DCA00MA030

NTSB accident investigation · Boeing 737-300 · Burbank, CA · March 6, 2000

Accident · Serious injuriesClass 1 · MajorFinal report
Date
March 5, 2000, 18:11 local (Mar 6, 2000, 02:11 UTC)
Place
Burbank, CA
Injuries
2 serious, 42 minor, 98 uninjured
Damage
Destroyed
Phase of flight
Landing
Aircraft
N668SWBoeing 737-300
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Dusk
Status
Completed · report May 6, 2003
Report
Board-adopted at Board Meeting
Investigation class
Class 1
NTSB office
Major Investigations Division
Safety recommendations
Yes
FAA report
20000305041579A
Case key
48764

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

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Probable cause

the flight crew's excessive airspeed and flightpath angle during the approach and landing and its failure to abort the approach when stabilized approach criteria were not met. Contributing to the accident was the controller's positioning of the airplane in such a manner as to leave no safe options for the flight crew other than a go-around maneuver.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

OverrunLanding - roll
Airspeed - excessiveFlightcrewCause
FlightcrewCause
Improper decisionFlightcrewCause
Improper decisionAtc personnel(dep/apch)Factor
Go-around - not performedFlightcrewCause
On ground/water collision with objectLanding - roll
Object - fence

Analysis

The Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm

History of flight

On March 5, 2000, about 1811 Pacific standard time (PST), Southwest Airlines, Inc., flight 1455, a Boeing 737-300 (737), N668SW, overran the departure end of runway 8 after landing at Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (BUR), Burbank, California. The airplane touched down at approximately 182 knots, and about 20 seconds later, at approximately 32 knots, collided with a metal blast fence and an airport perimeter wall. The airplane came to rest on a city street near a gas station off of the airport property. Of the 142 persons on board, 2 passengers sustained serious injuries; 41 passengers and the captain sustained minor injuries; and 94 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and the first officer sustained no injuries. The airplane sustained extensive exterior damage and some internal damage to the passenger cabin. During the accident sequence, the forward service door (1R) escape slide inflated inside the airplane; the nose gear collapsed; and the forward dual flight attendant jumpseat, which was occupied by two flight attendants, partially collapsed. The flight, which was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan, was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred in twilight lighting conditions.

According to Southwest Airlines records, the accident flight was the flight crew's first flight of what was scheduled to be a 3-day flight sequence that consisted of five flights. The accident flight originated at McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, and was scheduled to depart about 1445 for BUR. The first officer of the accident flight stated to National Transportation Safety Board investigators that he arrived at LAS about 1245, and the captain indicated that he arrived about 1400. The first officer reported in a postaccident interview that he met the captain on the way to the gate. Southwest Airlines records indicate that the accident airplane arrived at LAS from Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California, about 1630, almost 2 hours behind schedule, because of rain and gusting winds in the LAS area. The accident flight crew indicated that the preflight inspection was normal and that no maintenance discrepancies were noted.

Flight 1455 departed the gate about 1650, more than 2 hours behind schedule. During postaccident interviews, the flight crew indicated to Safety Board investigators that the takeoff and en route portions of the flight to BUR were normal and uneventful. The first officer stated that after the flight crossed the PMD very high frequency omni-directional radio range (VOR) navigation transmitter at 8,000 feet, he obtained information Oscar from the BUR airport terminal information service (ATIS), which indicated that winds were from 260° at 18 knots, gusting to 26 knots, and that aircraft were landing on runways 33 and 26. At 1754:21, the captain stated, "plan on [runway] three three at the moment. [A]pproach descent checklist when you get the chance."

At 1802:52, the flight crew was advised by the Southern California terminal radar approach control (SCT) Woodland controller that the current ATIS was information Papa and that they should expect an instrument landing system (ILS) landing on runway 8. At 1803:29, when the airplane was about 20 nautical miles (nm) north of the BUDDE outer marker at an altitude of about 8,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the Woodland controller instructed flight 1455 to turn left to a heading of 190° and to descend to and maintain 6,000 feet msl. The first officer acknowledged the instructions.

At 1804:02, when the airplane was about 19 nm north of the BUDDE outer marker at an altitude of about 7,800 feet msl, the SCT Woodland controller stated, "Southwest fourteen fifty five, maintain two thirty or greater `til advised please." The captain acknowledged the airspeed adjustment assignment. The Woodland controller indicated in a postaccident interview that he imposed the speed restriction as part of sequencing Southwest flight 1455 between Southwest flight 1713 and Executive Jet flight 278.

After the first officer obtained information Papa, he switched back to the approach control frequency. At 1804:42, he informed the captain that the target airspeed for the approach would be 138 knots and, at 1804:49, that winds were "down to six knots." A few seconds later, he confirmed that aircraft were landing at BUR on runway 8. At 1805:08, when the airplane was about 16 nm north of the BUDDE outer marker at an altitude of about 6,000 feet msl, the SCT Woodland controller instructed flight 1455 to "turn left heading one six zero." At 1805:13, the captain indicated to the first officer that ATC "wants two hundred thirty knots or greater, for a while."

At 1805:54, the SCT Woodland controller cleared flight 1455 to descend to and maintain 5,000 feet and advised the pilots that they were following company traffic (Southwest Airlines flight 1713) that was at their "one o'clock and twelve miles [ahead of them] turning onto the final out of forty six hundred." The first officer acknowledged the clearance. At 1807:43, the Woodland controller cleared flight 1455 to descend to and maintain 3,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the clearance. At 1808:18, the first officer notified ATC that he had the Southwest traffic in sight. At 1808:19, the Woodland controller issued an altitude restriction by stating, "cross Van Nuys at or above three thousand, cleared visual approach runway eight." The first officer acknowledged the clearance. At 1808:36, as the airplane was descending through about 3,800 feet msl, the captain began turning to the left for the final approach.

In postaccident interviews, the flight crew told investigators that, during the approach, the captain's navigation radio was tuned to the ILS frequency for runway 8, and the first officer's radio was tuned to the Van Nuys VOR. They indicated that the autopilot was engaged in the VOR/LOC mode and that the airplane captured the localizer course but then overshot the centerline before correcting back. The captain stated to investigators that as the flight passed about 2 miles west of Van Nuys at 3,000 feet at approximately 220 to 230 knots, he deployed the speed brakes.

According to the CVR, at 1809:28, when the airplane was at an indicated airspeed of about 220 knots, the captain called for "flaps five." At 1809:32, the flaps began to extend. At 1809:43, the captain called for "gear down." The captain indicated in a postaccident interview that at this point in the flight, he noted a 20-knot tailwind indication on the flight management system (FMS) screen. At 1809:53, the BUR tower controller stated, "Southwest fourteen fifty five, wind uh...two one zero at six [knots], runway eight, cleared to land." Simultaneously, the captain called for "flaps fifteen." At 1810:01, the captain again called for "flaps...fifteen" and "[flaps] twenty five."

From 1810:24 until 1810:59, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) alerts were being continuously broadcast in the cockpit, first as "sink rate" and then, at 1810:44, switching to "whoop, whoop, pull up." At 1810:29, the captain stated, "flaps thirty, just put it down." At 1810:33, the captain stated, "put it to [flaps] forty. [I]t won't go, I know that. [I]t's all right. [F]inal descent checklist." After the GPWS "whoop, whoop, pull up" alert sounded at 1810:47, the captain stated, "that's all right," at 1810:53. A final "sink rate" warning was recorded at 1810:55. The first officer stated in a postaccident interview that instead of reading the final descent checklist, he visually confirmed the checklist items and remembered seeing the captain arm the ground spoilers. The first officer also stated that when the captain called for flaps 40

Factual narrative

The Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm

On March 5, 2000, about 1811 Pacific standard time (PST), Southwest Airlines, Inc., flight 1455, a Boeing 737-300 (737), N668SW, overran the departure end of runway 8 after landing at Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (BUR), Burbank, California. The airplane touched down at approximately 182 knots, and about 20 seconds later, at approximately 32 knots, collided with a metal blast fence and an airport perimeter wall. The airplane came to rest on a city street near a gas station off of the airport property. Of the 142 persons on board, 2 passengers sustained serious injuries; 41 passengers and the captain sustained minor injuries; and 94 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and the first officer sustained no injuries. The airplane sustained extensive exterior damage and some internal damage to the passenger cabin. During the accident sequence, the forward service door (1R) escape slide inflated inside the airplane; the nose gear collapsed; and the forward dual flight attendant jumpseat, which was occupied by two flight attendants, partially collapsed. The flight, which was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan, was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred in twilight lighting conditions.

Aircraft

Registration
N668SW
Reported as
Boeing 737-300
Category
Airplane
Serial number
23060
Engines
CFM International CFM56-3, 114,000 lbs thrust, turbo fanCFM International CFM56-3, 114,000 lbs thrust, turbo fan
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Part 121
Operator
Southwest Airlines Co
Departed
Las Vegas, NV
Flight plan
Unknown
Airport
BUR · Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena, runway 08, 6,032 × 150 ft, asphalt

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew · 2

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
52
Injuries
Minor
Certificates
Airline transport, Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1, Valid Medical--w/ waivers/lim
Last flight review
October 29, 1999
Seat
Left
Flight hours
11,000 total
Role
Co-pilot
Age
43
Injuries
Minor
Certificates
Commercial, Airline transport
Airplane ratings
Multi-engine land, Single-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1
Last flight review
October 29, 1999
Flight hours
5,022 total · 2,522 in this make and model

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Dusk
Wind
250° at 6 knots
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
9,500 ft overcast
Temperature
48 °F
Altimeter
29.65 inHg

Docket · 116

The files NTSB released with the investigation on July 10, 2001, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 111 MB in all.

Operations 2 - Group Chairman Factual ReportItem 1 · .PDF · 2.0 MBOperations 2 - Attachment 1 - Interview SummariesItem 2 · .PDF · 18.1 MBOperations 2 - Attachment 2 - Dispatch Release/Flight Plan for SWA 1455Item 3 · .PDF · 92 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 3 - Jeppesen ChartsItem 4 · .PDF · 744 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 4 - Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Speed AdjustmentsItem 5 · .PDF · 256 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 5 - Flight Management Systems (FMS)Item 6 · .PDF · 90 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 6 - Flight Management Computer (FMC), Progress Page 3/3Item 7 · .PDF · 78 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 7 - Onboard Performance Computer (OPC), Landing PerformanceItem 8 · .PDF · 260 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 8 - Tailwind landings/Approach speedsItem 9 · .PDF · 118 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 9 - Landing Disance ChartItem 10 · .PDF · 101 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 10 - Normal ProceduresItem 11 · .PDF · 289 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 11 - Checklist UseItem 12 · .PDF · 113 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 12 - Approach Descent-Final Descent ChecklistItem 13 · .PDF · 191 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 13 - Emergency Evacuation ChecklistItem 14 · .PDF · 199 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 14 - Procedures for all ApproachesItem 15 · .PDF · 103 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 15 - Appraoch Envelope for All ApproachesItem 16 · .PDF · 182 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 16 - Visual Approach Procedure and Crew Coordination CalloutsItem 17 · .PDF · 84 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 17 - Visual Approach ProfileItem 18 · .PDF · 62 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 18 - Close in Descent ProceduresItem 19 · .PDF · 92 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 19 - Final Descent ProceduresItem 20 · .PDF · 108 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 20 - Normal Landing Dry RunwayItem 21 · .PDF · 117 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 21 - Deviation Callouts for All ApproachesItem 22 · .PDF · 98 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 22 - Warning Systems, Excessive Descent Rates (Mode-1)Item 23 · .PDF · 67 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 23 - PULL-UP Warning Escape ProcedureItem 24 · .PDF · 157 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 24 - Go-around and Missed Approach Procedure/ProfileItem 25 · .PDF · 226 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 25 - Air Conditioning and Pressurization ControlsItem 26 · .PDF · 85 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 26 - Flap Load Relief SystemItem 27 · .PDF · 216 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 27 - Speedbrakes/Spoilers SystemItem 28 · .PDF · 193 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 28 - Brake SystemItem 29 · .PDF · 122 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 29 - Thrust Reverser SystemItem 30 · .PDF · 232 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 30 - Pilot in Command Airport Qualifications, Special Airports, FAR 121.445Item 31 · .PDF · 666 KBOperations 2 - Attachment 31 - Witness Interview of Captain Mark ClaytonItem 32 · .PDF · 398 KBATC 3 - Group Chairman Factual ReportItem 33 · .PDF · 2.4 MBWitness 4 - Group Chairman Factual ReportItem 34 · .PDF · 1.5 MBMeteorology 5 - Group Chairman Factual ReportItem 35 · .PDF · 2.2 MBMeteorology 5 - Addendum 1 to Factual ReportItem 36 · .PDF · 597 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Factual Report of Group ChairmanItem 37 · .PDF · 1.6 MBSurvival Factors 6 - Errata/Addenda to Survival Factors Group Chairman's Factual ReportItem 38 · .PDF · 39 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 1 - Excerpts from Southwest Airlines flight attendant manual pertaining to takeoff and landing procedures.Item 39 · .PDF · 100 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 2 - Excerpts from Southwest Airlines Flight Attendant initial and recurrent training programsItem 40 · .PDF · 659 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 3 - Passenger QuestionnairesItem 41 · .PDF · 45.4 MBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 4 - Luggage DocumentationItem 42 · .PDF · 50 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 5 - NTSB Materials Laboratory Factual Report No. 00-118Item 43 · .PDF · 183 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 6 - Emergency equipment location diagram (from flight attendant manual).Item 44 · .PDF · 53 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 7 - Placard from overwing exit.Item 45 · .PDF · 58 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 8 - Passenger information card.Item 46 · .PDF · 815 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Attachment 9 - Photographs (1 thru 19)Item 47 · .PDF · 18 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 1. Forward, left exit.Item 48 · .PDF · 32 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 2. Forward, left exit, showing proximity to fireplug and street sign.Item 49 · .PDF · 27 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 3. Aft, left exit.Item 50 · .PDF · 25 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 4. Escape slide at the aft, left exit.Item 51 · .PDF · 30 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 5. Right side of airplane.Item 52 · .PDF · 19 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 6. Map light above captain's seat.Item 53 · .PDF · 30 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 7. Cockpit console.Item 54 · .PDF · 46 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 8. Forward flight attendant jumpseat.Item 55 · .PDF · 29 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 9. Forward flight attendant jumpseat (seat cushion removed).Item 56 · .PDF · 23 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 10. Forward, right exit, and slide cover.Item 57 · .PDF · 36 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 11. Forward, right exit handle and top of slide cover.Item 58 · .PDF · 32 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 12. Inboard armrest attachment on seat ID.Item 59 · .PDF · 27 KBSurvival Factors 6 - Photo 13. Cabin, forward left.Item 60 · .PDF · 37 KB
All 116 files on NTSB’s docket

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.