What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
The airplane was configured for landing at approximately 1,100 feet and met the operator’s
Stabilized approach criteria at both 1,000 and 500 feet; however, the stable call at 500 feet was missed by the pm. At the decision altitude (da), the autopilot was disconnected. Around 200 feet above ground level (AGL), the crew encountered heavy rain, and the pf requested activation of the windshield wipers. Shortly after, the pf stated he had “lost the runway” but the runway environment was visible. He asked whether a go-around should be initiated. The pm, who could see the runway environment, responded that they were good to continue. At 20 to 30 feet radio altitude, the crew retarded the thrust levers to idle. About the same time, the pf saw the runway threshold lights directly ahead of the aircraft’s nose. The crew perceived that the airplane touched down on the blast pad, a paved surface preceding the runway threshold. The remainder of the landing rollout and taxi were uneventful.
Following the initial touchdown, the airplane rolled onto the pavement and impacted a runway threshold light.
Following the incident, temporary and interim dispositions were carried out in accordance with Airbus engineering authorizations EA-A319-32-113573-00 and -01. The aircraft was ferried with landing gear down as per Airbus engineering instructions. Engineering guidance permitted the deferral of jacking-related inspections, while all other inspections were completed with the aircraft on wheels at minimum weight to maximize visibility of critical components.
A comprehensive series of inspections and maintenance actions were performed on the landing gear systems. Functional tests of the main landing gear (MLG) extension, retraction, and free fall were completed with no faults found. Pressure checks of both the MLG and nose landing gear (NLG) shock absorbers confirmed values within acceptable limits. Dimensional inspections of the MLG sliding tubes and side stay lower cardon pin holes showed measurements well within Airbus tolerances. All four MLG wheels were replaced as a precautionary measure.
Brake and wheel assemblies were removed and reinstalled to facilitate access for further inspections. These tasks were completed in accordance with amm 32-41-11 and 32-42-27 procedures, with no discrepancies noted. Additionally, detailed visual inspections of the NLG, MLG, and associated components revealed no signs of damage or oil loss.
Airframe and structural inspections were conducted across the cockpit, cabin, wings, fuselage, and nacelles, following amm 05-51-24-200-001. These inspections were completed to both level 1 and level 2 standards, and no structural damage was identified.
Final checks confirmed that no fault messages or warnings related to ata 32 systems were present. All required inspections and dispositions have been completed, and the maintenance record has been formally closed.
As the FAA filed it
THE AIRPLANE WAS CONFIGURED FOR LANDING AT APPROXIMATELY 1,100 FEET AND MET THE OPERATOR’S
STABILIZED APPROACH CRITERIA AT BOTH 1,000 AND 500 FEET; HOWEVER, THE STABLE CALL AT 500 FEET WAS MISSED BY THE PM. AT THE DECISION ALTITUDE (DA), THE AUTOPILOT WAS DISCONNECTED. AROUND 200 FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL (AGL), THE CREW ENCOUNTERED HEAVY RAIN, AND THE PF REQUESTED ACTIVATION OF THE WINDSHIELD WIPERS. SHORTLY AFTER, THE PF STATED HE HAD “LOST THE RUNWAY” BUT THE RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT WAS VISIBLE. HE ASKED WHETHER A GO-AROUND SHOULD BE INITIATED. THE PM, WHO COULD SEE THE RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT, RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE GOOD TO CONTINUE. AT 20 TO 30 FEET RADIO ALTITUDE, THE CREW RETARDED THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE. ABOUT THE SAME TIME, THE PF SAW THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD LIGHTS DIRECTLY AHEAD OF THE AIRCRAFT’S NOSE. THE CREW PERCEIVED THAT THE AIRPLANE TOUCHED DOWN ON THE BLAST PAD, A PAVED SURFACE PRECEDING THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD. THE REMAINDER OF THE LANDING ROLLOUT AND TAXI WERE UNEVENTFUL.
FOLLOWING THE INITIAL TOUCHDOWN, THE AIRPLANE ROLLED ONTO THE PAVEMENT AND IMPACTED A RUNWAY THRESHOLD LIGHT.
FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT, TEMPORARY AND INTERIM DISPOSITIONS WERE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AIRBUS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATIONS EA-A319-32-113573-00 AND -01. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FERRIED WITH LANDING GEAR DOWN AS PER AIRBUS ENGINEERING INSTRUCTIONS. ENGINEERING GUIDANCE PERMITTED THE DEFERRAL OF JACKING-RELATED INSPECTIONS, WHILE ALL OTHER INSPECTIONS WERE COMPLETED WITH THE AIRCRAFT ON WHEELS AT MINIMUM WEIGHT TO MAXIMIZE VISIBILITY OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS.
A COMPREHENSIVE SERIES OF INSPECTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACTIONS WERE PERFORMED ON THE LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS. FUNCTIONAL TESTS OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR (MLG) EXTENSION, RETRACTION, AND FREE FALL WERE COMPLETED WITH NO FAULTS FOUND. PRESSURE CHECKS OF BOTH THE MLG AND NOSE LANDING GEAR (NLG) SHOCK ABSORBERS CONFIRMED VALUES WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. DIMENSIONAL INSPECTIONS OF THE MLG SLIDING TUBES AND SIDE STAY LOWER CARDON PIN HOLES SHOWED MEASUREMENTS WELL WITHIN AIRBUS TOLERANCES. ALL FOUR MLG WHEELS WERE REPLACED AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.
BRAKE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLIES WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED TO FACILITATE ACCESS FOR FURTHER INSPECTIONS. THESE TASKS WERE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AMM 32-41-11 AND 32-42-27 PROCEDURES, WITH NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED. ADDITIONALLY, DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTIONS OF THE NLG, MLG, AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS REVEALED NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE OR OIL LOSS.
AIRFRAME AND STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED ACROSS THE COCKPIT, CABIN, WINGS, FUSELAGE, AND NACELLES, FOLLOWING AMM 05-51-24-200-001. THESE INSPECTIONS WERE COMPLETED TO BOTH LEVEL 1 AND LEVEL 2 STANDARDS, AND NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE WAS IDENTIFIED.
FINAL CHECKS CONFIRMED THAT NO FAULT MESSAGES OR WARNINGS RELATED TO ATA 32 SYSTEMS WERE PRESENT. ALL REQUIRED INSPECTIONS AND DISPOSITIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, AND THE MAINTENANCE RECORD HAS BEEN FORMALLY CLOSED.