20240906013292A

Accident · Destroyed

FAA accident report · Amazon.Com Services MK30 · Pendleton, OR · September 6, 2024

Date
September 6, 2024 · 10:52 local
Place
Pendleton, OR
Airport
Eastern Oregon Regional At Pendlet
Phase of flight
Landing: Approach
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Collision
Midair collision
Damage
Destroyed
Aircraft
N213PA
NTSB investigation
NTSBWPR24LA302
Reported as
Amazon.Com Services MK30
Reported engine
Amateur-built UNKNOWN ENG
People aboard
1
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0
Pilot’s certificate
Private pilot
Pilot’s flight hours
215 total155 in this make and model148 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

On September 6, 2024 the subject two MK30 UAS were conducting probable failure testing flights under a sac-ec and experimental authority at the Pendleton, Oregon flight test facility. The specific test being executed was the motor-electonic speed controller-propeller (mep)-out scenario described in DOC-013784, MK30 cmd probable failures and functionality demonstration flight test plan. Both UAS were separately loaded with a mission that had an intentionally injected mep-out which would be expected to result in a return home contingency and a landing at the divert pad not the routine return home landing pad. The nominal plan was for the second flight to be launched after the first landed, but due to an error they were launched 9 minutes apart.

UAS 1 took off from pad 301, performed a nominal delivery, the mep-out fault was injected following the delivery, and was returning to the divert pad via the return home path as intended. While UAS 1 was returning to the landing area, UAS 2 took off from pad 303, the planned mep-out was injected on takeoff ascent and it immediately proceeded to the divert pad per the test plan. UAS 1 started descending onto the divert pad from approximately 60M while UAS 2 was transitioning to the divert pad at approximately 40M. The shift lead/problems solver recognized the sound of a UAS motor failure and immediately shouted to execute an scl (safe congincy landing) this command was radioed to the flight monitor (PIC) at the ground control station (the same PIC was monitoring both flights and an additional UAS on his ground control station). The flight monitor commanded scl for UAS 2. UAS 2 entered the descent path of UAS 1 when drone 1 was at approximately 40M above the ground, UAS 1 descended onto UAS 2 in mid-air at approximately 40M altitude. The wings of both UAS interlocked. Both UAS spirled to the ground and impacted on the gravel south of the divert pad. The entire event was contained at the divert pad area, and there were no injuries or damage to third party property.

As the FAA filed it

ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2024 THE SUBJECT TWO MK30 UAS WERE CONDUCTING PROBABLE FAILURE TESTING FLIGHTS UNDER A SAC-EC AND EXPERIMENTAL AUTHORITY AT THE PENDLETON, OREGON FLIGHT TEST FACILITY. THE SPECIFIC TEST BEING EXECUTED WAS THE MOTOR-ELECTONIC SPEED CONTROLLER-PROPELLER (MEP)-OUT SCENARIO DESCRIBED IN DOC-013784, MK30 CMD PROBABLE FAILURES AND FUNCTIONALITY DEMONSTRATION FLIGHT TEST PLAN. BOTH UAS WERE SEPARATELY LOADED WITH A MISSION THAT HAD AN INTENTIONALLY INJECTED MEP-OUT WHICH WOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN A RETURN HOME CONTINGENCY AND A LANDING AT THE DIVERT PAD NOT THE ROUTINE RETURN HOME LANDING PAD. THE NOMINAL PLAN WAS FOR THE SECOND FLIGHT TO BE LAUNCHED AFTER THE FIRST LANDED, BUT DUE TO AN ERROR THEY WERE LAUNCHED 9 MINUTES APART.

UAS 1 TOOK OFF FROM PAD 301, PERFORMED A NOMINAL DELIVERY, THE MEP-OUT FAULT WAS INJECTED FOLLOWING THE DELIVERY, AND WAS RETURNING TO THE DIVERT PAD VIA THE RETURN HOME PATH AS INTENDED. WHILE UAS 1 WAS RETURNING TO THE LANDING AREA, UAS 2 TOOK OFF FROM PAD 303, THE PLANNED MEP-OUT WAS INJECTED ON TAKEOFF ASCENT AND IT IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDED TO THE DIVERT PAD PER THE TEST PLAN. UAS 1 STARTED DESCENDING ONTO THE DIVERT PAD FROM APPROXIMATELY 60M WHILE UAS 2 WAS TRANSITIONING TO THE DIVERT PAD AT APPROXIMATELY 40M. THE SHIFT LEAD/PROBLEMS SOLVER RECOGNIZED THE SOUND OF A UAS MOTOR FAILURE AND IMMEDIATELY SHOUTED TO EXECUTE AN SCL (SAFE CONGINCY LANDING) THIS COMMAND WAS RADIOED TO THE FLIGHT MONITOR (PIC) AT THE GROUND CONTROL STATION (THE SAME PIC WAS MONITORING BOTH FLIGHTS AND AN ADDITIONAL UAS ON HIS GROUND CONTROL STATION). THE FLIGHT MONITOR COMMANDED SCL FOR UAS 2. UAS 2 ENTERED THE DESCENT PATH OF UAS 1 WHEN DRONE 1 WAS AT APPROXIMATELY 40M ABOVE THE GROUND, UAS 1 DESCENDED ONTO UAS 2 IN MID-AIR AT APPROXIMATELY 40M ALTITUDE. THE WINGS OF BOTH UAS INTERLOCKED. BOTH UAS SPIRLED TO THE GROUND AND IMPACTED ON THE GRAVEL SOUTH OF THE DIVERT PAD. THE ENTIRE EVENT WAS CONTAINED AT THE DIVERT PAD AREA, AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES OR DAMAGE TO THIRD PARTY PROPERTY.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.

Other aircraft in the event · 1

Each aircraft in a collision has its own report.