20240109000279A

On January 9, 2024, at approximately 1212 (EST) the mishap aircraft was involved in a wheels up landing resulting in substantial damage to the aircraft. The aircraft was operated as a part 91 training flight. The aircrew consisted of the flight instructor and the student. Both aircrew members stated during their interviews that they had gotten 7-8 hours of sleep the previous night, neither had consumed any alchohol the previous evening, and were in good health at the start of the day. That day's training would consist of morning and afternoon training flights. The morning training started at 0800 with a briefing of the planned events of that day, including flight planning, weather, ground instruction, and multi engine maneuvers. The flight school records show the aircrew flew a 1.5 hour training flight that morning. The interviews with both crewman agree that the student had difficulties managing the multi engine aircraft. The student stated that the aircraft felt nose heavy, not docile, and made him feel as though he was always "behind the aircraft". The instructors interview revealed that there was "a mild tension" between himself and his student because he feels the student was not accepting instruction well. With exception of the tensions noted by each crewman, the mornings training evolution was uneventful. The afternoon flight (mishap flight) consisted of pattern work and began at approximately 1140 (EST). According to flight school records the afternoons flight was .49 hours in length. The aircraft made three touch and go landings, with the wheels up landing occuring on the fourth pattern. Both crewmen stated they had become task saturated. They were aware of a strong developing crosswind component. Communication with the tower had also increased. The tower asked if they wished to change runways, and also asked for extended downwind legs on each of the four patterns. Both crewman stated that mutliple radio calls had been missed due to extensive conversations between the instructor and the student. The instructor stated he believed the student was not flying the pattern well, and was having difficulty controlling his altitude. Both crewmen stated that there was little checklist usage prior to being abeam the numbers on the downwind leg because of higher cruise speeds in the pattern. The student does not remember using a checklist at any time in the pattern on the final flight. On the final pattern the tower requested an extended down wind leg and then almost immediately a turn to base. The crosswind had developed to an 8 to 10 knot, eighty degree, right quartering headwind. Both crewmen stated that at this time they were conversing about the best way to set up a stabilized approach to landing. Neither crewman remembers reviewing the pre-landing section of the checklist. The instructor stated that the approach was for a short field landing and had been stable at 87 knots. He also stated that the student had difficulty maintaning the glideslope but had stabilized by one half mile. The crewmen stated that neither of them realized they had not lowered the landing gear until they heard the aircraft scraping on the ground. The aircraft came to a stop in the middle of the runway and they exited the aircraft without injury. Both crewman stated that the landing gear lights and warning horn worked on the previous flights that day, but that they do not remember if the horn went off on the final pattern approach. The aircraft is also equipped with a mirror on the inboard engine cowling to view nose gear extended, as well as three green gear lights in the cockpit. Subsequent maintenance inspection found no mechanical defects.