- Date
- August 3, 2017, 13:00 local (22:00 UTC)
- Place
- Delta Junction, AK
- Injuries
- 2 uninjured
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Phase of flight
- Landing
- Aircraft
- N351SHAirbus AS350
- Defining event
- Landing: Collision during takeoff/land
- Weather
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Status
- Completed · report September 22, 2017
- Report
- Approved by Office Director
- NTSB office
- Alaska Regional Office
- Parties
- Safran Helicopter Engines (Technical Advisor), FAA Fairbanks FSDO, Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, Airbus Helicopters (Technical Advisor)
- FAA report
- 20170803012769A
- Case key
- 95765
From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.
On this page
Probable cause
The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from a steel frame attached to a tracked drilling unit. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to visually identify the steel frame during the reconnaissance process.
Findings · 2
NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.
Sequence of events
The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.
Analysis
The helicopter pilot reported that he was transporting a passenger to a remote drilling site where a tracked drilling unit was stationed. He reported that he landed into the wind, which necessitated descending over bordering trees into the drilling site. The helicopter touched down on the dirt, and upon lowering the collective, he reported that he heard a "bang," and the helicopter slowly started to "pick up a ground wobble." The pilot shut down the helicopter, and both occupants exited without further incident. A postaccident inspection revealed that the blue and red main rotor blades sustained substantial damage from impacting a black 1.5-inch steel frame attached to the tracked drilling unit, which is used to mount a canvas weather shelter for the drilling crews. The pilot reported that the steel frame was not visible to him from above as he was descending into the drilling site. The pilot further reported that he had made multiple landings at the drilling site in the past 3 months and that, with the previous landings, he had landed farther past the tracked drilling unit, and the steel frame was always behind the helicopter. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration Helicopter Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-21A, 2012) discusses high and low reconnaissance procedures and states, in part: The purpose of conducting a high reconnaissance is to determine direction and speed of the wind, a touchdown point, suitability of the landing area, approach and departure axes, and obstacles for both the approach and departure. A low reconnaissance is accomplished during the approach to the landing area. When flying the approach, verify what was observed in the high reconnaissance, and check for anything new that may have been missed at a higher altitude, such as wires and their supporting structures (poles, towers, etc.), slopes, and small crevices.
Factual narrative
The helicopter pilot reported that he was transporting a passenger to a remote drilling site, where a tracked drilling unit was stationed. He reported that he landed into the wind, which necessitated descending over bordering trees into the drilling site. The helicopter touched down on the dirt, and upon lowering the collective, he reported he heard a "bang" and the helicopter slowly started to "pick up a ground wobble." The pilot shutdown the helicopter and both occupants exited without further incident. A postaccident inspection revealed that the blue and red main rotor blades sustained substantial damage from impacting a black 1.5-inch steel frame attached to the tracked drilling unit, which is used to mount a canvas weather shelter for the drilling crews. The pilot reported that the steel frame was not visible to him from above as he was descending into the drilling site. The pilot further reported that multiple landings have been made to the drilling site in the past 3 months, and that with the previous landings he landed further past the tracked drilling unit and the steel frame was always behind the helicopter. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration Helicopter Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-21A, 2012) discusses high and low reconnaissance procedures and states in part: The purpose of conducting a high reconnaissance is to determine direction and speed of the wind, a touchdown point, suitability of the landing area, approach and departure axes, and obstacles for both the approach and departure. A low reconnaissance is accomplished during the approach to the landing area. When flying the approach, verify what was observed in the high reconnaissance, and check for anything new that may have been missed at a higher altitude, such as wires and their supporting structures (poles, towers, etc.), slopes, and small crevices.
Aircraft
- Registration
- N351SH
- Reported as
- Airbus AS350 (B3)
- Category
- Helicopter
- Serial number
- 4598
- Built
- 2008
- Airframe hours
- 3,823.7
- Engine
- Safran Helicopter Engines Arriel 2B1, 847 horsepower, turbo shaft
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Part 135
- Operator
- Soloy Helicopters, LLC, doing business as Soloy Helicopters, LLC
- Registered owner
- Wells Fargo Bank Northwest Na Trustee
- Airworthiness certificate
- Standard, Normal
- Last inspection
- 100 hour · June 19, 2017
- Departed
- 76AK · Delta Junction, AK
- Destination
- 76AK · Delta Junction, AK
- Flight plan
- Company VFR
- Equipment
- None
Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.
Flight crew
As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.
- Role
- Pilot
- Age
- 64
- Injuries
- None
- Certificate
- Commercial
- Medical
- Class 2, With waivers/limitations
- Last flight review
- May 12, 2017
- Seat
- Right
- Restraint
- 4-point
- Flight hours
- 14,998 total · 2,300 in this make and model · 14,800 as pilot in command · 340 in the last 90 days · 167 in the last 30 days · 5 in the last 24 hours
Weather
- Conditions
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Wind
- 180° at 13 knots
- Visibility
- 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling
- 11,000 ft broken
- Temperature
- 72 °F, dew point 46 °F
- Altimeter
- 30.12 inHg
- Observed at
- PABI, 35 nm away
Docket · 2
The files NTSB released with the investigation on August 31, 2017, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 1.2 MB in all.
FAA reports on this event · 1
The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.
Other investigations on N351SH · 1
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.