CHI00MA256

The airplane impacted heavily wooded terrain after experiencing a dual engine failure due to a reported lightning strike. The pilot received a weather brief that included information concerning a Convective Sigmet and a Severe Weather Watch. The weather briefer informed the pilot that a route to the southeast would keep the flight out of the heavy weather, and that, "... you'll get clobbered if you go due east." After departure, the pilot requested a turn to the northeast to stay clear of weather. While in the climb, the flight was advised of a Weather Watch that covered the area of their flight. The CVR revealed that Continuous Ignition was not selected prior to encountering turbulence. About 23 minutes after takeoff, the airplane was climbing at about 30,800 feet msl when the pilot reported a dual engine failure due to a lightning strike. The CVR indicated one engine quit and the second quit about two seconds later. The copilot established a 170 kts descent airspeed for "best glide." The airplane was vectored near a level 5 thunderstorm during the emergency descent. Two air starts were attempted when the airplane's altitude was outside of the air start envelope. Two more air starts were attempted within the air start envelope but were unsuccessful. The minimum airspeed for an air restart is 160 kts and the maximum speed for air start is 358 kts. The CVR indicated that the pilots did not call for the airplane's checklist, and no challenge and response checklists were used during the emergency descent. The CVR indicated the pilots did not discuss load shedding any of the electrical components on the airplane. The CVR indicated the hydraulic system cycled twice during the emergency descent and the landing gear was lowered using the hydraulic system during descent. During the descent the pilots reported they had lost use of their navigation equipment. The airplane impacted the terrain located about 166 nautical miles from the departure airport on a bearing of 083 degrees. No preexisting engines or airframe anomalies were found.

History of flight

On August 14, 2000, at 1822 central daylight time (all times CDT unless noted), a North American NA-265-80, Sabreliner, N85DW, was destroyed during a forced landing when it crashed in a densely wooded area about 3.0 nautical miles (nm) northeast of the Gogebic Iron-County Airport (IWD), Ironwood, Michigan. The 14 CFR Part 91 business flight had departed the Brainerd-Crow Wing County Regional Airport (BRD) at 1747 en route to the Flint/Bishop International Airport (FNT), Flint, Michigan, on an IFR flight plan. The airplane's altitude was approximately 31,800 feet mean sea level (msl) and about 7 nm north of Ashland, Wisconsin, when the airline transport pilot radioed a "MAYDAY" distress call. The pilot reported the airplane had lost power on both engines, and that the airplane had been struck by lightning. The airplane was vectored towards IWD. The airplane was approximately 17,500 feet msl and 12 nm west of IWD when the pilot reported the airplane lost its navigation capability. The airplane continued its descent toward IWD. The airplane impacted the terrain on an approximate heading of 210 degrees. The pilot and copilot received fatal injuries and the two passengers were seriously injured.

The two pilots and passengers had flown in N85DW from FNT to BRD in the morning. The passengers rented a car and conducted their business meetings. The pilots remained at the airport and prepared the airplane for the return flight to FNT. The airplane was refueled with 691 gallons of fuel. The pilot indicated on the flight plan that N85DW had 4:45 hours of fuel on board when it departed BRD.

At 1315:58, the pilot of N85DW called the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Princeton, Minnesota, Automated Flight Service Station (FSS) and spoke to a preflight briefing specialist. The pilot asked if the briefer had information on a severe weather warning that he had seen on television. The briefer replied, "... yes, it's number six eighty five, I was wondering when they would issue that, considering there's been severe thunderstorms up there all day."

The pilot asked if hail was in the forecast. The briefer replied, "... we've had indications of hail...all day." He added that there were, "... two cells, three cells, producing hail, one is just north of Brainerd." The pilot told the briefer he was not familiar with the area, and the briefer confirmed that the pilot was at Brainerd. The briefer described the area of cells as, "... north of you... moving east." The pilot said he would be departing at "six or seven o'clock tonight." The briefer said that thunderstorms were forecast for the Brainerd area, with the strongest activity expected "... right around the dinner hour...six o'clock or so," and added that "... they do look for redevelopment...along a line from about seventy five southwest of your present position up through the Duluth area." The pilot asked, "... what about the hail?" The briefer said, "... a severe weather watch looks for severe thunderstorms which include hail." The briefer stated that there was no cell currently affecting Brainerd, "... but I dunno what's gonna develop [by] the time you leave...there's a good chance there'll be hail in it."

At 1627:01, the pilot called the FSS again in order to file a flight plan under instrument flight rules (IFR) from BRD to FNT. The pilot filed the flight plan with the FSS Flight Data Specialist. The proposed departure time was 1800, planned altitude was FL330, and the requested route of flight was BRD direct FNT. The pilot then asked for "current and forecast at Flint."

The Flight Data Specialist read the FNT 2053 UTC observation and the FNT Terminal Forecast valid between August 14 at 1800 UTC and August 15 at 1800 UTC. The Flight Data Specialist then asked if the pilot if he needed the convective sigmet for northern Minnesota and northwestern Wisconsin for severe thunderstorms. The pilot replied that he did, and the Flight Data Specialist read Convective SIGMET 56C and Severe Weather Statement WW 685.

The pilot asked the Flight Data Specialist, "... how far south would I have to go to get around it?" The Flight Data Specialist asked, "This activity?" The pilot asked, "If you're saying twenty south of Brainerd?" The Flight Data Specialist said, "the convective sigmet is ... thirty northeast of Brainerd." The pilot asked, "if I went south around twenty or thirty miles, I'll get around it, no?" The Flight Data Specialist replied, "Brainerd to Duluth is where about the southernmost boundary of ... the activity."

The pilot asked the Flight Data Specialist if anyone got hail. He replied that the hail activity was "north of Brainerd" and described that the "heavier activity" was all north of Solon Springs, Wisconsin.

The pilot stated, "So if I'm going south...east I might just skirt the edge of this whole thing." The Flight Data Specialist replied, "if you go to the southeast...you can avoid practically all this stuff... anywhere east of Brainerd is where you're going to get clobbered, to about Cloquet." The pilot said, "You say east, if I go due east?" The Flight Data Specialist replied, "... you'll get clobbered if you go due east."

The passengers returned to the airport at about 1740 for the return flight to Flint. One of the passengers reported that as they were getting in their seats prior to takeoff, the pilot stopped and told him that it would be bumpy for the first 15 to 20 minutes of the flight.

At 1745:57, the pilot called the FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) and requested an IFR clearance to FNT and said, "...runway five, ready in less than a minute." ATC cleared N85DW, "... as filed, climb and maintain six thousand, squawk six three seven three, report airborne this frequency." The pilot acknowledged the clearance.

At 1748:18 the pilot reported being airborne to ATC.

At 1749:15, ATC advised N85DW, "... radar contact four miles east of the Brainerd Airport, verify leaving three thousand." The pilot replied in the affirmative and ATC instructed him to climb to 8,000 and contact Minneapolis Center (ZMP) on frequency 121.05.

At 1749:53, the pilot reported on the ZMP sector 10 (R10) frequency, 121.05, and the controller instructed him to climb to Flight Level (FL) 230. Radar returns from ZMP indicated that the aircraft was tracking 110 degrees magnetic. A direct course from BRD to FNT was 108 degrees at 490 nautical miles.

At 1753:00 the pilot requested, "... we'd like a left turn to zero nine zero for weather." R10 replied, "... approved as requested."

At 1753:49, the pilot requested a further left turn to a heading of 080 for weather, which R10 approved. Radar data indicated the aircraft was tracking 085 degrees. At 1754:30, the radar track indicated 113 degrees, and at 1756:30, the track indicated a course of 070.

At 1757:00, the pilot asked R10, "... are you painting anything up ahead of us, ah, we don't have any cells but, ah, it looks pretty grim up there." R10 replied, "... you can deviate as necessary for weather north or south, just keep me advised." The pilot asked, "... how's it looking, ah, to the north, northeast?" R10 replied, "... I'm showing just moderate precip towards the northeast. I don't think there's any significant cells. I think most of them have dissipated, but there is a significant one to your, ah, one o'clock clockwise to your three o'clock about thirty miles in diameter that you're skirting the edge of right now."

The pilot replied, "Okay, we're gonna go, ah, zero four zero to get around it."

At 1758:12, R10 instructed N85DW to contact ZMP sector 11 (R11) on frequency 133.4, and the pilot acknowledged.

At 1758:41, N85DW reported on R11's frequency, and the controller asked, "... how long do you expect to be on that heading?" The pilot replied, "Well til we're around the weather. We, ah, let you know, okay. He said it was thirty mil