What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
Landing bos during daylight, VFR, light wind conditions, captain assumed duties as pilot flying (pf) due to LAHSO operations in effect landing runway 22L. The transfer of controls occurred in advance of approach and landing. Operator stabilized approach criteria met throughout the approach into flare and touchdown zone.
Corroborating reports from both crewmembers and the digital voice and data recording (dvdr) indicate the aircraft became airborne again after an initial skip followed by a firm landing touchdown. Dvdr analysis supports the crew’s report of two distinct runway impacts over a 4 second period. Further evaluation of data indicates the aircraft recorded a 1.4 g initial vertical acceleration during the initial bounce followed by a 2.4 g vertical acceleration upon touchdown following the initial skip. This touchdown force value met the criteria for a comprehensive, hard landing inspection. The results of oem and operator inspections combined with FAA assessments indicate the airframe received substantial damage attributable to the tailstrike.
Certificate holder indicates oem-supplied information of tail strike potential with pitch attitudes of 11.5 degrees or greater on landing. Dvdr analysis indicates the round out and flare pitch attitude changed abruptly from 5.8 degrees to 13.9 degrees through stick shaker activation in this 4 second period. This rate of pitch change is neither consistent with certificate holder documented standard operating procedures (sops) nor consistent with oem recommendations and industry best practices for recoveries from bounced landings in this category of aircraft.
Both pilots received additional ground and simulator training to recognize, practice and reinforce elements of bounced landing recovery techniques. Both pilots satisfactorily completed all training and demonstrated their individual proficiency and crew performance to qualification standards outlined in the operator's aqp training system.
The root cause of the tail strike is the result of the pilot flying(pf) misapplication of pitch controls in the landing phase. Despite having received initial and recurrent bounced landing recovery training within the past 24 months in a qualified simulator device, the pilot flying stated under the immediate stress of experiencing the sudden bounce combined with the requirement to hold short of an active crossing runway, he chose to instinctively continue with the landing, reverting to first-trained, pitch responses in light, non-transport category aircraft. Additionally contributing to this event is the pilot’s stated subconscious desire to not go around with land and hold short operations (LAHSO) operations in effect.
Presently, the certificate holder started a quality evaluation by comparing other sim sponsor approaches to bounce simulator replication. All eight (8) simulators are pending a quality assessment to improve aerodynamic modeling for realistic E170/75 bounced training. The objective is to promote positive transfer of this training to the line.
Planned corrective actions include promoting flight crew awareness of this accident in accordance with the operators' sms.
In addition, FAA recommends supporting flight manual guidance, training content, and instructor delivery briefings to be re-examined by operator for adequacy, effectiveness and quality improvements on the subject of bounced landing recoveries. Additionally, FAA recommends emphasis be placed on promoting mental readiness for rejected landings and go arounds during supervised operating experience (soe) and routine line checks. Additionally, entry into special tracking should be considered mandatory for crewmembers who demonstrate individual proficiency or crew performance deficiencies resulting from safety incident investigations. The objective is that each crew member receive remedial training when circumstances support training as a viable performance improvement option.
As the FAA filed it
LANDING BOS DURING DAYLIGHT, VFR, LIGHT WIND CONDITIONS, CAPTAIN ASSUMED DUTIES AS PILOT FLYING (PF) DUE TO LAHSO OPERATIONS IN EFFECT LANDING RUNWAY 22L. THE TRANSFER OF CONTROLS OCCURRED IN ADVANCE OF APPROACH AND LANDING. OPERATOR STABILIZED APPROACH CRITERIA MET THROUGHOUT THE APPROACH INTO FLARE AND TOUCHDOWN ZONE.
CORROBORATING REPORTS FROM BOTH CREWMEMBERS AND THE DIGITAL VOICE AND DATA RECORDING (DVDR) INDICATE THE AIRCRAFT BECAME AIRBORNE AGAIN AFTER AN INITIAL SKIP FOLLOWED BY A FIRM LANDING TOUCHDOWN. DVDR ANALYSIS SUPPORTS THE CREW’S REPORT OF TWO DISTINCT RUNWAY IMPACTS OVER A 4 SECOND PERIOD. FURTHER EVALUATION OF DATA INDICATES THE AIRCRAFT RECORDED A 1.4 G INITIAL VERTICAL ACCELERATION DURING THE INITIAL BOUNCE FOLLOWED BY A 2.4 G VERTICAL ACCELERATION UPON TOUCHDOWN FOLLOWING THE INITIAL SKIP. THIS TOUCHDOWN FORCE VALUE MET THE CRITERIA FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, HARD LANDING INSPECTION. THE RESULTS OF OEM AND OPERATOR INSPECTIONS COMBINED WITH FAA ASSESSMENTS INDICATE THE AIRFRAME RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE TAILSTRIKE.
CERTIFICATE HOLDER INDICATES OEM-SUPPLIED INFORMATION OF TAIL STRIKE POTENTIAL WITH PITCH ATTITUDES OF 11.5 DEGREES OR GREATER ON LANDING. DVDR ANALYSIS INDICATES THE ROUND OUT AND FLARE PITCH ATTITUDE CHANGED ABRUPTLY FROM 5.8 DEGREES TO 13.9 DEGREES THROUGH STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION IN THIS 4 SECOND PERIOD. THIS RATE OF PITCH CHANGE IS NEITHER CONSISTENT WITH CERTIFICATE HOLDER DOCUMENTED STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS) NOR CONSISTENT WITH OEM RECOMMENDATIONS AND INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES FOR RECOVERIES FROM BOUNCED LANDINGS IN THIS CATEGORY OF AIRCRAFT.
BOTH PILOTS RECEIVED ADDITIONAL GROUND AND SIMULATOR TRAINING TO RECOGNIZE, PRACTICE AND REINFORCE ELEMENTS OF BOUNCED LANDING RECOVERY TECHNIQUES. BOTH PILOTS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED ALL TRAINING AND DEMONSTRATED THEIR INDIVIDUAL PROFICIENCY AND CREW PERFORMANCE TO QUALIFICATION STANDARDS OUTLINED IN THE OPERATOR'S AQP TRAINING SYSTEM.
THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE TAIL STRIKE IS THE RESULT OF THE PILOT FLYING(PF) MISAPPLICATION OF PITCH CONTROLS IN THE LANDING PHASE. DESPITE HAVING RECEIVED INITIAL AND RECURRENT BOUNCED LANDING RECOVERY TRAINING WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS IN A QUALIFIED SIMULATOR DEVICE, THE PILOT FLYING STATED UNDER THE IMMEDIATE STRESS OF EXPERIENCING THE SUDDEN BOUNCE COMBINED WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO HOLD SHORT OF AN ACTIVE CROSSING RUNWAY, HE CHOSE TO INSTINCTIVELY CONTINUE WITH THE LANDING, REVERTING TO FIRST-TRAINED, PITCH RESPONSES IN LIGHT, NON-TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY CONTRIBUTING TO THIS EVENT IS THE PILOT’S STATED SUBCONSCIOUS DESIRE TO NOT GO AROUND WITH LAND AND HOLD SHORT OPERATIONS (LAHSO) OPERATIONS IN EFFECT.
PRESENTLY, THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER STARTED A QUALITY EVALUATION BY COMPARING OTHER SIM SPONSOR APPROACHES TO BOUNCE SIMULATOR REPLICATION. ALL EIGHT (8) SIMULATORS ARE PENDING A QUALITY ASSESSMENT TO IMPROVE AERODYNAMIC MODELING FOR REALISTIC E170/75 BOUNCED TRAINING. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO PROMOTE POSITIVE TRANSFER OF THIS TRAINING TO THE LINE.
PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE PROMOTING FLIGHT CREW AWARENESS OF THIS ACCIDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPERATORS' SMS.
IN ADDITION, FAA RECOMMENDS SUPPORTING FLIGHT MANUAL GUIDANCE, TRAINING CONTENT, AND INSTRUCTOR DELIVERY BRIEFINGS TO BE RE-EXAMINED BY OPERATOR FOR ADEQUACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF BOUNCED LANDING RECOVERIES. ADDITIONALLY, FAA RECOMMENDS EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON PROMOTING MENTAL READINESS FOR REJECTED LANDINGS AND GO AROUNDS DURING SUPERVISED OPERATING EXPERIENCE (SOE) AND ROUTINE LINE CHECKS. ADDITIONALLY, ENTRY INTO SPECIAL TRACKING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED MANDATORY FOR CREWMEMBERS WHO DEMONSTRATE INDIVIDUAL PROFICIENCY OR CREW PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM SAFETY INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS. THE OBJECTIVE IS THAT EACH CREW MEMBER RECEIVE REMEDIAL TRAINING WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORT TRAINING AS A VIABLE PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OPTION.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.