What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
Description: airman was practicing an engine out approach to okv rwy 32. While on downwind abeam the numbers he reduced power and began a close in turn to base, announced his intentions and extended approach flaps to begin his before landing checklist. At that time his GPS announced "traffic" and indicated graphically that it was fairly close. He scanned for and located traffic on short final to the same runway. He continued the approach, now focused on separation with the traffic and his power off approach. As he continued the approach he did not hear any gear warning nor did he believe or understand that although he had initiated his before landing cl, it was not complete and the lg was not extended.
Root cause analysis. The airman's distraction due to traffic interupted his normal before landing checklist flow which he failed to complete resulting in gear up landing. He also indicated that given the distraction, "it would have been better to go around" instead of continuing to practice the no power approach and landing." Confirmation bias and his normal profile for this manuever also contributed to his lack of sa regarding the entire before landing cl.
Discussion. I discussed cl interuption and industry standard practice of re-starting cl if not completed in one sequence. Also discussed orally stating checklist items even single pilot (srm) using a call and response format and actually touching the switch or control to confirm its position. We also discussed the importance of using a written checklist to verify completion of procedural flows as well as gumpp or similar menomic final landing confirmation for gear and prop settings. Finally, we discussed confirmation bias and out of normal sequence items that can contribute to errors.
Recommendation. I do not recommend competency evaluation (44709) nor additional training. Airman apprears consciencious and disciplined to the extent that he was conducting personal training on this day. I believe that this mistake was caused by distraction and is unlikely to recurr especially given our extensive discussion regarding proper cl usage, srm and confirmation bias as well as "final landing check" techniques. Recommend no further action.
As the FAA filed it
DESCRIPTION: AIRMAN WAS PRACTICING AN ENGINE OUT APPROACH TO OKV RWY 32. WHILE ON DOWNWIND ABEAM THE NUMBERS HE REDUCED POWER AND BEGAN A CLOSE IN TURN TO BASE, ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTIONS AND EXTENDED APPROACH FLAPS TO BEGIN HIS BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST. AT THAT TIME HIS GPS ANNOUNCED "TRAFFIC" AND INDICATED GRAPHICALLY THAT IT WAS FAIRLY CLOSE. HE SCANNED FOR AND LOCATED TRAFFIC ON SHORT FINAL TO THE SAME RUNWAY. HE CONTINUED THE APPROACH, NOW FOCUSED ON SEPARATION WITH THE TRAFFIC AND HIS POWER OFF APPROACH. AS HE CONTINUED THE APPROACH HE DID NOT HEAR ANY GEAR WARNING NOR DID HE BELIEVE OR UNDERSTAND THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD INITIATED HIS BEFORE LANDING CL, IT WAS NOT COMPLETE AND THE LG WAS NOT EXTENDED.
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS. THE AIRMAN'S DISTRACTION DUE TO TRAFFIC INTERUPTED HIS NORMAL BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST FLOW WHICH HE FAILED TO COMPLETE RESULTING IN GEAR UP LANDING. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT GIVEN THE DISTRACTION, "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO GO AROUND" INSTEAD OF CONTINUING TO PRACTICE THE NO POWER APPROACH AND LANDING." CONFIRMATION BIAS AND HIS NORMAL PROFILE FOR THIS MANUEVER ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO HIS LACK OF SA REGARDING THE ENTIRE BEFORE LANDING CL.
DISCUSSION. I DISCUSSED CL INTERUPTION AND INDUSTRY STANDARD PRACTICE OF RE-STARTING CL IF NOT COMPLETED IN ONE SEQUENCE. ALSO DISCUSSED ORALLY STATING CHECKLIST ITEMS EVEN SINGLE PILOT (SRM) USING A CALL AND RESPONSE FORMAT AND ACTUALLY TOUCHING THE SWITCH OR CONTROL TO CONFIRM ITS POSITION. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF USING A WRITTEN CHECKLIST TO VERIFY COMPLETION OF PROCEDURAL FLOWS AS WELL AS GUMPP OR SIMILAR MENOMIC FINAL LANDING CONFIRMATION FOR GEAR AND PROP SETTINGS. FINALLY, WE DISCUSSED CONFIRMATION BIAS AND OUT OF NORMAL SEQUENCE ITEMS THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ERRORS.
RECOMMENDATION. I DO NOT RECOMMEND COMPETENCY EVALUATION (44709) NOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING. AIRMAN APPREARS CONSCIENCIOUS AND DISCIPLINED TO THE EXTENT THAT HE WAS CONDUCTING PERSONAL TRAINING ON THIS DAY. I BELIEVE THAT THIS MISTAKE WAS CAUSED BY DISTRACTION AND IS UNLIKELY TO RECURR ESPECIALLY GIVEN OUR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION REGARDING PROPER CL USAGE, SRM AND CONFIRMATION BIAS AS WELL AS "FINAL LANDING CHECK" TECHNIQUES. RECOMMEND NO FURTHER ACTION.
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