20220521008199I

On 05/21/2022 daher tbm 700, nose gear collapsed upon landing at okv after experiencing inadequate climb performance. Before landing, the incident pilot could not verify the landing gear was in a down and locked position through cockpit indications or audible cues. The incident pilot requested ?gear check? With ground personnel. Upon confirmation from ground personnel that the gear was down, the incident pilot landed the aircraft without preforming any emergency checklist items outlined in the pilot operating handbook (POH). After touchdown, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid on the forward section of the aircraft and came to a stop on the runway. Damage was not substantial and remained isolated to the lower engine cowling, propeller, and nose landing gear doors. There was one pilot and two passengers onboard who were uninjured in the incident.

After departure from hef, the incident pilot commanded the landing gear to retract. According to the tbm NTSB & bea liaison for daher aircraft working in conjunction with part 145 daher aircraft inc. repair station, the A14 landing gear control unit, the pilot?s interface for landing gear control, experienced a malfunction approximately 6 seconds after the incident pilot commanded the landing gear to retract and resulted in the pilot/aircraft losing primary control of landing gear retraction and extension capabilities via landing gear handle. The malfunction resulted in the landing gear staying in a partially down, unpowered, and unlocked in-transit orientation. The in-transit/lowered and unlocked configuration was not indicated to the incident pilot through aircraft displays, warning lights or audibly. The tbm NTSB & bea liaison for daher aircraft obtained this information through the fastbox system that recorded the malfunction and relayed the reported fastbox information it to FAA inspectors. Subsequent post-incident testing of the aircraft?s landing gear control unit installed on the incident aircraft at the time of the incident did not replicate the malfunction experienced on the incident flight.

The incident pilot had experienced poor climb performance due to the excessive drag created by the landing gear malfunction. The incident pilot was unaware of the landing gear malfunction and had reported concluding the aircrafts engine was underperforming and possibly would degrade further or fail while in flight. The aircraft was diverted to okv while enroute to kcsq. Upon approach the incident pilot had commanded the landing gear to extend, however, the incident pilot reported there was no indication present that the landing gear had moved or locked in the extended position. The incident pilot called for ground crews at okv for a gear check. The ground crews at okv reported seeing the landing gear down, but could not confirm full extension. Emergency procedures outlined in the incident aircraft?s POH to manually extend the landing gear to a down and locked position were not attempted due to the incident pilot?s present concern for degraded engine performance. The incident pilot proceeded with the landing without taking further mitigation measures or conducting any investigative process. Testing of the emergency landing gear extension procedure on the incident aircraft was performed by the tbm NTSB & bea liaison for daher aircraft post-incident and it was found the emergency extension procedure and aircraft manual extension components were functioning as designed. The emergency landing gear extension procedure can be performed without an operational A14 landing gear control unit and serves as a backup control to fully extend and lock the landing gear.