- Date
- August 3, 2023, 02:06 local (06:06 UTC)
- Place
- Chantilly, VA
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Phase of flight
- Landing
- Aircraft
- N676UABoeing 767-322
- Defining event
- Landing: Aircraft structural failure
- Weather
- Visual (VMC) · Night
- Status
- Completed
- Report
- Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class
- Class 4 - Basic report with no Prelim publish
- NTSB office
- Major Investigations Division
- Parties
- FAA, United Airlines
- Case key
- 192860
From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.
On this page
Probable cause
Improper overhaul of the trunnion cross-pin hole that resulted in the development of stress corrosion cracking and eventual failure of the right forward trunnion.
Findings · 4
NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.
Sequence of events
The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.
Analysis
United Airlines flight 924 received an engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) message regarding the main landing gear configuration after takeoff from Dulles International Airport (IAD). The flight returned to IAD and landed without incident. Post landing inspection revealed damage to the forward trunnion bearing and main gear beam. The flight crew reported that the departure sequence was normal. When the first officer retracted the landing gear, the flight crew received a “gear disagree” EICAS message. The flight crew ran the appropriate quick reference handbook (QRH) checklists to correct the issue, but the gear disagree message remained illuminated. The captain reported that they discussed the issue with dispatch and maintenance for guidance, and they decided to return to IAD for an overweight landing. During the approach into IAD, the normal gear extension did not work, and the crew performed an alternate gear extension per the QRH checklist. The captain reported that the left main and nose gear position indicators had green lights, but the right main gear indicator light was not illuminated. A “right side brace” caution message then appeared on the EICAS, and the captain initiated a go-around. The captain contacted dispatch again to discuss a course of action. The crew attempted to troubleshoot the landing gear issue with the assistance of engineering and maintenance crews on the ground but were unable to rectify the situation. The group agreed to have the aircraft conduct a flyby of IAD tower to visibly check the condition of the landing gear. IAD tower controllers confirmed that the right main gear was down but could not confirm if it was in a locked position. The decision was made to have the aircraft circle the airport to burn fuel to lighten the aircraft for landing. The passengers and flight attendants were prepared for the emergency landing and a possible evacuation. The flight crew stated that after running the appropriate QRH checklists, the captain performed the touchdown first on the left main landing gear, then the nose gear and then the right main landing gear. The crew stated the rollout was smooth and slow, and they avoided any abrupt actions. The airport fire rescue crew reported that there was no fire or smoke. The passengers, flight attendants and flight crew exited the airplane via airport mobile transport busses without injury. The airplane was examined by the operator after landing. The inspection found the right main landing gear trunnion, (see Figure 1) which is the upper end of the landing gear and attaches to the wing structure to support the airplane on the ground, and facilitates rotation of the gear on retraction, had fractured on the forward end. As a result of the fracture of the forward trunnion attachment, the rear trunnion became the main point of support for the right landing gear. The increased load on the rear main gear beam support damaged the rear trunnion bearing, bushing, and caused anoverload crack in a web of the main gear beam. Additionally, the loss of the forward trunnion support allowed upper components of the right main landing gear to shift and damage some secondary structure and panels. Figure1. A graphic depicting the main landing gear with forward trunnion highlighted. (Source: United Airlines) The operator and Boeing conducted a metallurgical examination of the forward trunnion failure and identified an origin location (see Figure 2). The examination determined the fracture was initiated by stress corrosion cracking from pits that were present on the cross-pin hole. The crack continued to propagate by stress crack corrosion until the final fracture occurred by ductile separation. Further testing and material sampling of the origin in the cross-pin hole found that corrosion had not been completely removed at the last overhaul, and chrome finish was applied in the cross-pin hole instead of a cadmium and primer finish as specified in the component maintenance manual. As a result of this accident, United Airlines performed inspections on select 767-300 airplanes that had been overhauled at the same facility as N676UA with no similar findings. Figure 2. Pictures showing crack in trunnion at the cross-pin hole and resulting trunnion failure. (Source: United Airlines)
Aircraft
- Registration
- N676UA
- Reported as
- Boeing 767-322
- Category
- Airplane
- Serial number
- 30028
- Built
- 2001
- Airframe hours
- 77,318
- Engines
- P&W PW4060-3, 60,000 lbs thrust, turbo fanP&W PW4060-3, 60,000 lbs thrust, turbo fan
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Part 121
- Operator
- United Airlines Inc
- Registered owner
- United Airlines Inc
- Airworthiness certificate
- Standard, Transport
- Last inspection
- Continuous airworthiness · July 13, 2023
- Destination
- LHR · London, OF
- Flight plan
- IFR
- Airport
- IAD · Washington Dulles Intl, runway 19L, 11,500 × 150 ft, concrete
- Equipment
- ADS-B, Angle of attack indicator, Auto-pilot, Data recorder, Electronic flight bag or handheld device, Electronic multifunction display, Electronic primary flight display, Onboard weather, Satellite tracking device, Stall warning system
Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.
Flight crew · 2
As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.
- Role
- Pilot
- Age
- 56
- Injuries
- None
- Certificate
- Airline transport
- Airplane ratings
- Multi-engine land, Single-engine land
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 1, Waiver time limited special
- Last flight review
- July 14, 2022
- Seat
- Left
- Restraint
- 5-point
- Flight hours
- 23,720 total · 8,210 in this make and model · 5,100 as pilot in command · 200 in the last 90 days · 45 in the last 30 days · 0 in the last 24 hours
- Role
- Co-pilot
- Age
- 33
- Injuries
- None
- Certificate
- Airline transport
- Airplane ratings
- Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 1, Without waivers/limitations
- Last flight review
- May 11, 2023
- Seat
- Right
- Restraint
- 5-point
- Flight hours
- 6,200 total · 677 in this make and model · 1,600 as pilot in command · 163 in the last 90 days · 33 in the last 30 days · 0 in the last 24 hours
Weather
- Conditions
- Visual (VMC) · Night
- Visibility
- 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling
- 20,000 ft broken
Docket · 6
The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 26, 2025, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 2.8 MB in all.