CEN22FA214

The student pilot was performing a solo flight and practicing takeoffs and landings. A witness reported, and ADS-B data confirmed, that the student pilot performed a touch-and-go. According to the witness, the airplane touched down long and then took off again. When the airplane lifted off the ground, the flaps remained down. The airplane climbed just above tree height in a nose-high attitude. Shortly thereafter, the left wing dropped, and the airplane descended “straight down.” During the climb, the student pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that he had an engine failure. Subsequently, he reported that he did not have his flaps up. A performance study was conducted to estimate the drag characteristics of the airplane and the engine power developed during the initial takeoff, subsequent landing, and accident takeoff. Before telling ATC that the flaps were not up, the pilot reported an engine failure; however, according to the study, the energy state of the airplane and the computed power required during the accident climb at flaps 30° are inconsistent with a loss of power. Instead, performance calculations indicate that the engine was producing power consistent with the power levels achieved during the previous (initial) takeoff and climb, which was performed with the flaps up. The airplane’s lift coefficient, computed using ADS-B data and wind speeds consistent with the reported weather, indicate that the flaps 30° maximum lift coefficient was reached about 13 seconds after the pilot reported an engine failure, and nearly coincident with the time that the pilot reported that the flaps were not up. The increase of the airplane’s lift coefficient to the maximum lift, and the rapid drop in pitch angle, angle of attack, and flight path angle that followed, are consistent with an aerodynamic stall and subsequent loss of control. Physical examination of the airframe, engine, and propeller did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

At the accident site, the airplane tachometer indicated 7954.2 hours. The engine maintenance log at the last annual inspection showed 7906.1 hours, which equates to 48.1 hours of engine operation since the annual inspection. On May 26, 2022, about 1456 central daylight time, a Cessna 152, N4978B, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Wauwatosa, Wisconsin. The student pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The flight instructor reported that, on the day of the accident, the student pilot was performing a solo flight. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data and ATC communications indicated that the airplane took off from runway 22R at Lawrence J. Timmerman Airport (MWC), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and entered a left traffic pattern. The airplane touched down on runway 22R and remained on the runway for about 20 seconds before the airplane began its second takeoff. The airplane’s groundspeed increased, and the airplane started to gain altitude. While climbing, the student pilot reported to ATC that the airplane had an engine failure. ATC acknowledged and the student pilot then transmitted, “unintelligible . . .I’m stalling, I don’t know what to do.” ATC asked the student pilot, “are you a solo?” The student pilot responded with, “I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I didn’t have my flaps up. . . unintelligible.” A few seconds later ATC transmitted, “increase speed . . . are you able to make the tar?” A witness reported that the airplane climbed just above tree height in a nose high attitude. Shortly thereafter, the left wing dropped, and the airplane descended “straight down.” An aircraft performance study was conducted using ADS-B data from the accident flight and previous flights, aircraft performance data, and other factors. The study concluded that the performance of the airplane was consistent with the scenario described by the eyewitness and that the airplane likely exceeded its critical angle of attack and stalled. The study also found that the energy state of the airplane was not consistent with an engine failure. The airplane impacted the ground in a residential neighborhood about 1/4 mile from the departure end of runway 22R. An autopsy on the pilot was conducted at the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner’s Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. No toxicological tests were performed. The student pilot began his flight training in June 2021. From the time that he had started, until the time of the accident, the student pilot had worked with four different flight instructors. He had flown 36.2 hours with his second instructor and had not soloed. The instructor stated the student pilot was not flying consistently enough and that he needed to do more pattern work. Additionally, the instructor stated the student was smart but that he had to work with the student to slow him down whenusing his checklists. He also stated the student was easily distracted in the beginning but had improved over time. The student pilot’s most recent flight instructor (fourth instructor) reported that he had been providing training to the pilot since March 5, 2022. The student pilot had received about seven lessons from the instructor; each lesson was about 2 hours long with 0.5 hours of ground training and 1.0 to 1.5 hours of flight training. All flight lessons were conducted in the accident airplane. The flight instructor also reported that the student pilot had about 40 hours of flight time before their first lesson but that he did not have the expected capability for a pilot with that flight time. The flight instructor stated that the student pilot’s landings were “a little abrupt,” so they spent several lessons practicing touch-and-go landings. The flight instructor also stated that, by the student pilot’s sixth lesson, his landings were “much better.” The flight instructor described the student pilot as “super smart,” “very bright,” and knowledgeable about ground aerodynamics but that he “constantly seemed rushed.” The flight instructor stated he was working with the student pilot to not rush. The flight instructor further stated that the student pilot was “a bit eager to solo.” The student pilot’s logbook showed that his first solo flight occurred on April 28, 2022, 4 weeks before the date of the accident. The flight instructor stated that he flew with the student pilot before his solo flight and that everything went smoothly. The student pilot then conducted a 1 hour solo flight with full-stop landings and taxiing back to takeoff. According to the flight instructor, the flight school does not allow student pilots to conduct touch-and-go landings during solo flights. The airplane came to rest nose down with its engine in a deep impact crater. The cabin area extended upward, and the aft fuselage was fractured just aft of the baggage area. Both wings remained partially attached to the fuselage, and their leading edges sustained aft crush damage. Both wing flaps were found in the retracted position. No fuel was found in the tanks; both fuel tanks had been breached due to impact. The fuel selector was in the “ON” position. No fueling paperwork was located. The engine was mostly intact. The left and right magnetos produced spark. The spark plugs had a normal appearance and produced spark during bench testing. The fuel system control position indicated a full-rich mixture. The carburetor screen was clean. The oil filter was checked for metal; none was found. Thumb compression was achieved on each cylinder. Both fixed-pitch propeller blades exhibited leading-edge gouges and minor chordwise scratching. An examination of the engine, airframe, and propeller did not reveal any pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.