20221218023489A

Accident · Minor damage

FAA accident report · Airbus A330-243 · Kahului, HI · December 18, 2022

Date
December 18, 2022 · 10:07 local
Place
Kahului, HI
Airport
Honolulu International
Phase of flight
Cruise/Level Flight
Operating rules
Air carrier (Part 121)
Operator
HALA
Damage
Minor damage
Aircraft
N393HA
NTSB investigation
NTSBDCA23LA096
Reported as
Airbus A330-243
Reported engine
Rolls-Royce RR772B-60
People aboard
293
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
24
Pilot’s certificate
Airline transport
Pilot’s flight hours
12,291 total5,887 in this make and model214 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

Beforeprivacy data omitted departed, the captain called the flight dispatcher to discuss the flight release, at which time the dispatcher advised the captain of potential turbulence and potential embedded convective activity over the hawaiian islands. While flying over the hawaiian islands at flight level (FL) 400, the airplane, an Airbus A330, was in visual

Meteorological conditions and above a cloud layer between FL370 and FL380. A cloud that the flight crew described as a “plume” appeared vertically in front of the airplane. The flight crew called the lead flight attendant to advise her about the anticipated turbulence. Within about 1 to 3 seconds, the airplane encountered severe turbulence that resulted in multiple injuries in the cabin. Data from the airplane’s quick access recorder showed that the airplane experienced vertical accelerations greater than 2 gs during the turbulence encounter. After the encounter, the airplane continued to the destination airport and landed there without further incident. The national weather service (NWS) forecast products for the time and route of the accident

Flight indicated that a storm was approaching the hawaiian islands that was expected to support an unstable atmosphere with abundant moisture and isolated thunderstorms. As a

Result of these conditions, the NWS issued a SIGMET (significant meteorological information) that was valid for an area of embedded thunderstorms to FL380 that included the turbulence encounter location. This SIGMET, which implied the potential for severe or greater turbulence, was provided to the flight crew. The NWS had also forecast moderate-to-severe clear air turbulence that was expected to develop behind the main area of precipitation. Thus, the conditions along the airplane’s flight route were favorable for convectively induced severe turbulence, and the flight crew was aware that thunderstorms and turbulence could occur

Along the flight route. The flight crew noticed the plume-like cloud shortly before the airplane was to begin its

Descent into Honolulu. The captain then changed the weather radar display mode to determine the intensity and elevation of the weather formation directly in front of the airplane, but he and the first officer saw “nothing” displayed; weather radar has reduced sensitivity at higher altitudes. In addition, the privacy data omitted A330 flight crew operating manual, quick reference handbook, stated that weather radar does not detect weather that “has small droplets,” such as clouds.

According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, the flight crew stated that the plume was “moving fast” and “building fast” but that the airplane should “clear most of it.” the meteorological evidence for this investigation showed that the plume that the crew observed outside the airplane comprised cumulonimbus clouds with severe-to-extreme convectively induced turbulence. The operator’s A330 flight crew operating manual/quick reference handbook also stated that “the flight crew should plan to fly above or around areas of severe turbulence.” however, the crewmembers did not anticipate the likely severity of the rising plume, even though they had been provided with sufficient meteorological information (including information from the dispatcher and the air traffic controller) to make such a

Determination. The CVR recorded the crewmembers stating, after the turbulence encounter, that they should have “gone around,” indicating that sufficient time should have been available to deviate away from the plume. The operator’s flight crew operating manual recommended that flight crews

“Consider storm cells above 35,000 ft as highly hazardous” and that a flight crew should not overfly a storm cell with its top at or above 25,000 ft because the airplane might encounter “stronger than expected” turbulence. Thus, the flight crew’s decision to overfly the active storm

Cell was a factor in the severe turbulence encounter.

As the FAA filed it

BEFORE^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ DEPARTED, THE CAPTAIN CALLED THE FLIGHT DISPATCHER TO DISCUSS THE FLIGHT RELEASE, AT WHICH TIME THE DISPATCHER ADVISED THE CAPTAIN OF POTENTIAL TURBULENCE AND POTENTIAL EMBEDDED CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY OVER THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. WHILE FLYING OVER THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AT FLIGHT LEVEL (FL) 400, THE AIRPLANE, AN AIRBUS A330, WAS IN VISUAL

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS AND ABOVE A CLOUD LAYER BETWEEN FL370 AND FL380. A CLOUD THAT THE FLIGHT CREW DESCRIBED AS A “PLUME” APPEARED VERTICALLY IN FRONT OF THE AIRPLANE. THE FLIGHT CREW CALLED THE LEAD FLIGHT ATTENDANT TO ADVISE HER ABOUT THE ANTICIPATED TURBULENCE. WITHIN ABOUT 1 TO 3 SECONDS, THE AIRPLANE ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURBULENCE THAT RESULTED IN MULTIPLE INJURIES IN THE CABIN. DATA FROM THE AIRPLANE’S QUICK ACCESS RECORDER SHOWED THAT THE AIRPLANE EXPERIENCED VERTICAL ACCELERATIONS GREATER THAN 2 GS DURING THE TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER. AFTER THE ENCOUNTER, THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED TO THE DESTINATION AIRPORT AND LANDED THERE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE (NWS) FORECAST PRODUCTS FOR THE TIME AND ROUTE OF THE ACCIDENT

FLIGHT INDICATED THAT A STORM WAS APPROACHING THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS THAT WAS EXPECTED TO SUPPORT AN UNSTABLE ATMOSPHERE WITH ABUNDANT MOISTURE AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS. AS A

RESULT OF THESE CONDITIONS, THE NWS ISSUED A SIGMET (SIGNIFICANT METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION) THAT WAS VALID FOR AN AREA OF EMBEDDED THUNDERSTORMS TO FL380 THAT INCLUDED THE TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER LOCATION. THIS SIGMET, WHICH IMPLIED THE POTENTIAL FOR SEVERE OR GREATER TURBULENCE, WAS PROVIDED TO THE FLIGHT CREW. THE NWS HAD ALSO FORECAST MODERATE-TO-SEVERE CLEAR AIR TURBULENCE THAT WAS EXPECTED TO DEVELOP BEHIND THE MAIN AREA OF PRECIPITATION. THUS, THE CONDITIONS ALONG THE AIRPLANE’S FLIGHT ROUTE WERE FAVORABLE FOR CONVECTIVELY INDUCED SEVERE TURBULENCE, AND THE FLIGHT CREW WAS AWARE THAT THUNDERSTORMS AND TURBULENCE COULD OCCUR

ALONG THE FLIGHT ROUTE. THE FLIGHT CREW NOTICED THE PLUME-LIKE CLOUD SHORTLY BEFORE THE AIRPLANE WAS TO BEGIN ITS

DESCENT INTO HONOLULU. THE CAPTAIN THEN CHANGED THE WEATHER RADAR DISPLAY MODE TO DETERMINE THE INTENSITY AND ELEVATION OF THE WEATHER FORMATION DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE AIRPLANE, BUT HE AND THE FIRST OFFICER SAW “NOTHING” DISPLAYED; WEATHER RADAR HAS REDUCED SENSITIVITY AT HIGHER ALTITUDES. IN ADDITION, THE ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ A330 FLIGHT CREW OPERATING MANUAL, QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK, STATED THAT WEATHER RADAR DOES NOT DETECT WEATHER THAT “HAS SMALL DROPLETS,” SUCH AS CLOUDS.

ACCORDING TO THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (CVR) TRANSCRIPT, THE FLIGHT CREW STATED THAT THE PLUME WAS “MOVING FAST” AND “BUILDING FAST” BUT THAT THE AIRPLANE SHOULD “CLEAR MOST OF IT.” THE METEOROLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR THIS INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT THE PLUME THAT THE CREW OBSERVED OUTSIDE THE AIRPLANE COMPRISED CUMULONIMBUS CLOUDS WITH SEVERE-TO-EXTREME CONVECTIVELY INDUCED TURBULENCE. THE OPERATOR’S A330 FLIGHT CREW OPERATING MANUAL/QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK ALSO STATED THAT “THE FLIGHT CREW SHOULD PLAN TO FLY ABOVE OR AROUND AREAS OF SEVERE TURBULENCE.” HOWEVER, THE CREWMEMBERS DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE LIKELY SEVERITY OF THE RISING PLUME, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION (INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM THE DISPATCHER AND THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER) TO MAKE SUCH A

DETERMINATION. THE CVR RECORDED THE CREWMEMBERS STATING, AFTER THE TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER, THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE “GONE AROUND,” INDICATING THAT SUFFICIENT TIME SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO DEVIATE AWAY FROM THE PLUME. THE OPERATOR’S FLIGHT CREW OPERATING MANUAL RECOMMENDED THAT FLIGHT CREWS

“CONSIDER STORM CELLS ABOVE 35,000 FT AS HIGHLY HAZARDOUS” AND THAT A FLIGHT CREW SHOULD NOT OVERFLY A STORM CELL WITH ITS TOP AT OR ABOVE 25,000 FT BECAUSE THE AIRPLANE MIGHT ENCOUNTER “STRONGER THAN EXPECTED” TURBULENCE. THUS, THE FLIGHT CREW’S DECISION TO OVERFLY THE ACTIVE STORM

CELL WAS A FACTOR IN THE SEVERE TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.