CHI05FA042

NTSB accident investigation · Piper PA-32R-301T · Glenwood, MN · December 9, 2004

Accident · FatalField investigationFinal report
Date
December 9, 2004, 17:10 local (23:10 UTC)
Place
Glenwood, MN
Injuries
2 fatal
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Approach
Aircraft
N587CPiper PA-32R-301T
Weather
Instrument (IMC) · Night
Status
Completed · report October 27, 2005
Report
Approved by Office Director
Parties
FAA-Minneapolis FSDO, Lycoming Engines, FAA-Mineapolis FSDO, New Piper Aircraft
FAA report
20041209033579A
Case key
60717

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

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Probable cause

The pilot's failure to execute a missed approach and his failure to maintain sufficient altitude and clearance from terrain and obstructions. Contributing factors were the pilot's failure to obtain a preflight weather briefing, his decision to delay descent for approach (icing concerns), cloud ceilings below the minimum descent altitude, in-flight icing conditions, dark night lighting conditions, and the fence and residence.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

In flight encounter with weatherApproach
Preflight planning/preparation - inadequatePilot in commandFactor
Weather condition - below approach/landing minimumsFactor
In-flight weather advisories - not issuedAtc personnel(artcc)
Weather condition - icing conditionsFactor
In flight collision with objectApproach
Descent - delayedPilot in commandFactor
Missed approach - not performedPilot in commandCause
Altitude/clearance - not maintainedPilot in commandCause
Light condition - dark nightFactor
Object - fenceFactor
In flight collision with terrain/waterApproach
Terrain condition - ground
On ground/water collision with objectApproach
Object - residenceFactor

Analysis

The airplane was substantially damaged when it collided with a fence, terrain and a residence during an instrument approach to the intended destination. The accident flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan at a cruise altitude of 10,000 feet mean sea level (msl) prior to descent for the approach. After descent to 6,000 feet msl, further descent to 4,000 feet msl at pilot's discretion was authorized by air traffic control (ATC). The pilot requested to remain at 6,000 feet in order to stay "out of the clouds here [until] the last minute [due to] possible icing." Shortly afterward the pilot requested and was cleared by ATC to climb to 7,000 feet msl when the aircraft encountered "light" rime and mixed icing conditions. The flight was subsequently cleared for the global positioning system (GPS) instrument approach to runway 33. Radar track data indicated that the aircraft began a descent from 7,000 feet about 9 nautical miles (nm) southeast of the destination and intercepted the published approach course. The radar track data plot depicted the airplane crossing the GPS runway 33 approach final approach fix (FAF), located 5 nm south-southeast of the runway threshold, at 6,000 feet msl. The minimum altitude crossing the FAF was 3,000 feet msl, according to the published procedure. Final radar contact was at 4,000 feet msl about 2 nm south-southeast of the airport. The normal floor of radar coverage in the area was 4,000 feet msl. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain about 1 nm north-northwest of the airport. The debris path was oriented on a 150-degree magnetic bearing toward the airport. The inbound course for the GPS approach to runway 33 was 338-degrees magnetic. The published minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the straight-in GPS runway 33 approach was 1,760 feet msl, or 372 feet above ground level (agl). An overcast ceiling at 200 feet agl was recorded at the airport about 15 minutes prior to the accident. Terminal weather forecasts issued for an airport located 14 nm north of the intended destination called for ceilings of 300 feet agl overcast and 2 sm visibility in light snow and mist about the time of the accident. Preflight weather briefings for two previous flights that day had been provided, however, no weather briefing for the accident flight was obtained by the pilot. A post-accident examination did not reveal any airframe or engine anomalies associated with a pre-accident malfunction. FAA regulations required a pilot to execute a missed approach when operating below the MDA if the aircraft is not "continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers."

Factual narrative

History of flight

On December 9, 2004, at 1710 central standard time, a Piper PA-32R-301T, N587C, owned and piloted by an instrument-rated private pilot, was substantially damaged during an in-flight collision with a fence and terrain approximately 1 nautical mile (nm) northwest of Glenwood Municipal Airport (GHW), Glenwood, Minnesota. The personal flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The accident flight departed Mount Vernon Airport (MVN), Mount Vernon, Illinois, about 1340.

The accident pilot contacted the Miami Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) about 0615 on the morning of the accident. He proceeded to file three IFR flight plans. The first was from Page Field Airport (FMY), Ft. Myers, Florida, to Southwest Georgia Regional Airport (ABY), Albany, Georgia. The second was from ABY to MVN, and the third was from MVN to GHW.

The pilot was provided with weather conditions for the first and second flights. Due to a tornado watch and convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) weather advisories effective for the route of flight from ABY to MVN, the pilot declined further weather information for the third flight (MVN-GHW) at that time.

About 0945, the pilot contacted the Macon AFSS and requested an abbreviated weather briefing for the route of flight from ABY to MVN. He was provided updated weather conditions for that route of flight. The pilot did not mention a planned flight from MVN to GHW to the briefer. No weather information related to that flight was provided.

No contacts, either on the ground or in-flight, were made with any AFSS along the route of the accident flight. This included Kankakee, St. Louis, Ft. Dodge and Princeton AFSS.

The FAA provided air-to-ground communications between the accident pilot and air traffic control (ATC) facilities, as well as radar track data for the accident flight. The radar track data was processed and plotted by the NTSB. Copies of all available FAA ATC transcripts and the NTSB plots of FAA radar data are included with the docket material associated with this accident file.

At 1342, the pilot contacted Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and reported that the flight was airborne off of MVN. The flight was subsequently cleared to GWH at an altitude of 10,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Control of the flight was handled through multiple FAA ATC facilities during the en route portion of the flight.

About 1550, responsibility for ATC services was transferred to the Minneapolis ARTCC. The flight was operating at 10,000 feet msl at that time. Minneapolis ARTCC provided ATC services throughout the remainder of the flight.

At 1637, the controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 6,000 feet msl. At 1641, the controller issued a clearance to descend to 4,000 feet msl at pilot's discretion. The pilot replied that he wished to stay at 6,000 feet in order to stay "out of the clouds here [until] the last minute [due to] possible icing." The controller replied that the flight could remain at 6,000 feet and reissued the clearance to descend to 4,000 feet msl at pilot's discretion.

At 1649, the pilot reported accumulating a "fair amount" rime and mixed ice at 6,000 feet. He requested and was cleared to climb to 7,000 feet msl. When asked he characterized the icing intensity as "light." He estimated the cloud tops were about 6,200 feet msl.

At 1659, the pilot stated that he was planning the global positioning system instrument approach to runway 33 (GPS RWY 33) at GHW and requested radar vectors. He also requested that the flight remain at 7,000 feet msl as long as practical due to icing. The controller replied that radar vectors for the approach at GHW could not be provided because radar coverage was not available in that area at lower altitudes. The controller also noted that descent was at the pilot's discretion. The plotted radar track data indicated that the flight was approximately 19 nm southeast of GHW at that time.

The minimum altitude for radar coverage in the vicinity of GHW was typically 4,000 feet msl, according to the FAA.

Radar data indicated that the aircraft began a descent out of 7,000 feet msl about 1703:08 (HHMM:SS). The flight was approximately 9 nm south-southeast of GHW at that time.

The radar data plot depicted the aircraft's flight path intercepting the GPS RWY 33 approach course at 1703:48, at an altitude of 6,800 feet msl. According to the radar data, the flight crossed the final approach fix, located 5 nm from the runway, at 1705:18, at an altitude of 6,000 feet msl. The published minimum crossing altitude was 3,000 feet msl.

At 1706:33, the controller cleared the flight for approach to GHW and requested the pilot report being established on the approach. The pilot acknowledged the approach clearance and reported established on the approach at that time. The controller authorized the pilot to change to the airport advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged that instruction at 1706:54. No further communications were received from the accident aircraft.

Final radar contact with the accident flight was at 1706:59 at 4,000 feet msl. The flight's position at that time was approximately 2 nm south-southeast of GHW. Radar contact was not reestablished with the aircraft.

A witness to the accident reported that she was in the front yard of her residence, which was located approximately 1 nm northwest of GHW. She stated that she heard the airplane prior to being able to see it. She noted that it sounded as if it was at a low altitude. She reported that she spotted the airplane's light. She stated that it approached from the north, appeared to dive down and impact the ground. She noted that it was completely dark at the time and recalled weather conditions as "misty and foggy."

According to the published procedure, an aircraft flying the GPS RWY 33 approach to GHW must cross the final approach at a minimum altitude of 3,000 feet msl and commence a descent to the minimum descent altitude (MDA). The MDA for a straight-in approach to runway 33 was 1,760 feet msl, or 372 feet above ground level (agl). The MDA for a circling approach was 1,820 feet msl, or 427 feet agl. A flight visibility of 1 statute mile (sm) was required for landing under both conditions.

Personnel information

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings, which was issued on June 29, 2001. The pilot was issued a third-class airman medical certificate with no restrictions or limitations on July 17, 2003.

The pilot had logged 710.9 hours total flight time and 684.6 hours in the same make and model as the accident aircraft. He had logged 93.1 hours in the accident airplane. Logged night flight time was 19.1 hours. The most recent night flight time was logged as 2.0 hours on October 21, 2003. Total instrument flight time was 84.5 hours with 2.8 hours logged within the previous 90 days.

The pilot's most recent flight review endorsement was dated August 22, 2003. The logbook contained a complex airplane endorsement dated August 7, 2000, and a high performance airplane endorsement dated August 13, 1999.

A separate flight log in the form of a single, tabulated sheet of paper was recovered at the accident site. It listed a flight on November 28, 2004, from GHW to ANE, which was 1.5 hours in duration. The log indicated the ending hour meter time was 337.7. The last line indicated a flight from GHW to MVN to ABY to FMY on December 5, 2004. No flight or hour meter times were noted for that flight.

Aircraft information

The accident airplane was a 2003 Piper PA-32R-301T Saratoga, serial number 3257324. The airplane was a single-engine, low win

Aircraft

Registration
N587C
Reported as
Piper PA-32R-301T
Category
Airplane
Serial number
3257324
Airframe hours
359.7
Engine
Lycoming TIO-540-AH1A, 300 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal
Last inspection
Annual · October 4, 2004 · 42.6 hours before
Departed
MVN · Mount Vernon, IL
Destination
GHW · Glenwood, MN
Flight plan
IFR
Airport
GHW · Glenwood Municipal, runway 33, 4,500 × 75 ft, asphalt

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
65
Injuries
Fatal
Certificate
Private
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 3, Valid Medical--no waivers/lim.
Last flight review
August 22, 2003
Seat
Left
Toxicology
Performed
Flight hours
711 total · 685 in this make and model · 661 as pilot in command · 25 in the last 90 days · 9 in the last 30 days · 9 in the last 24 hours

Weather

Conditions
Instrument (IMC) · Night
Wind
50° at 8 knots
Visibility
1.25 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
200 ft overcast
Temperature
36 °F, dew point 36 °F
Altimeter
29.68 inHg
Observed at
GHW, 1 nm away

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.