20260808011599I

Incident · No damage

FAA incident report · Zipline International P2 ZIP · Red Oak, TX · August 8, 2026

Date
August 8, 2026 · 18:46 local
Place
Red Oak, TX
Phase of flight
Hover/Holding
Operating rules
Air taxi and commuter (Part 135)
Operator
1ZIA
Damage
No damage
Aircraft
N394KW
Reported as
Zipline International P2 ZIP
People aboard
0
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0
Pilot’s certificate
Private pilot

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

On August 8, 2026, at approximately 6:14 pm CDT, a descending delivery droid contacted a third-party individual who entered the ground-loading area at the Red Oak walmart. The onsite runner reported attempting to warn the individual. Following contact, the runner reported offering emergency medical assistance. The individual declined an ambulance and reportedly sought medical evaluation. This has not been independently confirmed.

Operator operations initiated the incident response process and classified the event as sev 3 for a possible non-serious third-party injury. The affected loading location, P2-GL-153, was disabled pending review of operating criteria and mitigation measures. Follow-up with the individual was initiated. The individual’s diagnosis and final injury outcome have not been confirmed as of the report date.

Despite contact with injured party, non participant did not comment or communicate with iic regarding any information from the incident on 8/8/2026.

The loading location was exposed to pedestrian traffic, and the detection system had limited coverage for people entering the loading area laterally during droid descent.

Runner procedures required physical presence and attention to the loading area. The runner’s reported verbal warning did not prevent the individual from entering beneath the descending droid. Available information does not establish that the runner violated those procedures.

Operator has since revised procedures with additional layers of sterile area for non-participants.

Operator communicated corrective actions communicated that are:

Complete -

Loading-site criteria and restrictions: loading-site guidance was updated. Six previously active walmart ground-loading locations were disabled pending mitigation.

Runner training: updated runner training was implemented on August 12, 2026. The training reinforced continuous attention to the loading area, clear and timely pedestrian warnings, avoidance of competing tasks, and adherence to approved loading procedures.

In progress:

Loading-area barriers and resuming operations: a stanchion pilot was approved for the six disabled locations. Procurement and installation remain pending. Operations may resume after the stanchions are installed and any necessary placement adjustments are completed. Estimated completion: October 2026.

Detection coverage: add monocular person detection to the droid to improve coverage for people entering the loading or delivery area from the side during droid descent. Estimated completion: January 2027.

Under review:

Changes to droid descent speed, audible cues, and lighting: reduced low-altitude descent speed and additional audible cues remain under evaluation. Implementation and effectiveness of the proposed changes have not been confirmed. Existing lights on the droid were already operating at full brightness.

The iic attempted multiple communication methods with non-participant that included written and telephonic correspondence but has not had success in any subsequent communication after initial contact.

Operator changes to sterile areas will be evaluated through the subsequent continuous operational safety models as the validity, output, and effect of those changes.

The UAS / drone had no damage to the aircraft. The remote pilot in command was qualified and current for the operation. There were no injuries that were verified with the injured party, despite making initial contact and subsequent communication outreach efforts.

As the FAA filed it

ON AUGUST 8, 2026, AT APPROXIMATELY 6:14 PM CDT, A DESCENDING DELIVERY DROID CONTACTED A THIRD-PARTY INDIVIDUAL WHO ENTERED THE GROUND-LOADING AREA AT THE RED OAK WALMART. THE ONSITE RUNNER REPORTED ATTEMPTING TO WARN THE INDIVIDUAL. FOLLOWING CONTACT, THE RUNNER REPORTED OFFERING EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. THE INDIVIDUAL DECLINED AN AMBULANCE AND REPORTEDLY SOUGHT MEDICAL EVALUATION. THIS HAS NOT BEEN INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED.

OPERATOR OPERATIONS INITIATED THE INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCESS AND CLASSIFIED THE EVENT AS SEV 3 FOR A POSSIBLE NON-SERIOUS THIRD-PARTY INJURY. THE AFFECTED LOADING LOCATION, P2-GL-153, WAS DISABLED PENDING REVIEW OF OPERATING CRITERIA AND MITIGATION MEASURES. FOLLOW-UP WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WAS INITIATED. THE INDIVIDUAL’S DIAGNOSIS AND FINAL INJURY OUTCOME HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED AS OF THE REPORT DATE.

DESPITE CONTACT WITH INJURED PARTY, NON PARTICIPANT DID NOT COMMENT OR COMMUNICATE WITH IIC REGARDING ANY INFORMATION FROM THE INCIDENT ON 8/8/2026.

THE LOADING LOCATION WAS EXPOSED TO PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC, AND THE DETECTION SYSTEM HAD LIMITED COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE ENTERING THE LOADING AREA LATERALLY DURING DROID DESCENT.

RUNNER PROCEDURES REQUIRED PHYSICAL PRESENCE AND ATTENTION TO THE LOADING AREA. THE RUNNER’S REPORTED VERBAL WARNING DID NOT PREVENT THE INDIVIDUAL FROM ENTERING BENEATH THE DESCENDING DROID. AVAILABLE INFORMATION DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE RUNNER VIOLATED THOSE PROCEDURES.

OPERATOR HAS SINCE REVISED PROCEDURES WITH ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF STERILE AREA FOR NON-PARTICIPANTS.

OPERATOR COMMUNICATED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMMUNICATED THAT ARE:

COMPLETE -

LOADING-SITE CRITERIA AND RESTRICTIONS: LOADING-SITE GUIDANCE WAS UPDATED. SIX PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE WALMART GROUND-LOADING LOCATIONS WERE DISABLED PENDING MITIGATION.

RUNNER TRAINING: UPDATED RUNNER TRAINING WAS IMPLEMENTED ON AUGUST 12, 2026. THE TRAINING REINFORCED CONTINUOUS ATTENTION TO THE LOADING AREA, CLEAR AND TIMELY PEDESTRIAN WARNINGS, AVOIDANCE OF COMPETING TASKS, AND ADHERENCE TO APPROVED LOADING PROCEDURES.

IN PROGRESS:

LOADING-AREA BARRIERS AND RESUMING OPERATIONS: A STANCHION PILOT WAS APPROVED FOR THE SIX DISABLED LOCATIONS. PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION REMAIN PENDING. OPERATIONS MAY RESUME AFTER THE STANCHIONS ARE INSTALLED AND ANY NECESSARY PLACEMENT ADJUSTMENTS ARE COMPLETED. ESTIMATED COMPLETION: OCTOBER 2026.

DETECTION COVERAGE: ADD MONOCULAR PERSON DETECTION TO THE DROID TO IMPROVE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE ENTERING THE LOADING OR DELIVERY AREA FROM THE SIDE DURING DROID DESCENT. ESTIMATED COMPLETION: JANUARY 2027.

UNDER REVIEW:

CHANGES TO DROID DESCENT SPEED, AUDIBLE CUES, AND LIGHTING: REDUCED LOW-ALTITUDE DESCENT SPEED AND ADDITIONAL AUDIBLE CUES REMAIN UNDER EVALUATION. IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. EXISTING LIGHTS ON THE DROID WERE ALREADY OPERATING AT FULL BRIGHTNESS.

THE IIC ATTEMPTED MULTIPLE COMMUNICATION METHODS WITH NON-PARTICIPANT THAT INCLUDED WRITTEN AND TELEPHONIC CORRESPONDENCE BUT HAS NOT HAD SUCCESS IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION AFTER INITIAL CONTACT.

OPERATOR CHANGES TO STERILE AREAS WILL BE EVALUATED THROUGH THE SUBSEQUENT CONTINUOUS OPERATIONAL SAFETY MODELS AS THE VALIDITY, OUTPUT, AND EFFECT OF THOSE CHANGES.

THE UAS / DRONE HAD NO DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT. THE REMOTE PILOT IN COMMAND WAS QUALIFIED AND CURRENT FOR THE OPERATION. THERE WERE NO INJURIES THAT WERE VERIFIED WITH THE INJURED PARTY, DESPITE MAKING INITIAL CONTACT AND SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION OUTREACH EFFORTS.