CEN22FA119

The airplane had recently undergone an annual inspection, and the pilot planned to fly the airplane back to his home base. After receiving clearance from air traffic control, the pilot proceeded to take off. The airplane accelerated and reached a peak groundspeed of 81 kts about 2,075 ft down the 4,097-ft runway. Once airborne, the airplane drifted slightly to the right and the pilot radioed an urgent need to return to the airport. The controller cleared the airplane to land and no further transmissions were received from the accident airplane. The airplane’s flight path showed that it slowed before turning back toward the left and the airplane’s speed continued to decrease throughout the remainder of the data. The final data point recorded the airplane at a groundspeed of 45 kts. The groundspeed would equate to 60 kts airspeed when considering the 15-kt headwind. The stall speed chart for the airplane listed the minimum stall speed for any configuration as 64 kts. Postaccident examinations of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. External and internal engine damage indicated that the engine was producing power at the time of impact, but the amount of power output could not be determined. Based on the available information, the pilot perceived an urgent need to return the airplane to the airport; however, due to the amount of damage from the impact and postimpact fire, the reason that the pilot was returning to the airport could not be determined. Stall speed information for the airplane, the recorded winds, and flight track data, indicated that the airplane encountered an aerodynamic stall before impacting the ground near the departure end of the runway. Since the airplane stalled and impacted the ground before reaching the perimeter of the airport, the pilot may not have had sufficient altitude to execute a forced landing to the empty field off the departure end of the runway.

The “Pilot’s Operating Handbook and [Federal Aviation Administration] Approved Airplane Flight Manual” for the airplane showed the airplane’s stall speed when lightly loaded, flaps at 36°, and landing gear extended, was 64 knots indicated airspeed (IAS). This was the lowest published stall speed for any configuration or weight. With flaps at 0° and the landing gear retracted, the stall speed was depicted as 74 knots IAS. There was no chart depicting stall speeds for flaps at 10° and landing gear extended. On February 13, 2022, at 1020 central standard time, a Piper PA-46-500TP, N2445F, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident at the Johnson County Executive Airport (OJC), Olathe, Kansas. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The airplane had recently undergone an annual inspection, and the pilot planned to fly the airplane back to his home base of operations. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight from OJC to the Albuquerque International Sunport Airport (ABQ), Albuquerque, New Mexico. Communication data indicated that the pilot contacted the OJC controller and the OJC controller issued an IFR clearance for the flight to ABQ. Once the airplane had taxied to the runway, the OJC controller issued a takeoff clearance with instructions to fly a heading of 340° to an altitude of 5,000 ft msl. About one minute later, the pilot informed the tower controller that he urgently needed to return, and the tower controller cleared the airplane to land. The pilot did not provide a reason for the return, and no further transmissions were received from the accident airplane. Flight track data for the accident flight showed that the airplane began the takeoff roll on runway 36 at OJC at 1019:42. The airplane accelerated and reached a peak ground speed of 81 kts about 2,075 ft down the 4,097 ft long runway. Once airborne, the airplane drifted slightly to the right and slowed before it turned back toward the left. The airplane’s groundspeed continued to decrease throughout the remainder of the data. The final three data points showed the airplane’s groundspeed as 49 kts, 47 kts, and 45 kts respectively. The final recorded position was about 100 ft southeast of the initial impact point. Figure 1. Overview of accident flight track with time, altitude, ground speed, and heading information. Figure 2. Final segment of accident flight track in profile view looking from southwest to northeast. The pilot reported on his application for his most recent medical certificate that he had 354 hours total flight experience with 66 hours in the six months preceding the examination. No further pilot flight records were made available during the investigation. The airplane impacted the ground on the extended runway centerline about 400 ft past the departure end of runway 36. The airplane came to rest upright with its fuselage oriented in a southeasterlydirection. A postimpact fire that burned the wings and forward fuselage aft to the rear spar carry-through structure. The fuselage aft of the cabin, including the empennage, was intact. There was a fan shaped burn area on the ground that extended from the aircraft wreckage in a southerly direction. Figure 3. The aircraft wreckage at the accident site looking south. Postaccident examinations of the airframe did not indicate any preimpact structural failures of the airplane. Flight control continuity was verified from the control surfaces into the cabin area. Impact and fire damage precluded comprehensive determination of the integrity of the cockpit flight controls; however, no preimpact anomalies were noted. The flap jackscrew extension found at the accident site corresponded to about 10° flap extension. The landing gear was in the extended position. Examination of the engine showed that the engine exhaust duct had visible angular deformation, consistent with torsional loading. Several internal engine components had rub marks and damage that were consistent with engine rotation during the impact sequence. The propeller shaft was fractured consistent with torsional overload. Further testing and examination of the propeller governor, overspeed governor, torque limiter, fuel-oil heat exchanger, fuel pump and fuel control were conducted and did not reveal any preimpact anomalies. Examination of the propeller revealed that all five of the propeller blades were broken off at the root with the blade roots still present in the propeller hub. Internal impact damage suggested that the propeller blade angle was between 26-34°, corresponding to a cruise power setting.