CHI05LA217

The airplane impacted terrain during a forced landing following a loss of engine power after takeoff. The airplane was climbing through 400 feet above ground level after takeoff when the power loss occurred. The pilot then attempted a turn back to the departure airport and impacted trees and terrain. The pilot received serious injuries, and the passenger received minor injuries. The airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The postcrash fire consumed the cockpit/cabin area and portions of the inboard wing. A disassembly examination of the engine noted no anomalies that would have precluded operation.

On August 8, 2005, at 2100 central daylight time, a Cessna 150G, N4080J, owned and piloted by a private pilot, received substantial damage on impact with terrain following a total loss of engine power during climb after departing from Mountain View Airport, Mountain View, Missouri. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight was not operating on a flight plan. The pilot received serious injuries, and the passenger received minor injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the airplane was flown prior to the accident for 2 hours during which 3 takeoff and landings were performed by the pilot. The pilot and passenger waited at the airport until night so that the pilot could perform night takeoff and landings. The pilot noted that each fuel tank was approximately 1/2 full during his preflight inspection. During climb from the first night takeoff, the engine started running rough and losing power at 400 feet above ground level. The pilot applied carburetor heat which did not restore engine power and then pumped the throttle after which the engine experienced a momentary increase in power and then quit. The pilot made a left turn back to the airport and the airplane impacted trees and terrain. A postcrash fire ensued.

The airplane was examined by a representative of the Cessna Aircraft Company without supervision from the Federal Aviation Administration or National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The representative reported that he established flight control continuity from all flight control surfaces to the cockpit controls. Engine mechanical continuity was established and each cylinder expelled air. The throttle control was near an idle position, and the mixture control was in the full rich position at the cockpit control and carburetor. The carburetor heat control knob was in the off position. The flap pull bar was destroyed by postcrash fire. The postcrash fire consumed the cockpit/cabin area and inboard portions of both wings.

The airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses.

Advisory Circular 91-65, Use of Shoulder Harness in Passenger Seats, states: "...The safety board [National Transportation Safety Board] found that 20 percent of the fatally injured occupants in these accidents could have survived with shoulder harnesses (assuming the seat belt fastened) and 88 percent of the seriously injured could have had significantly less severe injuries with the use of shoulder harnesses. Energy absorbing seats could have benefited 34 percent of the seriously injured. The safety board concluded that shoulder harness use is the most effective way of reducing fatalities and serious injuries in general aviation accidents."

The engine was then removed and shipped to Teledyne Continental Motors for a disassembly examination supervised by an inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration. No anomalies that would have precluded operation were reported.

The FAA, Cessna Aircraft Company, and Teledyne Continental Motors were parties to the investigation.