CEN24LA014

NTSB accident investigation · Cirrus SR22 · Saginaw, MI · October 6, 2023

Accident · No injuriesClass 3 · LimitedFinal report
Date
October 6, 2023, 09:45 local (13:45 UTC)
Place
Saginaw, MI
Injuries
2 uninjured
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Taxi
Aircraft
N969JBCirrus SR22
Defining event
Taxi-to runway: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report October 22, 2025
Report
Approved by Office Director
Investigation class
Class 3
NTSB office
Central Region
Parties
Federal Aviation Administration - Grand Rapids FSDO
FAA report
20231006016219A
Case key
193247

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

The failure of the right brake assembly due to excessive brake lining wear, which resulted in a thermally damaged piston O-ring, hydraulic fluid leak, and subsequent fire.

Findings · 3

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Landing gear system: brakeAircraft › Aircraft systems · Fatigue/wear/corrosionCirrus Design SR22: 3 casesAll aircraft: 297 casesProbable cause
Landing gear system: brakeAircraft › Aircraft systems · Damaged/degradedCirrus Design SR22: 3 casesAll aircraft: 297 casesProbable cause
Landing gear system: brakeAircraft › Aircraft systems · FailureCirrus Design SR22: 3 casesAll aircraft: 297 casesProbable cause

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

The pilot was taxiing from the fixed-base operator’s building to the runway. As he increased brake pressure to stop the airplane before the runway hold short line, it turned to the left and completed a full 360° turn before coming to rest. The passenger then offered to try his brake pedals but the airplane only turned to the left; the pilot and passenger concluded they had no control of the right brake. The passenger then observed a fire emanating from under the right wing. The airport’s aircraft rescue and firefighting personnel responded and extinguished a fire associated with the right brake assembly. The right wing’s lower surface sustained substantial thermal damage during the ground fire. A postaccident examination revealed that the right brake linings had exceeded the manufacturer’s serviceable wear limit. The left brake linings were also significantly worn but within the serviceable wear limit. Additionally, the left brake assembly revealed a darkened temperature indicator sticker that indicated the left brake assembly had previously exceeded the manufacturer’s temperature limitation. The right brake assembly sustained significant thermal damage during the ground fire and its associated temperature indicator stickers were not observed. The excessively worn brake linings would have resulted in increased brake temperatures being transferred to the brake pressure plate and pistons. The loss of right brake effectiveness and subsequent fire likely occurred when hydraulic fluid leaked past a thermally damaged O-ring installed on one of the right brake pistons, then caught fire when it contacted the hot brake assembly.

Factual narrative

A review of the airframe maintenance logbook indicated that the last annual inspection of the airplane was completed on May 16, 2023, about 5 months before the accident, at an airframe total time of 2,572.7 hours. The airframe logbook entry for the last annual inspection did not refer to the condition of or any work completed on the airplane’s brake system. However, the work order associated with the last annual inspection included the discrepancy, “Brake discs beyond allowable limits (replace parts),” but there were no corrective actions taken because when rechecked the brake components were reportedly “within allowable limits.” Based on the work order invoice, there was no labor charge associated with the brake system inspection despite the aircraft owner being charged for 8 replacement brake linings. Further review of the airframe maintenance logbook revealed the last time the brake linings were replaced was on March 19, 2015, at an airframe total time of 1,893.7 hours. At the time of the accident, the brake linings had accumulated 807.8 hours since they were installed. On October 6, 2023, about 0945 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22 airplane, N969JB, was substantially damaged while taxiing at the MBS International Airport (MBS), Saginaw, Michigan. The pilot and passenger were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that he taxied from the fixed-base operator’s building to runway 23 via taxiway C to taxiway C4 and held short at the approach end of runway 23. As the pilot increased brake pressure to stop the airplane, it turned to the left and completed a full 360° turn before coming to rest. The passenger then offered to try his brake pedals, but the airplane only turned to the left; the pilot and passenger concluded they had no control of the right brake. The passenger then observed a fire emanating from under the right wing. The airport’s aircraft rescue and firefighting personnel responded and extinguished a fire associated with the right brake assembly. The right wing’s lower surface sustained substantial thermal damage during the ground fire. An examination of the left brake assembly revealed a darkened temperature indicator sticker that indicated the left brake assembly had previously exceeded the manufacturer’s temperature limitation. The right brake assembly sustained significant thermal damage during the ground fire and its associated temperature indicator stickers were not observed. As part of the investigation, an aviation mechanic measured the thickness of the airplane’s brake linings. The measured thickness of the brake linings was reported as follows: Left inner brake lining, 0.144 inch Left outer brake lining, 0.120 inch Right inner brake lining, 0.066 inch Right outer brake lining, 0.052 inch The postaccident examination of the airplane’s brake system established that the brake components were consistent with the original brake designbefore the release of Cirrus Service Bulletin No. 2X-32-12. According to the Cirrus SR22 Maintenance Manual, if not modified by Service Bulletin No. 2X-32-12, the serviceable wear limit for the brake linings was 0.1 inch.

Aircraft

Registration
N969JB
Reported as
Cirrus SR22
Category
Airplane
Serial number
1280
Built
2005
Airframe hours
2,701.5
Engine
Continental IO-550-N, 310 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Fire
On-Ground
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal
Last inspection
Annual · May 16, 2023 · 128.8 hours before
Airport
MBS · MBS International Airport
Equipment
Electronic multifunction display, Airframe parachute, ADS-B, Electronic primary flight display

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
71
Injuries
None
Certificate
Private
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land
Medical
Class 3, With waivers/limitations
Last flight review
May 1, 2022
Seat
Left
Restraint
3-point
Flight hours
208 total · 86 in this make and model · 180 as pilot in command · 41 in the last 90 days · 9 in the last 30 days · 0 in the last 24 hours

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
250° at 10 knots
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
57 °F, dew point 48 °F
Altimeter
29.88 inHg
Observed at
MBS
METAR
METAR KMBS 061353Z 25010KT 10SM CLR 14/09 A2988 RMK AO2 SLP119 T01390094=

Docket · 7

The files NTSB released with the investigation on October 22, 2025, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 14.6 MB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.