20240503006429A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Robinson Helicopter R22 BETA · Tumwater, WA · May 3, 2024

Date
May 3, 2024 · 16:30 local
Place
Tumwater, WA
Phase of flight
Hover/Holding
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N4082J
NTSB investigation
NTSBWPR24LA139
Reported as
Robinson Helicopter R22 Beta
Reported engine
Lycoming 0-320 series
People aboard
2
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
1
Pilot’s certificate
Flight instructor

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

The FAA was notified by the regional operational control center of an incident that occurred on may 3, 2024, at olympia airport. The incident involved a training helicopter from a local flight school based at olympia airport. The instructor pilot, who was operating the helicopter as pilot-in-command (PIC), was identified, and contacted for further investigation. On may 30, 2024, two inspectors from the seattle flight standards district office met with the PIC to continue the investigation. The PIC was cooperative and attentive during the investigation process.

The PIC reported that the helicopter had more fuel than expected, making it 39 pounds over its maximum gross weight after the weight and balance calculation. Despite this, the PIC decided to proceed with the training flight, which focused on hovering techniques in a designated practice area on the south side of the airfield. Shortly after takeoff, the olympia tower requested that the helicopter relocate to another part of the airfield to allow another aircraft to use the runway. The PIC complied and relocated the helicopter. The wind was blowing from the south at 5-6 knots. The helicopter departed to the south into the wind and made a 180-degree turn. The PIC hover-taxied at an altitude of about 30-40 feet while transitioning to the new training area. During the approach phase, the helicopter now had a tailwind. During the final landing sequence, the PIC attempted to turn the helicopter's nose into the wind, while maintaining effective translational lift, which required increased engine power. The PIC also had to raise the collective pitch to prevent the aircraft from descending, further increasing engine power demand. Given the helicopter's potential over-gross weight and minimal fuel burn-off, the engine power demand exceeded what was available. As a result, the helicopter descended, causing the right skid to contact the ground, (perpendicular) and initiate a dynamic rollover, leading to the accident.

The investigation revealed that the PIC failed to manage power requirements properly. The helicopter's potential over-gross weight status placed its flight characteristics outside the approved flight profile per Robinson Helicopter's flight manual, and the decision to continue flight was contrary to 14 CFR § 91.9 and 91.3. Contributing factors included the pic's poor judgment and decision to continue the flight despite the weight issue, influenced by pressure from theprivacy data omitted and improper decisions on the landing phase of the flight.

The inspectors discussed several points with the PIC, including the importance of a safety culture, the responsibilities of the pilot-in-command, adherence to manufacturer limitations, and the necessity of sound aeronautical decision-making skills. The PIC acknowledged the need to follow all regulations, prioritizing safety over potential employment repercussions. After the discussion, the inspectors determined that a compliance action was required and appropriate. They counseled the PIC, who committed to adhering to the discussed safety practices (safety culture) and regulations to prevent any future incidents/accidents/occurrences. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions were adequate, and no further follow-up was necessary, restoring confidence in the pic's ability to operate safely within the national airspace system.

As the FAA filed it

THE FAA WAS NOTIFIED BY THE REGIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER OF AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON MAY 3, 2024, AT OLYMPIA AIRPORT. THE INCIDENT INVOLVED A TRAINING HELICOPTER FROM A LOCAL FLIGHT SCHOOL BASED AT OLYMPIA AIRPORT. THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT, WHO WAS OPERATING THE HELICOPTER AS PILOT-IN-COMMAND (PIC), WAS IDENTIFIED, AND CONTACTED FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION. ON MAY 30, 2024, TWO INSPECTORS FROM THE SEATTLE FLIGHT STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE MET WITH THE PIC TO CONTINUE THE INVESTIGATION. THE PIC WAS COOPERATIVE AND ATTENTIVE DURING THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS.

THE PIC REPORTED THAT THE HELICOPTER HAD MORE FUEL THAN EXPECTED, MAKING IT 39 POUNDS OVER ITS MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT AFTER THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE CALCULATION. DESPITE THIS, THE PIC DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH THE TRAINING FLIGHT, WHICH FOCUSED ON HOVERING TECHNIQUES IN A DESIGNATED PRACTICE AREA ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF, THE OLYMPIA TOWER REQUESTED THAT THE HELICOPTER RELOCATE TO ANOTHER PART OF THE AIRFIELD TO ALLOW ANOTHER AIRCRAFT TO USE THE RUNWAY. THE PIC COMPLIED AND RELOCATED THE HELICOPTER. THE WIND WAS BLOWING FROM THE SOUTH AT 5-6 KNOTS. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED TO THE SOUTH INTO THE WIND AND MADE A 180-DEGREE TURN. THE PIC HOVER-TAXIED AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 30-40 FEET WHILE TRANSITIONING TO THE NEW TRAINING AREA. DURING THE APPROACH PHASE, THE HELICOPTER NOW HAD A TAILWIND. DURING THE FINAL LANDING SEQUENCE, THE PIC ATTEMPTED TO TURN THE HELICOPTER'S NOSE INTO THE WIND, WHILE MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE TRANSLATIONAL LIFT, WHICH REQUIRED INCREASED ENGINE POWER. THE PIC ALSO HAD TO RAISE THE COLLECTIVE PITCH TO PREVENT THE AIRCRAFT FROM DESCENDING, FURTHER INCREASING ENGINE POWER DEMAND. GIVEN THE HELICOPTER'S POTENTIAL OVER-GROSS WEIGHT AND MINIMAL FUEL BURN-OFF, THE ENGINE POWER DEMAND EXCEEDED WHAT WAS AVAILABLE. AS A RESULT, THE HELICOPTER DESCENDED, CAUSING THE RIGHT SKID TO CONTACT THE GROUND, (PERPENDICULAR) AND INITIATE A DYNAMIC ROLLOVER, LEADING TO THE ACCIDENT.

THE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE PIC FAILED TO MANAGE POWER REQUIREMENTS PROPERLY. THE HELICOPTER'S POTENTIAL OVER-GROSS WEIGHT STATUS PLACED ITS FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS OUTSIDE THE APPROVED FLIGHT PROFILE PER ROBINSON HELICOPTER'S FLIGHT MANUAL, AND THE DECISION TO CONTINUE FLIGHT WAS CONTRARY TO 14 CFR § 91.9 AND 91.3. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED THE PIC'S POOR JUDGMENT AND DECISION TO CONTINUE THE FLIGHT DESPITE THE WEIGHT ISSUE, INFLUENCED BY PRESSURE FROM THE^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ AND IMPROPER DECISIONS ON THE LANDING PHASE OF THE FLIGHT.

THE INSPECTORS DISCUSSED SEVERAL POINTS WITH THE PIC, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANCE OF A SAFETY CULTURE, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND, ADHERENCE TO MANUFACTURER LIMITATIONS, AND THE NECESSITY OF SOUND AERONAUTICAL DECISION-MAKING SKILLS. THE PIC ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED TO FOLLOW ALL REGULATIONS, PRIORITIZING SAFETY OVER POTENTIAL EMPLOYMENT REPERCUSSIONS. AFTER THE DISCUSSION, THE INSPECTORS DETERMINED THAT A COMPLIANCE ACTION WAS REQUIRED AND APPROPRIATE. THEY COUNSELED THE PIC, WHO COMMITTED TO ADHERING TO THE DISCUSSED SAFETY PRACTICES (SAFETY CULTURE) AND REGULATIONS TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS/OCCURRENCES. THE INSPECTORS CONCLUDED THAT THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE ADEQUATE, AND NO FURTHER FOLLOW-UP WAS NECESSARY, RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE PIC'S ABILITY TO OPERATE SAFELY WITHIN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.