ANC96FA072

MD-11 was cleared visual approach (apch) to runway (rwy) 24R, 3 mi (1 min) behind Boeing 747 (landing on rwy 24L). Rwys were 550 ft apart with rwy 24L threshold staggered 4300 ft beyond that of rwy 24R. MD-11 captain (capt) used VASI, which had 3.25 deg glide path. On final apch, 21 kt left crosswind diminished to about 5 kts. From 100 ft agl, MD-11 exhibited left, then right roll & slight yawing. About 50 ft agl, MD-11 entered high sink rate. Capt began go-around & raised nose. Lower aft fuselage hit rwy & MD-11 bounced. Capt discontinued go-around; MD-11 bounced two more times; sustained damage to aft pressure bulkhead. Last 20 sec of flight, MD-11 averaged 1380 ft/min rate of descent, 152 kts, 5.12 deg apch angle. MD-11 flight manual discussed visual apchs, go-around procedure, & tail/wing clearance issues, but operator did not have formal tailstrike awareness training for MD-11 pilots. After accident, operator developed tail strike awareness training program that included bounced landing recovery & simulator training, & limited pitch attitude to 7-1/2 deg for recovery from bounced landing. AIM recommended that for landing behind larger acft on parallel rwy, closer than 2500 ft, stay above larger acft's flight path. Tower controller did not issue precaution for wake turbulence.

History of the Flight

On May 16, 1996, about 0633 Alaska daylight time (ADT), a McDonnell Douglas MD-11-F, N614FE, sustained substantial damage when its tail struck the runway during landing at the Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The airplane, operated by Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee, as Federal Express flight 71 (FDX71), was being operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country cargo flight under Title 14 CFR Part 121 when the accident occurred. The captain, a certificated airline transport pilot, reported minor injuries. The first officer, also a certificated airline transport pilot, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated from Newark, New Jersey, about 2328 ADT, May 15, 1996.

A Japanese Airlines Boeing 747 (JAL flight 49), contacted the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) at 0621:25 and reported passing 10,000 feet during its descent into the Anchorage terminal area from the northeast. The accident airplane (FDX71), also arrived in the terminal area from the northeast and advised the ARTCC of passing 10,000 feet at 0622:35. Each airplane was vectored for a visual approach to runway 24L. At 0622:50, FDX71 advised they would take runway 24R if it was available. At 0624:48, FDX71 requested a right base entry to the airport but the request was denied due to sequencing. At 0628:13, FDX71 advised the ARTCC that JAL49 was in sight. The ARTCC advised FDX71 to maintain visual separation from JAL49 and was cleared for a visual approach to runway 24R at 0628:31.

At 0630:17, JAL49 received clearance to land on runway 24L from the Anchorage Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) local controller. At 0630:32, FDX71 was cleared by ATCT for a visual approach to runway 24R. At 0631:42 the local controller requested on-board inertial navigational system (INS) wind information from FDX71 and was told 180 degrees (true, 156 degrees magnetic) at 21 knots. At that time, the controller reported observing FDX71, 4 nautical miles southeast of the approach end of runway 24R. JAL 49 was observed approximately 1 mile from the approach end of runway 24L.

The captain of FDX71 reported he was flying the airplane and turned onto the final approach at 1,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The captain was visually aligning the airplane with the visual approach slope indicator (VASI) for the runway. He indicated he was observing a "pink over white" visual angle indication from the VASI. The autopilot was disengaged and the autothrottle was engaged. About 50 feet above the ground, the captain noticed some instability of the airplane and then the airplane developed a high rate of descent. The captain initiated a wind shear "escape" procedure by applying go-around power and began pitching the nose of the airplane upward but the airplane continued to descend. The tail of the airplane scraped the runway and bounced into the air. The captain decided to discontinue the go-around maneuver and closed the throttles. The airplane descended and bounced a second time. The airplane touched down a third time and then rolled out.

The pilot was concerned about the hazard of wind shear activity to other arriving aircraft and reported a 40 knot low level wind shear on short final.

The airplane was inspected externally by airport fire department personnel and then was taxied to parking. During the completion of the after landing checklist, the flight crew noticed the spoiler handle was retracted. The crew also noticed a "FADEC ALTN" (full authority digital electronic control - alternate) alert message from each engine on the engine activity display (EAD).

Crew Information

The captain holds an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane single and multi-engine land ratings. He also holds a flight engineer certificate with a turbojet powered rating and type ratings in Douglas DC-8, Boeing 727 and 747, and McDonnell Douglas MD-11 aircraft. The captain received his basic indoctrination with Federal Express Corp., on April 4, 1977. Since that time the captain has functioned as captain of Boeing 727 and Douglas DC-8 aircraft and first officer of Boeing 747 aircraft. On July 20, 1994, he completed his initial operating experience (IOE) in McDonnell Douglas MD-11 aircraft. At the time of the accident, the captain had accrued 1,470 hours in the MD-11. The captain's most recent simulator training was provided on June 25, 1995.

The first officer holds an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multi-engine land rating. He also holds a flight engineer certificate with a turbojet powered rating and a type rating in McDonnell Douglas MD-11 aircraft. The first officer received his basic indoctrination with Federal Express Corp., on May 9, 1986. Since that time, the first officer has functioned as the second officer and first officer on Boeing 727 aircraft. On April 26, 1992, he completed his IOE in MD-11 aircraft. At the time of the accident, the first officer had accrued 2,107 hours in the MD-11. The first officer's most recent simulator training was provided on April 23, 1995.

Aircraft Information

The airplane had accumulated a total time in service of 12,392.54 flight hours. The most recent continuous airworthiness inspection was accomplished on April 29, 1996, 204.76 flight hours before the accident.

Following the accident, the operator measured the right main landing gear strut extension as 5 3/8 inches at 1,475 PSI. The left main landing gear strut extension was 4 3/4 inches at 1,500 PSI. The status of the fluid level of the main landing gear struts was not evaluated by the operator at the Anchorage base prior to the airplane being ferried to their maintenance facility in Los Angeles, California, for repair. During the repair to the airframe, the operator planned to conduct a check of the strut fluid level. On July 10, 1996, the operator informed the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) of an internal miscommunication that resulted in the landing gear struts being deflated on May 27, 1996 while being prepared for the tail strike repair.

On the accident date, the airplane transmitted an automated Arinc Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) message to a Federal Express Inc., ground station at 0632:18. The message noted "turbulence". A second ACARS report obtained from the airplane's computer noted an "on report" at 0632:03. The accuracy of the transmittal time could not be correlated with the time reference contained on the flight data recorder. The operator indicated that the airplane could have generated the ACARS report as a result of the hard landing.

The airplane utilizes an auto ground spoiler system (AGS) that will automatically deploy the spoilers about 30 degrees when the main landing gear tires spin up at touchdown. The spoilers will fully deploy to 60 degrees upon nose wheel compression. The AGS also has an auto-retract feature for use in go-arounds. The spoilers will retract automatically when the number 2 throttle is advanced more than 1 inch from the idle stop.

The airplane utilizes several systems to provide the crew with alert messages concerning the operational limits of the airplane. The previously noted FADEC ALTN alert message on the EAD is recorded when the throttles are advanced beyond the FADEC bar. At this point the FADEC systems reverts to the alternate mode for maximum manual selection of engine thrust.

The airplane is equipped with a wind shear alert and guidance system (WAGS) that provides a visual and aural warning and pitch guidance commands to the crew. The system is enabled from 1,500 feet down to 50 feet above ground level (AGL). The WAGS did not activate.

The airplane is also equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) that provides a visual and aural warning to the crew. The GPWS had several