- Date
- July 18, 2025, 17:35 local (Jul 19, 2025, 00:35 UTC)
- Place
- Santa Barbara, CA
- Injuries
- 1 serious, 133 uninjured; on the ground: 1 serious
- Damage
- No damage
- Phase of flight
- Standing
- Aircraft
- N822UAAirbus Industrie A319-131
- Defining event
- Standing-engine(s) operating: Prop/jet/rotor blast/suction
- Weather
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Status
- Completed · report March 17, 2026
- Report
- Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class
- Class 4 - Basic report with no Prelim publish
- NTSB office
- Major Investigations Division
- Parties
- FAA AVP-110
- FAA report
- 20250718018609A
- Case key
- 200619
From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.
On this page
Probable cause
The ramp worker’s premature entry into the jet blast hazard area of an operating engine due to his failure to maintain situational awareness and his misinterpretation of the marshaller’s hand signals.
Findings · 1
NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.
Sequence of events
The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.
Analysis
On arrival at Santa Barbara Municipal Airport (SBA), Santa Barbara, California, United Airlines flight 2428 (UAL2428), operating from San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California, experienced multiple electrical system fault indications after landing and during taxi-in. Following the aircraft’s arrival at its gate, a ramp service agent sustained serious injuries after entering the jet blast area of an engine that remained running during ramp operations. No damage to the aircraft was reported. The flight crew reported that the flight segment from SFO to SBA was uneventful. After landing and clearing the runway, the first officer (FO), who was the pilot monitoring, started the auxiliary power unit (APU) and conducted the after-landing checklist. The captain, who was the pilot flying, taxied the airplane toward gate 2, where ramp personnel were positioned to receive the aircraft. As the airplane approached the stopping point at the gate, the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system annunciated a Level 2 caution chime and light with a “ELEC APU GEN FAULT” on the Engine/Warning Display. The captain verbalized “ECAM” and instructed the FO to “Stand by” on the ECAM procedure as the captain prioritized their parking guidance. Upon reaching the designated gate stop point, the marshaller signaled the flight crew to stop the airplane, and the captain set the parking brake. The FO subsequently shut down the Number 2 (right) engine in accordance with the standard parking procedure. Immediately following the right engine shutdown, the flight crew observed multiple ECAM fault messages, including an intermittent right engine fire warning accompanied by an aural alert and illumination of associated warning lights. The indication cleared within several seconds. With the left engine still running and the aircraft beacon still on the captain instructed the FO to begin ECAM actions to try and get the APU GEN back online. The flight crew attempted to reset the APU generator; however, the fault condition persisted. The crew then requested ground power before shutting down the remaining Number 1 (left) engine. Ramp personnel informed the crew that jet bridge power could not be connected while the left engine was still operating. A portable ground power unit (GPU) was subsequently retrieved and connected to the aircraft. After verifying that external power was available, the flight crew shut down the left engine and completed the parking checklist. According to the captain, the elapsed time from parking brake set to engine shutdown was approximately 10 minutes. Once the aircraft was secured, the captain and FO coordinated with United Maintenance Control to troubleshoot the electrical system faults. During this time, the FO was informed by the ramp lead that one of the ground crew members, serving as a wing walker, had sustained a serious injury from jet blast while the left engine remained running. According to the ramp lead, theinjured wing walker approached the aircraft prematurely to place chalks at the main landing gear and entered the jet blast zone without confirming that the left engine had been shut down. The ramp lead indicated that the employee was relatively new and may have misinterpreted marshalling procedures, potentially confusing the procedures with those used by other carriers operating at SBA. According to United, there were 5 ground crew members in place to bring in UAL2428. The marshaller was behind the aircraft nose stop mark, one wing walker was on the left-wing side of the airplane, the lead ramp agent and the right-wing walker was at the right-wing side of the airplane, and another support ramp agent was by the jetbridge to handle the chocks and other arrival duties. Once the aircraft came to a stop, the marshaller gave the X signal (stop), and the support agent placed the nose landing gear chocks. The support ramp agent does not need an all-clear signal to chock the nose landing gear, as this position is not exposed to engine jet blast. The marshaller then gave the hand signal to the flight crew indicating that the aircraft was chocked and lowered his hands. Standard procedure requires the left and right wing walkers—who are potentially exposed to engine jet blast—to wait for an all-clear signal from the marshaller before approaching the airplane to chock the main landing gear. The injured ramp service agent (left wing walker) indicated that he was waiting for the “safe-to-approach” signal from the marshaller but was uncertain whether he misinterpreted the signal or received it in error. He proceeded behind the left engine while carrying wheel chocks, unaware that the engine was still operating. He recalled being struck by jet blast and falling onto his left side, sustaining multiple injuries. He reported experiencing shock and was unable to feel pain immediately after impact. Nearby personnel assisted him and transported him to the on-site emergency response vehicle. The injured agent reported that he was not distracted or under time pressure and had already serviced four flights that day. The lead ramp agent stated that the ramp experienced a brief delay due to the ongoing electrical issue reported by the flight crew. During this time, the injured ramp agent appeared to misinterpret the marshaller’s gestures as the all-clear signal and began approaching the aircraft carrying two wheel chocks. The lead agent observed that the anti-collision beacon remained illuminated and that the left engine was still operating. He attempted to radio the injured agent to stop, but the agent did not appear to have heard the transmission. Moments later, the agent was struck by the exhaust blast from the operating left engine resulting in the agent being thrown to the ground. Following the accident, United issued a safety alert reminding the employees that aircraft must only be approached after marshallers give the “Safe to Approach” signal and only afterconfirming the nose gear is chocked, both engines are fully shut down and spooled down, the beacon light is off, and emphasizing “when in doubt, wait.”
Aircraft
- Registration
- N822UA
- Reported as
- Airbus Industrie A319-131
- Category
- Airplane
- Serial number
- 0948
- Built
- 1998
- Airframe hours
- 80,811
- Engines
- GE CFM56-5B, 32,000 lbs thrust, turbo fanGE CFM56-5B, 32,000 lbs thrust, turbo fan
- Damage
- No damage
- Flight
- Part 121
- Operator
- United Airlines Inc
- Registered owner
- United Airlines Inc
- Airworthiness certificate
- Standard, Transport
- Last inspection
- Continuous airworthiness · June 30, 2025
- Departed
- KSFO · San Francisco, CA
- Destination
- Same as departure
- Flight plan
- IFR
- Airport
- KSBA · Santa Barbara Municipal Airport
- Equipment
- Stall warning system, Satellite tracking device, Onboard weather, Heads up display, Electronic primary flight display, Electronic multifunction display, ADS-B, Data recorder, Airframe parachute, Auto-pilot, Angle of attack indicator
Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.
Flight crew · 2
As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.
- Role
- Pilot
- Age
- 57
- Injuries
- None
- Certificates
- Airline transport, Flight engineer
- Airplane ratings
- Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 1, With waivers/limitations
- Seat
- Left
- Restraint
- 5-point
- Flight hours
- 19,680 total · 9,638 in this make and model · 3,881 as pilot in command · 130 in the last 90 days · 33 in the last 30 days · 0 in the last 24 hours
- Role
- Co-pilot
- Age
- 37
- Injuries
- None
- Certificates
- Airline transport, Private
- Airplane ratings
- Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 1, With waivers/limitations
- Last flight review
- November 26, 2024
- Seat
- Right
- Restraint
- 5-point
- Flight hours
- 5,301 total · 2,500 in this make and model · 1,483 as pilot in command · 182 in the last 90 days · 48 in the last 30 days · 0 in the last 24 hours
Weather
- Conditions
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Visibility
- 10 statute miles
- Altimeter
- 2998.00 inHg
- Observed at
- KSBA
Docket · 4
The files NTSB released with the investigation on March 17, 2026, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 2.9 MB in all.
FAA reports on this event · 1
The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.