CHI06FA193

NTSB accident investigation · Cessna 560 · Cresco, IA · July 19, 2006

Accident · FatalField investigationFinal report
Date
July 19, 2006, 11:04 local (16:04 UTC)
Place
Cresco, IA
Injuries
2 fatal, 2 serious
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Landing
Aircraft
N636SECessna 560
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report May 7, 2008
Report
Approved by Office Director
Parties
Universal Avionics Systems Corporation, Federal Aviation Administration, Cessna Aircraft Company, Honeywell Aerospace
FAA report
20060719014529A
Case key
64158

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

The flight crew's inadequate aeronautical decision-making and poor crew resource management (CRM), including the inadequate use of the on-board sources (such as the flight management system and navigation charts), to get critical information about Ellen Church Field Airport, including runway direction and length. Contributing factors to the accident were the flight crew's failure to consider and understand indications that the runway length was insufficient and inadequate CRM training for pilots at Part 135 on-demand operators.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

On ground/water encounter with terrain/waterLanding - aborted
In-flight planning/decision - inadequateFlightcrewCause
Terrain condition - ground
Crew/group coordination - poorFlightcrewCause
Inadequate trainingCompany/operator managementFactor
Performance data - not calculatedFlightcrewCause

Analysis

The airplane was managed by and listed on the certificate of Jackson Air Charter, Inc. (JAC), a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand operator; however, because the owner of the airplane was using it for personal use, the accident flight was flown under 14 CFR Part 91 regulations. The right-seat pilot, who was the chief pilot for JAC, was the flying pilot for the flight. The right-seat pilot had about 13,312 total flight hours, 833 hours of which were in Cessna 560 airplanes. The left-seat pilot, who was the nonflying pilot for the flight and had only worked for JAC for a little over a month, had not yet completed the company's Part 135 training but was scheduled to do so. The left-seat pilot had about 11,607 total flight hours, 557 hours of which were in Cessna 560 airplanes.

The flight was planned to land at Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota. The flight crew attempted to circumnavigate severe weather conditions and continue the planned descent for about 15 minutes even though a Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center controller stated that the flight would have to deviate 100 miles or more to the north or 80 miles to the south to do so. The RST approach controller subsequently told the flight crew that there was "weather," including wind gusts, along the final approach course, and on-board radar and weather advisories also showed severe thunderstorms and wind gusts in the area. Given the overwhelming evidence of severe weather conditions around RST, the flight crew exhibited poor aeronautical decision-making by attempting to continue the preplanned descent to RST despite being aware of the severe weather conditions and by not diverting to a suitable airport earlier in the flight.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the flight crew begin discussing an alternate destination airport about 3 minutes after contacting RST approach; however, the CVR did not record the left-seat pilot adequately communicate to air traffic control that the flight was going to divert. CVR evidence also showed that neither pilot took a leadership role during the decision-making process regarding the diversion. As a result, the flight crew chose an alternate airport, Ellen Church Field Airport (CJJ), Cresco, Iowa, from either looking at a map or seeing it out the cockpit window. The flight crew was not familiar with the airport, which did not have weather reporting capabilities. CVR evidence indicates that the flight crew did not use the on-board resources, such as the flight management system and navigational charts, to get critical information about CJJ, including runway direction and length. Further, the flight crew did not use on-airport resources, such as the wind indicator located on the left side of runway 33.

During the approach and landing, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) alerted in the cockpit. However, the flight crew did not recognize or respond to the EGPWS warning, which alerted because the EGPWS did not recognize the runway since it was less than 3,500 feet long. CVR evidence indicated that the flight crew incorrectly attributed the warning to the descent rate. Further, the runway was not depicted on an on-board non-navigational publication, which only contained runways that were 3,000 feet or more long, and this was referenced and noted by the flight crew. In addition, the flight crew visually recognized during the final approach that the runway was shorter than the at least 5,000 feet they originally believed it to be (as stated by the right-seat pilot earlier in the flight). Despite all of these indications that the runway was not long enough to land safely, the flight crew continued the descent and landing. (After the accident, Cessna computed the landing distance for the accident conditions, which indicated that about 5,200 feet would have been required to stop the airplane on a wet runway with a 10-knot tailwind. Runway 33 is only 2,949 feet long. Further, the Cessna Aircraft Flight Manual does not recommend landing on precipitation-covered runways with any tailwind component.) Because the flight crew did not look up the runway length and did not heed indications that the runway was too short, both of which are further evidence of the flight crew's poor aeronautical decision-making, they landed with inadequate runway length to either land the airplane on the runway or abort the landing. Subsequently, the airplane exited the runway and continued about 1,700 feet beyond its end. The airplane had sufficient fuel to have proceeded to an airport with a suitable runway length.

In addition to the poor decision-making, the flight crew did not exhibit adequate crew resource management (CRM) throughout the flight. For example, the flight crew exhibited poor communication and decision-making skills, did not effectively use the available on-board resources to get information about the landing runway, and neither pilot took a leadership role during the flight. JAC did not have and was not required to have an approved CRM training program although, according to company pilots, some CRM training was incorporated into the company's simulator training.

On December 2, 2003, the National Transportation Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-03-52, which asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require that 14 CFR Part 135 on-demand charter operators that conduct dual-pilot operations establish and implement an FAA-approved CRM training program for their flight crews in accordance with 14 CFR Part 121, subparts N and O. On May 2, 2006, Safety Recommendation A-03-52 was reiterated and classified "Open-Unacceptable Response" pending issuance of a final rule. Although the accident flight was operated under Part 91, if JAC, as an on-demand Part 135 operator, had provided all of its pilots CRM training, the benefits of such training would extend to the company's Part 91 flights. In November 2007, the Safety Board placed Safety Recommendation A-03-52 on its Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements because of continued accidents involving accident flight crewmembers. As a result of this accident, the Safety Board reiterated Safety Recommendation A-03-52 on May 1, 2008.

The right-seat pilot had in his possession multiple prescription and nonprescription painkillers, nonprescription allergy and anti-acid medications, and one prescription muscle relaxant. None of these medications are considered illicit drugs and would not have been reportable on drug testing required under 49 CFR Part 40. The right-seat pilot was known to have problems with back pain, although no medical records of treatment for the condition could be located. On his most recent application for airman medical certificate, the pilot had reported no history of or treatment for any medical conditions and no use of any medications. Toxicology testing revealed recent use of a prescription muscle relaxant, which might have resulted in impairment. It is also possible that the right-seat pilot was impaired or distracted by the symptoms for which he was taking the muscle relaxant; however, it could not be determined what role the muscle relaxant or the physical symptoms might have played in this accident.

Factual narrative

History of flight

On July 19, 2006, at 1104 central daylight time, a Cessna 560, N636SE, received substantial damage on impact with terrain during an aborted landing on runway 33 (2,949 feet by 50 feet, concrete) at Ellen Church Field Airport (CJJ), Cresco, Iowa. The airplane was located in a cornfield about 1,751 feet north of the departure end of runway 33. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Flight crew services were provided by Jackson Air Charter, Inc (JAC). The left seat pilot and right seat pilot received fatal injuries, and the two passengers received serious injuries. The flight last departed from University-Oxford Airport (UOX), Oxford, Mississippi, at 0920, and was en route to Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota, when it diverted to CJJ.

The JAC Trip Sheet Information lists the following itinerary for four passengers, including the passengers aboard the accident flight.

---------------------------------------

Depart from Jackson at 0600; Arrive Gulfport-Biloxi at 0639

Depart from Gulfport-Biloxi at 0700; Arrive at Destin-Ft. Walton, Fla. at 0739

Depart Destin-Ft. Walton at 0745; Arrive at Meridian, Miss. at 0830

Depart from Key Field, Miss. at 0845; Arrive at Oxford, Miss., at 0924

Depart from Oxford, Miss. at 1000; Arrive at Rochester, Minn. At 1151

Depart from Rochester, Minn. at 1300; Arrive at Oxford, Miss. at 1445

Depart from Oxford, Miss. at 1730; Arrive at Meridian, Miss. at 1809

Depart from Meridian, Miss. at 1830; Arrive at Destin-Ft. Walton, Fla. at 1915

Depart from Destin-Ft. Walton, Fla. at 1930; Arrive at Jackson at 2027

------------------------------

One of the four passengers is designated as the "primary passenger" on the Trip Information Sheet, which also lists the primary passenger's corporation as the customer. According to JAC and the primary passenger, the flights on the day of the accident were 14 CFR Part 91 flights. The Trip Sheet Information also provides a quote and list of charges.

The left front second row seat (#5) passenger stated that he had not flown in N363SE prior to the accident but has flown on similar airplanes with 8-12 seats but did not recall whether they were in Cessna 560 airplanes.

The right front seat (#4) passenger called the left front seat passenger and asked him to accompany him to Mayo Clinic to undergo medical tests. They both boarded the airplane at Gulfport, Mississippi, and flew to Destin, Florida, where the primary passenger boarded the airplane. They then flew to Meridian, Mississippi, where they dropped off the primary passenger. They then flew to Oxford, Mississippi, where the dropped off the primary passenger's wife.

The primary passenger stated that he boarded the airplane with his wife at Destin-Ft. Walton Beach, Destin, Florida, where he met his friend who was the #4 passenger and the other passenger who was the #5 passenger. They departed a few minutes after 0715 en route to Key Field Airport, Meridian, Mississippi, where the primary passenger deplaned and his wife continued onto University-Oxford, Oxford, Mississippi, where she then deplaned. The primary passenger stated that his wife overheard the pilots saying that they were going to top off the fuel and the remaining passengers could get some coffee or something to eat.

The #5 passenger stated that he had lunch with the right seat pilot (viewed looking forward from within the airplane). The right seat pilot was a "great guy" and was alert. During lunch, the right seat pilot ate a biscuit and drank a nonalcoholic beverage, but the left front seat passenger could not recall if it was coffee. The right seat pilot was a "young good looking healthy guy." The left seat pilot remained with the airplane. He stated that it was a "beautiful day" on the coast.

The #5 passenger stated that the crew obtained fuel for the airplane in University-Oxford, Oxford, Mississippi (a credit card receipt for 527 gallons of Jet A time stamp with a time stamp of 0846 at University-Oxford, Oxford, Mississippi, was found at the accident site). He stated that the cockpit door was left open during the flight and they did not talk to the flight crew because the noise level was "loud," and they were "far" from the flight crew.

According to Flight Service Station information, an IFR flight plan for N636SE was filed for a flight from UOX to RST at flight level (FL) 380 with no alternate airport.

The #5 passenger stated they were flying north toward Rochester, Minnesota, when they made a "hard u-turn" and started "dropping down" to Cresco, Iowa. He stated that it was a "pretty aggressive drop," and the descent was "more aggressive" than a "commercial airliner." He said he had "no fears what so ever." The descent was so steep that he could see the runway through the pilot windshield at an altitude of 5,000 feet. The airplane then felt as if it got "jarred" and a couple of overhead panels opened. The flight crew recovered and lined themselves up for landing. He stated alarms were "going on," and he heard a "beeping" and "pull-up pull-up." He stated that it looked like the flight crew was going to make a "picture perfect" landing.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was read out by the National Transportation Safety Board's Recorders Laboratory. The CVR begins as the airplane is on final approach to University-Oxford airport in Oxford, Mississippi. The crew states the items in the landing checklist and the sound of touchdown, followed by in an increased background noise (similar to thrust reverser) is recorded. The CVR stops recording followed immediately by the sound of a CVR power-up tone. It is unknown how much local time actually elapsed between the shut down and power up of the CVR. However, eight minutes and thirty-two seconds elapsed from the beginning of the recording to the shut down/power-up of the CVR.

The second part of the recording began at the power-up tone on the CVR at 09:09:20 (approximately 8 minutes, 32 seconds after the start of the recording). About 09:11:54, the crew discusses the weather between Oxford, Mississippi, and Rochester, Minnesota. The crew states items in the before taxi and the before takeoff checklists and about 09:17:52, the right seat pilot states within the crew briefing that he will be flying the airplane. About 09:18:36, the sound of increased engine RPM is recorded. The airplane is issued an IFR clearance, as filed, from Memphis Center about 09:21:58. The airplane is subsequently issued clearance to climb to FL 380 and about 09:47:31, the airplane is transferred to Kansas City Center, where they are given clearance to climb to FL 400. About 10:20:00, the airplane is transferred to Chicago Center and about 11 minutes later reports light chop. About 10:32:19, the airplane is transferred to another Chicago Center controller.

At 10:33:14, the crew requests a lower altitude, which the center controller approves to FL 350. About 10:42:33, the airplane is transferred to Minneapolis Center. About 10:43:13, the left seat pilot relays to Minneapolis Center that they are deviating from weather (but direct to Rochester), and additionally are not able to pick up automatic terminal information service (ATIS) at Rochester. The controller then relays the weather information to the airplane. About 10:45:54, the left seat pilot radios Center stating, "we're just gonna' keep kinda' heading this direction stay on the west side of the weather 'til we get north of Rochester and then turn around and take a look at it." The controller asks for clarification that he means "on the east side of the weather" and the left seat pilot replies, "affirmative." After, the airplane is transferred to another Minneapolis Center controller, the controller states at 10:51:57, "it's heck of a bow hook we got going on there… but ah you'd have to go about a hund

Aircraft

Registration
N636SE
Reported as
Cessna 560
Category
Airplane
Serial number
560-0636
Airframe hours
713.3
Engine
Pratt & Whitney Canada PW535A, 3,400 lbs thrust, turbo fan
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Operator
G & S Holdings
Registered owner
Tomco II, LLC
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal
Last inspection
Continuous airworthiness · April 1, 2006 · 41.3 hours before
Departed
UOX · Oxford, MS
Destination
RST · Rochester, MN
Flight plan
IFR
Airport
CJJ · Ellen Church Field, runway 33, 2,949 × 50 ft, concrete

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew · 2

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
62
Injuries
Fatal
Certificates
Commercial, Airline transport
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land, Single-engine sea
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 2
Last flight review
September 1, 2005
Seat
Left
Toxicology
Performed
Flight hours
11,607 total · 557 in this make and model
Role
Pilot
Age
41
Injuries
Fatal
Certificates
Flight instructor, Commercial, Airline transport
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1
Last flight review
June 1, 2006
Seat
Right
Toxicology
Performed
Flight hours
14,695 total · 833 in this make and model

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
180° at 10 knots, gusting 15
Visibility
4 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
1,300 ft broken
Temperature
73 °F, dew point 66 °F
Altimeter
30.04 inHg
Observed at
DEH, 19 nm away

Docket · 55

The files NTSB released with the investigation on August 31, 2007, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 53.6 MB in all.

Meteorology 5 - Factual Report of Group ChairmanItem 1 · .PDF · 2.0 MBPilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1Item 2 · .PDF · 313 KBRecord of Interviews and Witness StatementsItem 3 · .PDF · 448 KBPassenger StatementItem 4 · .PDF · 42 KBTrip SheetItem 5 · .PDF · 137 KBEGPWS Pilot GuideItem 6 · .PDF · 2.1 MBBasic Guide to System SafetyItem 7 · .PDF · 229 KB14 CFR 40 ExcerptItem 8 · .PDF · 86 KBChairman's Testimony to CongressItem 9 · .PDF · 705 KBNTSB Safety Recommendation A-02-12Item 10 · .PDF · 306 KBNTSB Most WantedItem 11 · .PDF · 85 KBCessna 560 Flight Manual ExcerptItem 12 · .PDF · 9.7 MBAdvisory Circular 60-22Item 13 · .PDF · 1.3 MBAdvisory Circular 120-51EItem 14 · .PDF · 1.1 MBCopilot 135 ChecksItem 15 · .PDF · 611 KBCopilot Medical ApplicationItem 16 · .PDF · 144 KBToxicological Report - PilotItem 17 · .PDF · 54 KBToxicological Report - CopilotItem 18 · .PDF · 72 KBCompany Toxicology - CopilotItem 19 · .PDF · 41 KBMedical Records InformationItem 20 · .PDF · 12 KBPilot Airman Blue RibbonItem 21 · .PDF · 2.3 MBCopilot Airman Blue RibbonItem 22 · .PDF · 4.9 MBStatement of Party Representatives to NTSB InvestigationItem 23 · .PDF · 337 KBPhoto 1. Main WreckageItem 24 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 2. Main WreckageItem 25 · .PDF · 994 KBPhoto 3. Main WreckageItem 26 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 4. Main WreckageItem 27 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 5. Main WreckageItem 28 · .PDF · 982 KBPhoto 6. Ground Scar w/Main WreckageItem 29 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 7. Ground Scar w/Main WreckageItem 30 · .PDF · 971 KBPhoto 8. Runway 33Item 31 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 9. Airport Wind Indicator & Wind SockItem 32 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 10. Runway 33 Departure EndItem 33 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 11. Ground Scar From Departure EndItem 34 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 12. Ground Scar From Departure EndItem 35 · .PDF · 1.2 MBPhoto 13. Ground Scar From Departure EndItem 36 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 14. Ground Scar From Departure EndItem 37 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 15. Wreckage PathItem 38 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 16. Seat #5 PanItem 39 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 17. Seat #5 PanItem 40 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 18. Seat #4 PanItem 41 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 19. Copilot SeatItem 42 · .PDF · 1.1 MBPhoto 20. Pilot Seatbelt LatchItem 43 · .PDF · 959 KBPhoto 21. Copilot MedicationItem 44 · .PDF · 561 KBPhoto 22. Copilot MedicationItem 45 · .PDF · 509 KBPhoto 23. Copilot MedicationItem 46 · .PDF · 481 KBPhoto 24. Copilot MedicationItem 47 · .PDF · 465 KBPhoto 25. Copilot MedicationItem 48 · .PDF · 411 KBPhoto 26. Copilot MedicationItem 49 · .PDF · 359 KBPhoto 27. Copilot MedicationItem 50 · .PDF · 365 KBPhoto 28. Copilot MedicationItem 51 · .PDF · 348 KBPhoto 29. Copilot MedicationItem 52 · .PDF · 386 KBPhoto 30. Copilots MedicationItem 53 · .PDF · 379 KBPhoto 31. Copilots MedicationItem 54 · .PDF · 407 KBCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group ChairmanItem 55 · .PDF · 986 KB

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.