ERA09LA413

Shortly after the pilot took off in night conditions from a coastal island airport the airplane impacted the sea. There was neither low-level radar coverage of the area nor any known radio transmissions from the airplane. The pilot had intended to fly along the coast, toward his home airport to the west, but his body was recovered near the mouth of a river south of the departure airport. The only airplane wreckage recovered was a tire. The pilot, who had a reported 162 hours of flight experience, obtained his private pilot certificate about 6 weeks before the accident and purchased the airplane about 4 weeks before the accident. The pilot had delayed his flight for several hours due to en route weather and had declined several offers of ground transport. Weather at the time included a few clouds at 3,000 feet and visibility of 8 miles. Two tenths of the moon was illuminated. The departure airport had one runway, and with the prevailing winds, the pilot likely took off from runway 12, which would have resulted in a turn over water, back toward the west. Given the pilot’s relatively low experience level, the overwater flight path and the dim lighting conditions, spatial disorientation likely resulted. However, because the airplane was not recovered, a mechanical anomaly cannot be excluded.

On July 18, 2009, sometime after 2315 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 152, N5518P, was lost at sea in the vicinity of Ponce, Puerto Rico. The certificated private pilot was fatally injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the flight, from Mercedita Airport (TJPS), Ponce, Puerto Rico, to Antonio Juarbe Pol Airport (TJAB), Arecibo, Puerto Rico. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to a flight instructor, the pilot, a medical doctor, originally departed Arecibo for Ponce at 1745, with the purpose of picking up some flu vaccine for some friends. The airplane departed with 17 gallons of fuel onboard, or approximately 3 hours' flight duration. A half hour later, the pilot called the flight instructor to say he had arrived in Ponce. At 1900, the flight instructor called the pilot to advise him that the weather was deteriorating, especially in some of the interior regions, and the pilot responded that he was aware of it and was monitoring Doppler radar. The flight instructor called the pilot again about 2000, and told him that there was weather in the vicinity of Arecibo, and the pilot responded that he'd wait 1 to 2 hours for the weather to improve. The flight instructor then offered to drive over and pick up the pilot, but the pilot told him no, and that he would wait. About 2230, the flight instructor again called the pilot to inform him that there was weather east and north of Ponce. The flight instructor had also called the pilot's wife, who subsequently offered to retrieve the pilot by car, but the pilot also declined her offer. In later discussions, the pilot told the flight instructor that he planned to fly along the coast to the west, via Mayaguez and Aguadilla, and if the weather deteriorated, he could land and the flight instructor could then pick him up. At 2300, the pilot called the flight instructor to advise him that he was about to depart, and to the flight instructor's knowledge, the airplane departed about 2315. As time passed, the flight instructor attempted to contact the pilot multiple times, and about 0100, he and others began to contact authorities about the missing airplane. There was no low level radar coverage of the area, and no known radio transmissions from the airplane. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) subsequently issued an Alert Notice (ALNOT), and on July 20, 2009, about 2000, the pilot's body was located near the mouth of Rio Inabon, south of the departure airport. Several days later, a wheel from the airplane was also found. The pilot, age 52, held a private pilot certificate, and according to the flight instructor, had about 162 hours of total flight time. FAA records indicated that the pilot was issued his private pilot certificate on June 3, 2009. A copy of a sales contract indicated that the pilot purchased the airplane on July 9, 2009. Maintenance records revealed that theairplane’s latest annual inspection was completed on November 20, 2008, and that an overhauled engine was installed at that time. The departure airport had one runway, 12/30, which was 6,904 feet long and 150 feet wide. Airport elevation was 29 feet above mean sea level. On July 21, 2009, a postmortem examination of the pilot was performed at the Instituto de Ciencias de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico, with the cause of death reported as, “severo trauma corporal.” The autopsy report also noted multiple fractures of the pelvis, and only 8 ml of urine in the bladder. Local toxicology testing performed in conjunction with the autopsy noted 0.03 percent alcohol in urine, and no alcohol in central blood. According to shipping documentation, toxicological samples were shipped from Puerto Rico on July 28, 2009, and arrived at the FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the following day. Testing revealed 2.642 ug/ml of acetaminophen in the pilot’s blood, and the presence of ethanol, N-butanol, and N-propanol in multiple fluid and tissue samples, with putrefaction noted. Weather, recorded at Ponce at 2258, included a few clouds at 3,000 feet, visibility 8 statute miles, and winds from 070 degrees true at 5 knots. U.S. Naval Observatory data indicated that approximately 2/10 of the moon was illuminated. According to the FAA’s “Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge,” FAA-H-8083-25, “spatial disorientation specifically refers to the lack of orientation with regard to the position, attitude, or movement of the airplane in space.” In addition, “under normal flight conditions, when there is a visual reference to the horizon and ground, the sensory system in the inner ear helps identify the pitch, roll, and yaw movements of the airplane. When visual contact with the horizon is lost, the vestibular system becomes unreliable. The Handbook further states: “Prevention is usually the best remedy for spatial disorientation. Unless a pilot has many hours of training in instrument flight, flight in reduced visibility or at night when a horizon is not visible should be avoided.”