DCA19CA170

NTSB accident investigation · Boeing CV2 · Beeville, TX · June 21, 2019

Accident · No injuriesData collectionFinal report
Date
June 21, 2019, 08:42 local (13:42 UTC)
Place
Beeville, TX
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Enroute
Aircraft
N243XTBoeing CV2
Defining event
Enroute: Nav system malfunction/failure
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report March 27, 2020
Report
Approved by Office Director
NTSB office
Major Investigations Division
Case key
99683

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

A higher than expected and accounted for crosswind which initiated a lateral deviation, and resulted in the aircraft reaching the limits of the geo-fence area triggering a contingency forced landing.

Findings · 2

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Aircraft capability: maximum crosswind componentAircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Capability exceededBoeing BOEING CV2: 1 caseAll aircraft: 21 casesProbable cause
Navigation system: global positioning sys (GPS)Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Capability exceededBoeing BOEING CV2: 1 caseAll aircraft: 3 casesProbable cause

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

On June 21, 2019, at 0842 central daylight time (CDT), N243XT a Boeing CV2-Cargo Air Vehicle (CAV), unmanned aircraft system (UAS), sustained substantial damage during a contingency landing during a test flight at Chase Industrial airport (TX2), Beeville, TX. This aircraft is a large UAS with 12 electric motors and 12 propellers mounted in the horizontal or near-horizontal plane. It is a developmental platform for unmanned cargo operations. The pilot does not control the flight path, speed or attitude of the aircraft in flight, all flights are preprogrammed. The only ability the pilot or ground control station operator has to affect the flight is through contingency management via the "abort to planned zone" (APZ), "land now" or "cut power" (terminate the flight) commands. Flight testing of the aircraft had been going on for several weeks, with approximately 45 flights completed. Test flights were very short in duration, no longer than 4 minutes. According to the manufacturer/operator, the accident flight was a planned 30 knot flight over the grass area between the runway and the taxiway. All preparations for the flight were normal. After takeoff and turning on course to parallel the runway/taxiway, the aircraft started to deviate from the programmed flight profile. The flight test area included a two-level geo-fence boundary to keep the aircraft contained within a safe area. The aircraft identified the deviation and autonomously triggered an "abort to planned zone" (APZ). The APZ is a contingency plan where the aircraft stops the current flight and immediately turns towards the closest planned landing zone (in this case, the taxiway) and begins the approach. However, the aircraft continued the lateral deviation. The aircraft reached the first geo-fence boundary and then autonomously executed a "land now" command where the aircraft immediately begins a landing regardless of its position. The aircraft appeared to adjust pitch attitude for the abort to planned zone landing and drifted towards the second geo-fence boundary. Upon reaching the outer geo-fence, the aircraft autonomously cut power to all motors and dropped to the ground, as designed. The aircraft was substantially damaged, there were no injuries. The aircraft remained within the test area. A review of the flight data by the manufacturer/operator revealed that the lateral deviation initiated due to higher than expected and accounted for wind, which resulted in high vibration within the aircraft navigation system. The contingency logic was unable to return the aircraft to the planned abort zone prior to reaching the outer geo-fence. The manufacturer/operator determined that there had been insufficient tests related to high crosswinds, and insufficient ability to determine winds during test flights. Additionally, the manufacturer/operator determined that the physical separation between the abort to planned zone (APZ) and geo-fence locations was inadequate for the aircraft to maneuverconsidering the wind and other environmental factors.

Factual narrative

On June 21, 2019, at 0842 central daylight time (CDT), N243XT a Boeing CV2-Cargo Air Vehicle (CAV), unmanned aircraft system (UAS), sustained substantial damage during a contingency landing during a test flight at Chase Industrial airport (TX2), Beeville, TX. This aircraft is a large UAS with 12 electric motors and 12 propellers mounted in the horizontal or near-horizontal plane. It is a developmental platform for unmanned cargo operations. The pilot does not control the flight path, speed or attitude of the aircraft in flight, all flights are preprogrammed. The only ability the pilot or ground control station operator has to affect the flight is through contingency management via the "abort to planned zone" (APZ), "land now" or "cut power" (terminate the flight) commands. Flight testing of the aircraft had been going on for several weeks, with approximately 45 flights completed. Test flights were very short in duration, no longer than 4 minutes. According to the manufacturer/operator, the accident flight was a planned 30 knot flight over the grass area between the runway and the taxiway. All preparations for the flight were normal. After takeoff and turning on course to parallel the runway/taxiway, the aircraft started to deviate from the programmed flight profile. The flight test area included a two-level geo-fence boundary to keep the aircraft contained within a safe area. The aircraft identified the deviation and autonomously triggered an "abort to planned zone" (APZ). The APZ is a contingency plan where the aircraft stops the current flight and immediately turns towards the closest planned landing zone (in this case, the taxiway) and begins the approach. However, the aircraft continued the lateral deviation. The aircraft reached the first geo-fence boundary and then autonomously executed a "land now" command where the aircraft immediately begins a landing regardless of its position. The aircraft appeared to adjust pitch attitude for the abort to planned zone landing and drifted towards the second geo-fence boundary. Upon reaching the outer geo-fence, the aircraft autonomously cut power to all motors and dropped to the ground, as designed. The aircraft was substantially damaged, there were no injuries. The aircraft remained within the test area. A review of the flight data by the manufacturer/operator revealed that the lateral deviation initiated due to higher than expected and accounted for wind, which resulted in high vibration within the aircraft navigation system. The contingency logic was unable to return the aircraft to the planned abort zone prior to reaching the outer geo-fence. The manufacturer/operator determined that there had been insufficient tests related to high crosswinds, and insufficient ability to determine winds during test flights. Additionally, the manufacturer/operator determined that the physical separation between the abort to planned zone (APZ) and geo-fence locations was inadequate for the aircraft to maneuverconsidering the wind and other environmental factors.

Aircraft

Registration
N243XT
Reported as
Boeing CV2
Category
Helicopter, unmanned
Serial number
004
Built
2018
Airframe hours
4.5
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight test · Part 91
Operator
Boeing
Registered owner
Boeing
Airworthiness certificate
Certificate of authorization or waiver (COA)
Last inspection
March 20, 2019
Departed
TX2 · Beeville, TX
Destination
TX2 · Beeville, TX
Airport
TX2 · Beeville, runway 13, 8,000 × 200 ft

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
51
Injuries
None
Certificates
Flight instructor, Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Helicopter, Airplane
Medical
Class 2, With waivers/limitations
Last flight review
March 28, 2019
Seat
None
Flight hours
5,662 total · 1 in this make and model · 5,326 as pilot in command · 14 in the last 90 days

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
10 knots, gusting 6

Docket · 1

The files NTSB released with the investigation on March 31, 2020, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 2.0 MB in all.