CEN15LA280

The pilot receiving instruction and the flight instructor were conducting an instructional flight to help prepare the pilot for the multiengine practical examination. The pilot stated that, while returning to the base airport and about 7,500 ft above ground level (agl), the instructor reduced power on the left engine to simulate a single engine-out emergency. The student then identified, verified, and feathered the left engine propeller. About 7,000 ft agl, the instructor advised the pilot that they were going to conduct a simulated dual engine-out emergency and reduced the right engine power to idle. About 3 miles from the airport, the instructor advised that he was going to restart the feathered left engine, and the left propeller began turning, which led him to believe the engine was operating; however, he did not verify that the engine was operating. The instructor advised the pilot to conduct a straight-in approach and target 1,000 ft down the runway. As the airplane neared the airport with full flaps and the landing gear lowered for landing, the instructor realized that it was lined up with a taxiway. The instructor pushed the throttles forward, took the control yoke, and instructed the pilot to "get the wheels up for a go-around." Subsequently, the airplane entered a steep left turn and then impacted a cornfield adjacent to the airport. The instructor's inadequate monitoring of the approach led to his failure to see that the airplane was lined up with a taxiway instead of a runway, which necessitated the go-around. Data downloaded from the airplane's onboard avionics showed that, about 4.5 minutes before the accident, the left engine fuel flow and rpm decreased to zero, consistent with the engine being shut down and feathered. The rpm and fuel flow remained at zero for about 4 minutes and then began to increase. Subsequently, the fuel flow began to drop below minimum fuel flow levels again, and the rpm remained about 2,000 and decreased as the airspeed decreased, which is indicative of the instructor's failure to restart the engine. It is likely that the instructor saw the propeller windmilling and assumed it was rotating under power. The Federal Aviation Administration noted in a General Aviation Joint Steering Committee Safety Enhancement Topic bulletin that "single-engine go-arounds in light twin [airplanes] often don't go well and they should be avoided if possible." Because the instructor did not recognize that the airplane only had one engine operating, there was insufficient power for a go-around, which resulted in the instructor's subsequent loss of airplane control.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On June 12, 2015, about 1350 central daylight time, a Beechcraft G58 airplane, N669CS, experienced a loss of left engine power during a go-around and subsequent impact with terrain near Taylorville Municipal Airport (TAZ), Taylorville, Illinois. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall and aft bulkhead. The student pilot, who was the registered owner, and instructor pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was being operated in accordance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, without a flight plan. The flight departed from Decatur Airport (DEC), Decatur, Illinois, at 1211 and was destined to TAZ. The pilot receiving instruction (student pilot) stated he hired the instructor pilot for 4 days of flight instruction to help prepare him for the multi-engine practical exam. The accident occurred on the last landing of the last day of the 4-day training period. After lunch, they took off from Decatur, Illinois and headed to Champaign, Illinois where they completed about one hour of instrument training "under the hood." When completed with the instrument training, they decided to return to TAZ. They were coming from the northeast, about 8 to 9 miles from TAZ, when the instructor "pulled power to the left engine." They were about 7,500 ft above ground-level (agl). The student said he identified, verified, and feathered the left engine propeller. The instructor said he wanted to practice a simulated dual engine out emergency and pulled the right engine to idle about 7,000 feet agl. About 3 miles out of TAZ the instructor advised he was going to restart the feathered left engine, and the left propeller started turning which indicated to him that the engine was running. The pilot receiving instruction made the call for 2-mile final for runway 8 over the radio. The instructor advised him to conduct a straight-in approach and target 1,000 feet down the runway because they had no power. His airspeed was about 100kts targeting 95 kts for landing. He was on short final, with full flaps and gear down for landing, when the instructor noticed he was lined up for the taxiway. The instructor pushed the throttles forward and announced to "get the wheels up for a go-around." The airplane made a severe left turn. The student stated he could not control the airplane as it continued in the left turn. The airplane "barely cleared a hangar," flew across the highway, went under some power wires, and landed in a corn field. There was no formal transfer of controls, the instructor just took the throttles and control yoke. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot receiving instruction held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He reported 276 hours of total flight experience, with about 19 hours in multi-engine airplanes in the prior 30 days. All the student pilot's multi-engine time was completed in the accident airplane. The student held an FAAthird-class medical certificate, dated July 12, 2013, without any limitation or waivers. The student flew a Cessna 206 prior and was new to multi-engine airplanes, with no prior multi-engine flight time. According to the student pilot, he felt the instructor was a "bit intimidating with his resume" and "take charge kind of guy." The instructor owned a Beechcraft Bonanza of his own with many hours logged, the student said did not question the instructor's actions because he was a low time pilot in comparison. The instructor pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate; with ratings in single- and multi- engine land, single-engine sea, instrument airplanes and a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi- engine land. The instructor reported 18,645 hours of total flight experience, with about 1,400 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 25 multi-engine hours in the last 30 days. The instructor held an FAA second-class medical certificate, dated May 15, 2015, with the limitation: must wear lenses for distance, have glasses for near vision. His flight instructor certificate was renewed in July 2014. His flight review was completed on March 22, 2015. He had flown Beech airplanes for 26 years and about 1,300 hours of instruction in the Beech Barron 55 and 58 airplanes. He had a total of about 13,600 hours as pilot-in-command for single and multi-engine airplanes, including 5,000 hours of military time in F-100 and F-16 airplanes. He remarked that he has owned a Beech Bonanza F33A for 34 years and has about 7,500 hours flying that airplane. The instructor pilot stated he had been instructing through the Bonanza Proficient Pilot Program (BPPP) since 1988. To be accepted into the program an instructor must pass a review of his flight records and a flight check. The program typically looks for pilots with substantial training. In addition, semi-annual ground training and a flight check were required to remain a BPPP qualified instructor. He had a private contract between himself and the accident student pilot. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane was moved to a hangar at Taylorville Municipal Airport, in Taylorville, IL where the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-in-Charge (IIC), along with FAA and airplane manufactures, conducted a wreckage examination and engine test runs. It was noted the FAA had removed two access panels on the lower fuselage aft of the nose landing gear to visually inspect for damage to the firewall bulkhead during their initial on-scene response to the accident. The lower section of the firewall bulkhead was buckled. The aircraft hobbs meter displayed 24.7 hours. Both throttle levers were at idle, both propellers were at high RPM, both mixture levers were at idle cutoff, both fuel selectors were in the 'off' position. The flap handle was up and visually indicated the flaps were up. The landing gear handle was down. The cowl flaps were in the 'closed' position. The pitchtrim displayed 5 units nose up. The rudder and aileron were in the 'neutral' position. Both the left and right fuel gauges indicated 47 gallons, a total of 94 gallons of fuel onboard. Engine continuity was confirmed by turning the crankshaft and audibly observing the 'clicking' magnetos. Engine control continuity of the throttle, mixture and propeller to the left engine was verified. The upper and chin cowling were removed to access the engine. The engine was visually inspected, no apparent damage was noted. The engine crankshaft propeller flange was visually inspected, no damage was noted. The SD card was removed from the Garmin 1000 and downloaded by the NTSB IIC. The data showed the fuel flow to the left engine (engine 1) began to decrease about 13:43:13. A minute later, at 13:44:13 fuel flow to the left engine went to 0. A 0 RPM indicates the engine was showdown and feathered by a pilot/operator. Engine RPMs for the left engine began decreasing at 13:44:12 and slowed to a completed stop at 13:44:21. The left engine fuel flow and RPMs remained at 0 until 13:48:18. A second later, both fuel flow and RPMs began to increase. The RPMs remained about 2,000 RPM for about a minute when it began decreasing, coinciding with the decreasing airspeed toward the end of the flight. However, the fuel flow only briefly increased above minimum fuel levels before decreasing below minimums again at 13:48:26 for the remainder of the recording at 13:49:42. TESTS AND RESEARCH Engine Test Run Before removing the propeller, each blade on the damaged Hartzel (Model-PHC-J3YF-2UF, SN-ED6360B) accident propeller was twisted using hand pressure, two of the blades exhibited excessive movement similar to pitch change mechanism damage. After removing the accident propeller, a two-bladed McCauley (Model-2A34C201, SN-173880) non-counter-weighted propeller was installed. The deice slip ring was removed from the left engine to allow for the replacement propeller to be installed. The air conditioning compressor was removed and secured to the aft air conditioner mount. The belt tensioner was removed. Relocation of the air conditioning compressor and removal of the belt tensioner was to ensure the propeller could spin free for testing. The airplane was moved out of the hangar and placed on a clear area on the ramp in front of the hangar. The left and right battery switches were placed in the 'on" position, and the master switch was placed in the 'on' position. The Garmin G1000 primary flight display unit powered on an indicated there were 24 volts coming from the left and right battery. The left fuel selector was place in the 'on' position. The left mixture lever was places at full rich and left throttle lever moved to almost full open. The left airframe electric boost pump was placed in the 'on' position and was secured when fuel flow peaked. The engine was started and was running at approximately 900 RPM. When oil temperature indicated in the 'green' on the G1000, the throttlelever was reduced to idle. It was noted that with the throttle at idle, RPM was between 600-620 and the fuel flow was 1.9 GPH. The manifold pressure was noted to be 4.7 inches. The throttle lever was repeatedly manipulated idle to mid-range, the engine was responsive to the throttle commands. The mixture was reduced slowly, the RPM did not change until reaching 1.2 GPH fuel flow. Engine temperature was noted at 433 and reducing as the fuel flow decreased. At 1.2 GPH fuel flow, the engine stopped running. While at approximately 1350 RPM, the mixture was leaned to establish a 'lean of peak value' using the cylinder number 1 engine temperature (approximately 720). Once the 'lean of peak' was established, the left throttle lever was placed at idle. The engine continued to run, and fuel flow was noted at 1.2 GPH. With slight movements of the left mixture lever toward idle cutoff, the engine stopped running. A magneto check was conducted; a drop of between 20-30 RPM was noted. Fuel Samples The airplane had a 200-gallon fuel capacity stored in various wing tanks in the left and right wings that fed to a single output for each wing. A light blue tint colored fuel (resembling 100 low-lead) was found in the fuel strainer, fuel selector valve and main tank. Fuel collected from the left main tank was tested using water detecting paste. No water was detected. After the accident, the FAA collected fuel samples from the wing tanks and reported all samples taken were absent of water and debris. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The Beechcraft 58 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3 – Emergency Procedures, states: SYSTEMS EMERGENCIES ONE-ENGINE-INOPERATIVE OPERATION ON CROSSFEED NOTE The fuel crossfeed system is to be used only during emergency conditions in level flight only. Left Engine Inoperative: 1. Right Fuel Boost Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LOW 2. Left Fuel Selector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF 3. Right Fuel Selector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CROSSFEED (feel for detent; confirm visually) 4. Right Fuel Boost Pump . . . . . LOW or OFF (as required) The Beechcraft 58 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 4 – Normal Procedures, states: SIMULATING ONE-ENGINE-INOPERATIVE (ZERO THRUST) Use the following power setting (only on one engine at a time) to establish zero thrust. Use of this power setting avoids the difficulties of restarting an engine and preserves the availability of power to counter potential hazards. The following procedure should be accomplished by alternating small reductions of propeller and then throttle, until the desired setting has been reached. 1. Propeller Lever . . . . . RETARD TO FEATHER DETENT 2. Throttle . . . . . . .SET 12 in. Hg MANIFOLD PRESSURE NOTE This setting will approximate Zero Thrust using the recommended One-Engine-Inoperative Climb speed. FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information System, Volume 5: Airmen Certification, restricted simulated engine failures "at altitudes lowerthan 3,000 feet above the surface must be performed by adjusting the throttle to simulate zero thrust" during practical testing. Further, the FAA General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) published a Safety Enhancement Topic bulletin entitled "Emergency Procedures Training." The GAJSC identified the mismanagement of light, twin-engine airplanes in single-engine operations was of concern in aviation accidents following a powerplant failure. The GAJSC believes that scenario-based training in emergency procedures would be effective in reducing these kinds of mishaps. However, the bulletin noted "Losing an engine en route or on approach is less critical because you'll likely have more airspeed and possibly more altitude to deal with; but what if you have to go around? Single-engine go-arounds in light twins often don't go well and they should be avoided if possible."