CHI96FA049

The noncertificated pilot advised ARTCC that he was flying at 11,500 feet msl. After numerous exchanges regarding the weather, the ARTCC controller asked if the pilot was over an overcast and if he needed clearance down through it. The pilot replied that he was on-top. The pilot was then asked if he had recent training or experience flying IFR. He replied, 'I have not.' The pilot told the controller, 'I have gone down through the clouds...we've never had a problem with it.' The controller advised that it would be illegal to enter the clouds (while flying VFR). A few moments later, the pilot said, '...we've got a broken spot right here. We can dip down through.' After that, there was no further communication with the airplane. Subsequently, an in-flight breakup of the airplane occurred, and wreckage was scattered over a 1,600' area. An exam revealed the stabilator and portions of the left wing had separated due to overload failure. Radar data showed that a number of altitude and heading changes occurred before radar contact was lost (witnesses noted a corresponding variation in engine sound before impact). A toxicology test of the pilot's blood detected a trace of cocaine (less than 0.020 mcg/ml) and showed 0.129 mcg/ml Benzoylecgonine (metabolite of cocaine). A test of his liver fluid showed 0.051 mcg/ml Benzoylecgonine.

History of flight

On December 12, 1995, at 1425 central standard time (cst), a Piper PA32R-301T, N14BA, piloted by a non-certificated pilot, was destroyed during an inflight structural breakup, collision with the ground, and post-impact fire. Instrument meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident. The personal 14 CFR Part 91 flight was not operating on a flight plan. The pilot was fatally injured. The flight departed Dallas, Texas, at 1207 cst.

The pilot of N14BA contacted the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Kansas City, Missouri's Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) at 1327 cst. The pilot told the ARTCC controller (controller) that his airplane was flying at 11,500 feet above mean sea level (msl). About 33 minutes later the pilot informed the controller he was descending to 3,500 feet msl.

At 1400 cst, the controller asked the pilot if he was on top of an overcast and in need of a clearance "...down through it... ." The pilot responded, "... no, we're on top the overcast. I think we can get down through it, ...get on down where we need to be." At 1405 cst, the controller said, "...if you're on top of an overcast and there isn't any big holes in it and we haven't had anything reported broken for the last 4 to 5 hours, ...can't go through the clouds so let me known what you want to do."

N14BA's pilot told the controller, "Well, I was lookin' for some broken...looks like I'm going to stop off here at about probably 5,500 the way it looks right now. You know I may, I'm not IFR certified so you advise." The controller presented the weather in the pilot's area and told the pilot to "...maintain VFR there's other traffic out there... ." The controller then asked the pilot, "...have you had experience flying IFR? I mean recent training or anything?" The pilot replied, "I have not. I've got about 1,500 hours of regular VFR flight...I have gone down through clouds doing surveillance and everything else. We've never had a problem with it."

The controller told the pilot, "Well, you're illegal to enter the clouds that's the problem." Shortly after this communication, the pilot told the controller, "This is 4BA, we've got a broken spot right here. We can dip down through." There were no other communications between the pilot and controller. ARTCC Radar NTAP data showed the airplane to be heading about 020 degrees magnetic at 6,200 feet msl when it made a 90 degree left turn and began descending. About 1 minute and 27 seconds after completing the turn, N14BA had descended about 2,400 feet msl according to this data.

Shortly after descending to 2,400 feet msl N14BA made a second 90 degree turn. The NTAP data showed it then climbed to 3,500 feet msl. The last reported radar contact was at 4,400 feet msl; 38 seconds after making the second 90 degree turn.

Two witnesses near the accident site said, they heard an airplane engine increase and decrease its power twice. Shortly after hearing the engine sound the witnesses said they heard two closely spaced explosions. While driving their vehicle to locate the wreckage they said ice was forming on their car windshield.

Two other witnesses stated they thought an airplane was buzzing the area. One witnesses said the airplane's engine sound went away for a short time and then came back. He said he heard a "ka-wump" a short time later. This witness estimated the "ka-wump" sound was between 1420 and 1430 cst. The other witness said the airplane sounded like a crop duster. The engine went from a low to high pitch sound. Both said the area had fog down to tree top level.

Personnel information

The pilot had been issued a student pilot's certificate on June 16, 1994. The pilot's logbook showed he had a total time of 119.4 hours. Of this time, 2.1 hours were listed as dual flight instruction. There were no endorsements in the logbook for solo flight or operating a high performance airplane. According to the pilot's airplane insurance application, he reported he had a total pilot-in-command time of 679 hours. The form showed the pilot also reported he had a commercial pilot certificate and a second class medical certificate.

A flight instructor who had flown with the accident pilot was interviewed by a Federal Aviation Administration Principal Operations Inspector (POI). According to the POI, the instructor said he had not flown more than 10 hours with the pilot. He said the pilot only wanted to fly. The instructor said the pilot stopped coming to the flight school after less than 10 hours of dual instruction. He said, "...he had a very cavalier attitude toward flying, safety, and regulations."

The pilot's student pilot certificate had been revoked by the FAA on November 16, 1994. According to a November 15, 1994, Independence, Kansas, Police Department report, the accident pilot had flown low over the town and toilet papered the downtown area. He was arrested for flying under the influence of alcohol and littering after he landed the airplane. The FAA revocation stated the pilot had carelessly operated an airplane when he flew it under the influence of alcohol, and did not have an endorsement for solo flight.

Aircraft information

N14BA was registered with the FAA by PSC Air, Incorporated (PSC Air), on May 3, 1995. N14BA's airframe logbook showed it received an annual inspection on December 29, 1994. At that time the airplane had a total time of 1,837.1 hours. The last entry in the engine logbook, August 18, 1995, showed an airframe total time of 1,973.4 hours.

Wreckage and impact information

N14BA's wreckage path was oriented on a general heading of 050 degrees magnetic. The wreckage path covered approximately 1,600 feet over the ground. The airplane's stabilator, vertical stabilizer, and portions of the left wing were found along the beginning of the wreckage trail. Sections of the stabilator were found lodged in small trees along the trail. The first ground impact point was about 1,500 feet from the beginning of the wreckage trail. All airframe component fractures observed were overload type fractures.

Most of the fuselage and right wing were within 100 feet of the first ground impact point. These sections were involved in a postimpact fire that destroyed the fuselage forward of the vertical stabilizer. The cockpit had been destroyed. Control cable continuity was established for all three flight controls. Continuity for the engine control linkages and cables was established.

The engine was fire damaged and had sections of its lower case melted. The accessory case section, magnetos, and vacuum pump were destroyed by the post impact fire. The propeller was rotated about 30 degrees. During the engine's rotation the accessory gears moved and the rocker arms on cylinder number 2 moved. The oil pan was melted and the engine data plate was destroyed. The engine driven fuel pump had separated from its mount and was fire damaged.

One propeller blade had separated from the propeller hub. This blade was buried along the wreckage trail, about 100 feet from the wreckage's final resting place. The second and third propeller blade remained attached to their hub. One of these blades was curled from the tip to the mid-span point. This blade had been partially melted in the fire. The third blade was bowed forward about 10 degrees from the blade's hub mounting. All propeller blades had chordwise scratches on their face and front side. The intensity of these scratches varied. All three propeller blades had leading edge nicks and indentations. These indentations varied between about 1/32 and about 1/16 inch deep.

Medical and pathological information

The autopsy on the pilot was conducted at the Kansas City Medical Center, Kansas City, Kansas, on December 16, 1995. The toxicological examination was conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Aerome