DCA97MA016

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.

On December 22, 1996, at about 1810 eastern standard time (est), a Douglas DC-8-63F, N827AX, operated by Airborne Express personnel on a test flight, impacted mountainous terrain in the vicinity of Narrows, Virginia. The three flightcrew members and three maintenance/avionics technicians on board the airplane received fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed for the night flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The local test flight operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and originated from Greensboro, North Carolina at approximately 1740 est.

The airplane required a functional check flight (FCF) following major modifications and "C" check inspections at a Greensboro (GSO) Part 145 repair station. A portion of the FCF was accomplished on December 21, 1996; however, the flight was terminated at GSO due to low hydraulic quantity. Following some delay for ground maintenance activity, the FCF was resumed the following day. The airplane departed GSO about 1740 local time on a 14 CFR 91 IFR flight plan filed back to GSO. Following climbout, the flightcrew was assigned a block altitude of 13,000 to 15,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The airplane was observed on air traffic control (ATC) radar to depart the floor of the assigned altitude block at low speed. ATC inquired if the flight had an emergency, and the flightcrew responded in the affirmative and that they were descending through 8,000 feet. There was no further radio contact. Evidence from the CVR and FDR indicated that the descent was related to operations associated with the flight test profile rather than a structures or systems anomaly. The airplane descended at a higher than normal rate and struck local mountainous terrain at about 3400 feet msl.