CHI01IA124

A Boeing 717 sustained an in-flight thrust reverser deployment following a takeoff. The flight returned without further incident. After the prior flight the reverser was unlocked but not deployed. The flightcrew found the reverser unlock light during preflight. The crew could not clear the indication and contract maintenance was contacted to lock out the reverser. The contractor was not familiar and asked for the procedure to be faxed to him. The contractor used an incomplete set of procedures to lock out the reverser. Post incident inspection revealed the thrust reverser doors had over deployed. Four locking pins and their fork shaped locking triggers showed nicks and gouges on their mating surfaces. Subsequently Boeing revised their dispatch guide to include that maintenance would have to verify that "no more than one Thrust Reverser Proximity Sensor indicates Open" and that operators verify that the thrust reverser unlock indication is not present and red lockout pins are present on the inoperative reverser. Subsequent to the incident the overcenter links were redesigned. Boeing and the thrust reverser manufacturer issued service bulletins (SB) to retrofit the existing engines with the new link's design change, the link's associated hardware, and rub plates. Airplanes in production will incorporate the SB items as a production change. Boeing's SB 717-78-004 stated, "Operators have reported five instances of thrust reversers failing to deploy and ten instances of side beam gouging. Inspections revealed that gouging had occurred between the over center link bolts and side beam assembly. One recent event resulted in a relatively new thrust reverser having side beam gouging so deep, it required a doubler to restore airworthiness. Rohr Incorporated Service Bulletin R715.78-008 provides instructions to modify the thrust reverser actuation system. The purpose of modifying the thrust reverser actuation system is to minimize the possibility of gouging and inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment procedures given in this service bulletin."

On February 19, 2001, about 0730 central standard time, N2410W, registered as a Boeing 717-231, operated as Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight number 73, piloted by Airline Transport Pilot rated captain and copilot, sustained an in-flight thrust reverser deployment following a takeoff from General Mitchell International Airport (MKE), near Milwaukee Wisconsin. The flight landed at MKE without further incident. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The 2 flight crewmembers, 3 cabin crewmembers and 62 passengers were uninjured. The flight was on an IFR flight plan. The flight was originating from MKE at the time of the incident and was destined for Lambert-Saint Louis International Airport, near Saint Louis, Missouri.

Excerpts from that flight's debrief stated:

During the cockpit preflight, the right engine's EPR display

included an amber "T/R" light. The flight crew researched the

QRH (quick reference handbook) and the flight handbook, and

found no guidance for this problem. The Captain called the

Kansas City maintenance coordinator (MCIMD) and discussed

the problem with him. It was agreed that the engine would not

be started with the T/R displayed. Two procedures were to be

attempted by the flight crew before contract maintenance would

be called: 1) pressurization of the hydraulics, followed by

movement of the thrust reverse lever; and 2) an electrical

"depowering" of the aircraft, followed by a total reboot of the

computers.

The loading was complete and the ramp service man was on the

interphone; the Captain asked the agent to close the door and the

flight blocked at 0614L. The flight crew completed the two

procedures, with the ground crew verifying that the right engine's

thrust reverse lever was not moving the buckets. Neither procedure

cleared the problem T/R amber light; the flight was blocked-in at

0620 without having started an engine or moving the aircraft. (The

gate in use at MKE does not involve a pushback.)

The Captain phoned MCIMD and informed the coordinator that

the procedures were not helpful and [contract maintenance]

had been called. When the [contract maintenance] mechanic arrived, the

Captain explained the problem and stated that the proposed solution

was to lock out the right engine's thrust reverser and placard it as

inoperative. The [contract maintenance] mechanic was careful

and apprehensive as he reviewed the problem and stated that he

would need a full hardcopy of the appropriate maintenance manual

pages. He asked if there was one on the airplane, and the flight

crew said there was not. The Captain explained that these pages

are generally received by fax from MCIMD, which became the

agreed-upon course of action.

The [contract maintenance] mechanic explained his level of training

(one day of ground school and no "hands on" experience with the B717) to

MCIMD during a phone call as he requested a faxed, full copy of

the procedure. The Captain had introduced the mechanic to the

coordinator, who was a different individual as a shift change had

occurred at MCIMD. The fax was sent to the MKE station

manager's office and delivered to the [contract maintenance] mechanic

by the MKE operations agent. The [contract maintenance] mechanic

reviewed the procedure with the Captain; a placard and a circuit

breaker collar were obtained from the station personnel. The [contract

maintenance] mechanic completed the procedure that involved

the "pinning" of the right engine thrust reverser, and the logbook

signoff was reviewed with MCIMD. The amber T/R indication

was still displayed in the cockpit.

The flight departed the gate at 0720L. The takeoff was from

runway 19R, followed by two turns to a westerly heading. Prior to

slat retraction, at an altitude approximating 1400AGL and an

airspeed of 200K, the right engine thrust reverser deployed. The

airplane shuddered and rolled hard right; the T/R light was red. The

Captain immediately closed the right throttle; the engine was

secured shortly after the first officer was able to notify MKE

departure control of an emergency and immediate need to return

for landing. ATC cleared the flight for an immediate return with

clearance to land on any runway. The wind at takeoff was

southwesterly at 13 to 19 knots, which would require a landing

on either 19R or 25L. The position of the flight was crosswind

for 19R, and the distance to touchdown was shortest for 19R.

A right turn to the downwind resulted in a call from the first

officer of a 1500 fpm sink rate. To maintain a 1200AGL

downwind and 200K, slats extended, the Captain forced the left

engine thrust lever through the gate to obtain max thrust. (When time

permitted, the first officer made a PA announcement to the cabin

concerning our emergency condition; that we were returning and the

cabin should be prepared for landing; and that we would be on the

ground shortly.) A tight traffic pattern resulted in a safe landing after

6 minutes of airtime. ...

When the Captain arrived in the MKE operations office a few minutes

later, the [contract maintenance] mechanic was present and involved

in a phone conversation with MCIMD. When he completed the phone

call, he stated that MCIMD had not sent a fourth page that graphically

depicted the pinning of the B717 thrust reverser. The B717 requires

three pins to lock out the thrust reverser, and only one had been

installed as had been normal with the DC9 and MD80.

The thrust reverser was removed from the incident engine and shipped to the manufacturer for examination. A Federal Aviation Administration engineer oversaw the examination. Retrieved system data showed that after the prior flight the reverser, when stowed, moved to stowed position and did not lock. The examination revealed that the thrust reverser doors had over deployed. Four locking pins and their fork shaped locking triggers were inspected. Nicks and gouges were found on their mating surfaces.

Subsequent to the incident, Boeing revised its 717 Dispatch Deviation Guide (DDG). The revised DDG included that maintenance would have to verify that "no more than one Thrust Reverser Proximity Sensor indicates Open" and that operators verify that the thrust reverser unlock indication is not present and red lockout pins are present on the inoperative reverser.

Subsequent to the incident, Boeing revised its Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) procedure for REVERSER DEPLOYED OR U/L OR REV DISPLAYED IN FLIGHT. A step was added to the FCOM to land at the nearest suitable airport.

Subsequent to the incident the overcenter links were redesigned. Boeing and the thrust reverser manufacturer issued service bulletins (SB) to retrofit the existing engines with the new link's design change, the link's associated hardware, and rub plates. Airplanes in production will incorporate the SB items as a production change.

An excerpt from Boeing's SB 717-78-004 stated:

Background

Operators have reported five instances of thrust reversers failing to

deploy and ten instances of side beam gouging. Inspections revealed

that gouging had occurred between the over center link bolts and

side beam assembly. One recent event resulted in a relatively new

thrust reverser having side beam gouging so deep, it required a

doubler to restore airworthiness. Rohr Incorporated Service

Bulletin R715.78-008 provides instructions to modify the thrust

reverser actuation system. The purpose of modifying the thrust

reverser actuation system is to minimize the possibility of

gouging and inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment.

procedures given in this service bulletin.

An