ERA12LA261

The pilot said that he normally flew the airplane with the fuel selector positioned to the right main fuel tank during skydiving operations. However, on the day of the accident, maintenance was performed on the airplane, and three engine run-ups were performed using the left main fuel tank. The pilot ferried the airplane back to its home base uneventfully with the left main fuel tank selected. Before the accident flight, the pilot verified that there was adequate fuel in the right main fuel tank; however, he did not reposition the fuel selector to the right main fuel tank. During climb, about 800 feet above ground level, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power. The pilot was unable to restart the engine and performed a forced landing. Subsequent examination revealed that the airplane’s right main fuel tank had been compromised and was leaking fuel, whereas the left main fuel tank was intact and devoid of fuel. Additionally, data downloaded from the airplane's engine monitor revealed that the engine power loss was preceded by a loss of fuel flow. Postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

On March 31, 2012, about 1810 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 210-5 (205), N224AL, operated by Chalet Suzanne Aviation Inc., was substantially damage during a forced landing to a field, following a total loss of engine power during climb from Chalet Suzanne Air Strip (X25), Lake Wales, Florida. The certificated commercial pilot and six passengers were not injured. The commercial skydive flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the planned local flight. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, earlier during the day of the accident, maintenance was performed on the airplane at Bartow Municipal Airport (BOW), Bartow, Florida. Specifically, a gascolator seal and starter motor were replaced. During that time, the airplane's left main fuel tank was utilized for three maintenance engine run-ups. The pilot stated that he flew the airplane uneventfully from BOW to X25, following the maintenance work, with the fuel selector positioned to the left main fuel tank. He shut down the engine at X25 and checked the right main fuel tank with a stick. The right main fuel tank had 2.5 inches of fuel, which equated to 9 or 10 gallons. The pilot further stated that he did not check the fuel quantity in the left main fuel tank as he usually flew with the fuel selector positioned to the right main fuel tank; however, he usually kept 9 or 10 gallons in the left main fuel tank as reserve. The pilot did not reposition the fuel selector to the right main fuel tank prior to the accident flight. During climb from runway 18, about 800 feet mean sea level, the pilot noted that the cylinder head temperature for all cylinders was indicating red and the engine lost rpm. He activated the fuel boost pump and initiated a turn back toward the airport. The mixture lever and throttle lever were already full-forward, so the pilot did not move them. During the turn, he moved the fuel selector from the left main fuel tank position to the right main fuel tank position, but the engine did not respond. The rpm indicated below idle, with the exception of a momentary jump to 1,500 rpm, then back to idle. He subsequently performed a forced landing to a field. Examination of the airplane by the FAA inspector revealed that during the landing, the right main landing gear and nosegear dug into soft ground, which caused them to collapse. The airplane came to rest on its right side, which resulted in damage to the fuselage, propeller, right wing, and right horizontal stabilizer. The inspector observed fuel leaking from the right wing. When he examined the left main fuel tank, it was intact and he did not observe any fuel. An engine data monitor was recovered from the cockpit and forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC, for data download. Review of the downloaded data revealed that at 1805, the engine fuel flow decreased to 0.0gallons per hour, which was followed by a brief rise and then decrease of exhaust gas temperature and a decrease in cylinder head temperature. Following the accident, an independent mechanic examined the maintenance work performed on the gascolator and did not observe any discrepancies or fuel leaks.