONTINUE AS PER THE BOEING TRAINING. THE CAPTAIN MADE THE REJECTED TAKEOFF CORRECTLY EXCEPT FOR THE WRONG REASON. DUE TO THE PREVIOUS TRAINING COMING INTO PLAY ON THE AIRBUS HE REJECTED THE TAKEOFF, BECAUSE OF THE LIGHT. IT WAS A REACTION AND NOT A THOUGHT PROCESS, WHICH BROUGHT UP THE TRANSITION TRAINING AND THE GAPS THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. BOTH HE AND THE FIRST OFFICER REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR ACTIONS WITHOUT THINKING FIRST AND WHAT ?COULD? HAVE HAPPENED HAD THERE BEEN A FIRE FROM THE HOT BRAKES.
THE CAPTAIN WAS DEBRIEFED BY NUMEROUS ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ MANAGEMENT. DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT STANDARDS HAD A VERY IN DEPTH DISCUSSION AS TO THE BOEING PHILOSOPHY AND WHY IT IS THE WAY IT IS. THE CAPTAIN SELF-IDENTIFIED THE PROBLEM WHICH BROUGHT UP AN ISSUE TO THE CARRIER THAT THE TRANSITION TRAINING FROM AIRBUS TO BOEING HAD GAPS IN IT BECAUSE OF AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE PHILOSOPHIES. AQP, QUARTERLY, AND TRANSITION TRAINING WERE IMMEDIATELY CHANGED TO ACCOMMODATE THE TRAINING GAPS THAT THE TWO AIRCRAFT HAVE.
THE IDENTIFIED GAPS: THE AIRBUS INHIBITS ANY CAUTION LIGHTS ABOVE 80 KTS, UNLESS IT IS MANDATORY FOR AN ABORT. BOEING AIRCRAFT DOES NOT INHIBIT ANY LIGHT AND LEAVES THAT UP TO THE CREWS DECISION TO ABORT. BOEING'S PHILOSOPHY IS AFTER 80 KNOTS, ONLY A RED LIGHT OR ANY UN-FLYABLE CONDITION SHOULD BE ABORTED FOR, ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ LEAVES THE FINAL ABORT DECISION UP TO THE CAPTION.
CAPTAIN WAS ASKED BY THE DIRECTOR OF STANDARDS IS THERE ANY AMBER LIGHT IN THE QRH THAT IS WORTHY TO ABORT FOR, THE ANSWER WAS EMPHATICALLY NO! THE PACK LIGHT THAT CAME ON, THEY COULD HAVE CONTINUED ON A ONE PACK OPERATION ALL THE WAY TO KSEA AT ALTITUDE. THEY TALKED ABOUT THE BIG 4 RED LIGHTS (ENGINE FAILURE, ENGINE FIRE, ENGINE FIRE/FAILURE, AND TAKEOFF WARNING). COMPANY FLIGHT HANDBOOK SECTION 4.020 WAS THOROUGHLY DISSECTED AND DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. THE POINT IN REVIEWING THE ENTIRE QRH, THERE IS NO AMBER LIGHT ABOVE 80 KTS. WORTH REJECTING FOR. WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED, AND WHAT IS THE SAFE THING TO DO. MANAGEMENT DID DISCUSS TAKING THE CREW INTO THE SIMULATOR, BUT TO WHAT END, AS THE ABORT WAS COMPLETED PROPERLY, AND THE CAPTAIN REALIZING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE REJECT.
THE CAPTAIN HAD A NEW SELF-AWARENESS AND ALSO BROUGHT UP THE FACT THAT THESE DIFFERENCES NEEDED A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS IN TRANSITION TRAINING. THE COMPANY WITHIN A DAY HAD AN OUTLINE AND PLAN TO CHANGE TRAINING FOR NOT ONLY TRANSITION CREWS FROM THE AIRBUS TO THE BOEING BUT FOR BOTH AIRCRAFT ON REJECTED TAKEOFFS ABOVE 80 KTS. FOR AN AMBER CAUTION LIGHT.
THE TWO DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHIES FROM BOEING AND AIRBUS WERE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED BY ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ TRAINING AND SAFETY DEPARTMENTS. AN ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ SAFETY FLASH WENT OUT.
ITEMS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE CH:
1. CREW WAS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED.
2. SAFETY FLASH WAS BEEN PUBLISHED AND SENT OUT TO ALL PILOTS.
3. TAKEOFF GO/NO-GO AND BOEING RTO PHILOSOPHY TO BE PUT INTO Q4 CBTS
4. ADDING TO MTS ?GO? MALFUNCTIONS ABOVE 80KTS IN AQP
5. ADDING IMMEDIATELY TO THIS YEAR?S CQ DURING DAY 1-2. IF EXTRA TIME (WHICH THERE SHOULD BE) AT END OF SESSIONS TO GIVE A ?FIRST LOOK? TAKEOFF WITH A MASTER CAUTION ABOVE 80KTS.
6. ADDING TO CQ 2022 SAME AS ABOVE DURING DAY 1-2.