What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
Performed an incident investigation of a commercial flight, which after block-in at myr on 5/30/25, was “windmilled” by a lateral wind gust which rotated the nose of the B737-800NG away from the jet bridge. Consequently, the left wingtip struck the gate structure, and the fuselage and right engine struck the ground service equipment positioned around the right-hand side aircraft. All these areas sustained damage. The ch’s safety department immediately initiated an investigation and quickly provided initial event data to the FAA. At the time of the event four flight attendants and approximately 40 passengers were on board the aircraft. One passenger was assessed by airport emts and released. No injury reports were subsequently filed. The ch assigned a company manager to oversee the damage assessment and preparation of the aircraft for ferry to a maintenance base. The damage was assessed by an on-site company engineer then temporary repairs were performed in order to ferry the aircraft to the ch’s repair vendor. The event was classified an incident iaw FAA order 8900.1, vol 7, chp 1, sec 2, 49 CFR part 830, and 14 CFR part 1 based on the fact that the flight was still being “operated,” with passengers on board, and was damaged. The aircraft was ferried to vqq for permanent repairs on 6/6/2025. The ch’s final investigation report and redacted asap reports were received via email on 6/23/2025. Based on the report, the ch’s investigation was comprehensive, detailed, and iaw its manual. The role of the ground (go), inflight, and flight operations (fo) departments were thoroughly investigated. In addition, the impact of the wind gust on other ch’s aircraft that were parked on adjacent gates at the same time was considered. The ch utilized the “5-whys” method to reach its root cause conclusions. As a result, two corrective actions were proposed under the comprehensive fix: 1) revision of ground and flight operations procedures to include processes for securing aircraft when certain weather conditions are forecasted during ground handling. 2) incorporation of new training into the ground and flight operations curriculum to enhance coordination between ground and flight operations during certain forecasted whether conditions. Repairs to the aircraft were completed on 6/25/2025. A review of the repair records indicated that the repairs were performed iaw applicable repair data. However, the review revealed that the ch failed to complete the structural repair record form required by its gmm. This finding was reported to the ch’s manager of regulatory compliance and its 119 chief inspector. The ch agreed to implement immediate corrective actions and submit its comprehensive fix by 8-27-2025. A cdct was opened to document this finding, non-regulatory compliance action, and the ch’s comprehensive fix. The investigation of the event described herein is concluded. No evidence of regulatory non-compliance was found.
As the FAA filed it
PERFORMED AN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION OF A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT, WHICH AFTER BLOCK-IN AT MYR ON 5/30/25, WAS “WINDMILLED” BY A LATERAL WIND GUST WHICH ROTATED THE NOSE OF THE B737-800NG AWAY FROM THE JET BRIDGE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LEFT WINGTIP STRUCK THE GATE STRUCTURE, AND THE FUSELAGE AND RIGHT ENGINE STRUCK THE GROUND SERVICE EQUIPMENT POSITIONED AROUND THE RIGHT-HAND SIDE AIRCRAFT. ALL THESE AREAS SUSTAINED DAMAGE. THE CH’S SAFETY DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION AND QUICKLY PROVIDED INITIAL EVENT DATA TO THE FAA. AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT FOUR FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND APPROXIMATELY 40 PASSENGERS WERE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT. ONE PASSENGER WAS ASSESSED BY AIRPORT EMTS AND RELEASED. NO INJURY REPORTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY FILED. THE CH ASSIGNED A COMPANY MANAGER TO OVERSEE THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND PREPARATION OF THE AIRCRAFT FOR FERRY TO A MAINTENANCE BASE. THE DAMAGE WAS ASSESSED BY AN ON-SITE COMPANY ENGINEER THEN TEMPORARY REPAIRS WERE PERFORMED IN ORDER TO FERRY THE AIRCRAFT TO THE CH’S REPAIR VENDOR. THE EVENT WAS CLASSIFIED AN INCIDENT IAW FAA ORDER 8900.1, VOL 7, CHP 1, SEC 2, 49 CFR PART 830, AND 14 CFR PART 1 BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE FLIGHT WAS STILL BEING “OPERATED,” WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD, AND WAS DAMAGED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FERRIED TO VQQ FOR PERMANENT REPAIRS ON 6/6/2025. THE CH’S FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT AND REDACTED ASAP REPORTS WERE RECEIVED VIA EMAIL ON 6/23/2025. BASED ON THE REPORT, THE CH’S INVESTIGATION WAS COMPREHENSIVE, DETAILED, AND IAW ITS MANUAL. THE ROLE OF THE GROUND (GO), INFLIGHT, AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS (FO) DEPARTMENTS WERE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED. IN ADDITION, THE IMPACT OF THE WIND GUST ON OTHER CH’S AIRCRAFT THAT WERE PARKED ON ADJACENT GATES AT THE SAME TIME WAS CONSIDERED. THE CH UTILIZED THE “5-WHYS” METHOD TO REACH ITS ROOT CAUSE CONCLUSIONS. AS A RESULT, TWO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE PROPOSED UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE FIX: 1) REVISION OF GROUND AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE PROCESSES FOR SECURING AIRCRAFT WHEN CERTAIN WEATHER CONDITIONS ARE FORECASTED DURING GROUND HANDLING. 2) INCORPORATION OF NEW TRAINING INTO THE GROUND AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS CURRICULUM TO ENHANCE COORDINATION BETWEEN GROUND AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS DURING CERTAIN FORECASTED WHETHER CONDITIONS. REPAIRS TO THE AIRCRAFT WERE COMPLETED ON 6/25/2025. A REVIEW OF THE REPAIR RECORDS INDICATED THAT THE REPAIRS WERE PERFORMED IAW APPLICABLE REPAIR DATA. HOWEVER, THE REVIEW REVEALED THAT THE CH FAILED TO COMPLETE THE STRUCTURAL REPAIR RECORD FORM REQUIRED BY ITS GMM. THIS FINDING WAS REPORTED TO THE CH’S MANAGER OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AND ITS 119 CHIEF INSPECTOR. THE CH AGREED TO IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND SUBMIT ITS COMPREHENSIVE FIX BY 8-27-2025. A CDCT WAS OPENED TO DOCUMENT THIS FINDING, NON-REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ACTION, AND THE CH’S COMPREHENSIVE FIX. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT DESCRIBED HEREIN IS CONCLUDED. NO EVIDENCE OF REGULATORY NON-COMPLIANCE WAS FOUND.