ERA21LA141

The pilot was operating a cross-country flight in visual flight rules (VFR) weather conditions. About 10 miles from the destination airport, the pilot contacted the air traffic control tower and reported the airplane’s location and altitude and his intention to land. The controller advised the pilot to report entering a left downwind for the active runway, which the pilot acknowledged. No further communications were received from the pilot or, nor were any made by the controller. Shortly after the pilot’s last transmission, the airplane made a gradual turn to the right and then back to the left, and the airplane then continued on a constant heading with a gradual descent. About 4 minutes later, the airplane passed the destination airport, which the controller did not notice, and the airplane continued in a gradual descent until tracking data ended. At that time, the airplane was over the Atlantic Ocean about 16 miles southeast of the destination airport. Family members reported the airplane overdue 2 days later, after which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an alert notification. Search and rescue operations, which were coordinated by the US Coast Guard, ensued. The airplane and pilot were not located despite a 3.5-day search. Search and rescue operations might have been initiated sooner if the controller at the destination airport had followed the track of the airplane as it transitioned through the controlled airspace. If the controller had followed the airplane’s track, he would likely have attempted to contact the pilot and initiated procedures for search and rescue operations after losing contact with the airplane over the ocean. Further, the pilot had not filed a VFR flight plan, which is the primary tool the FAA uses to initiate search and rescue operations for an overdue airplane operating under VFR. Such flight plans are not required by the FAA. However, for those VFR flight plans that are filed, the FAA will initiate action if the flight plan is not closed or the airplane is not confirmed to have successfully landed beginning 30 minutes after the estimated time of arrival indicated on the flight plan. Because the airplane could not be examined and no pilot autopsy or toxicology could be performed, the investigation was unable to determine the events that led to the airplane’s impact with water.

On February 24, 2021, about 1104 eastern standard time, radar contact was lost with an experimental amateur built Lancair 320, N670BS, while the airplane was over the Atlantic Ocean about 16 nautical miles southeast of Boca Raton, Florida. The airplane wreckage and the pilot were not subsequently located. As a result, the airplane was presumed to have impacted the Atlantic Ocean and sustained substantial damage, and the pilot was presumed to be fatally injured. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar tracking data, the airplane departed DeLand Municipal Airport (DED), DeLand, Florida, about 0949 and flew southeast toward Boca Raton Airport (BCT), Boca Raton, Florida. A review of FAA audio recordings revealed that the pilot contacted the BCT air traffic control tower at 1054:00 when the airplane was about 10 miles northwest of the airport. The pilot reported that the airplane was at an altitude of 2,400 ft mean sea level (msl) and was descending, and the pilot stated his intention to land at BCT. The controller instructed the pilot to report when he had entered a left downwind for runway 5; at 1054:30, the pilot replied, “report left downwind for runway five, bravo sierra.” No further communications were recorded from the pilot or the controller. Shortly after the pilot’s radio transmission, the airplane made a gradual turn to the right (turning about 12° during a 10- to 15-second period) followed by gradual turn to the left (turning about 10° during a period of about 10 seconds). The turn stopped at 1054:58, after which the airplane flew straight for the remainder of the flight on a true heading of about 136°. The airplane entered the BCT class D airspace from the northwest while descending through 1,700 ft msl. The airplane continued to track toward the southeast and, at 1057:53, was abeam BCT 1 nautical mile to the northeast and at 1,400 ft msl. The airplane exited the class D airspace about 1 nautical mile east of Boca Raton at an altitude of about 1,100 ft msl. The airplane continued to descend on a southeast heading until 1104:02, when track data were lost. At that time, the airplane was about 16 nautical miles southeast of BCT at an altitude of about 100 ft msl and a groundspeed of about 155 knots. The figure below shows the airplane’s flight track through presumed water impact. Figure - The airplane’s ground track (in red) as the airplane flew southeast past BCT toward the Atlantic Ocean. During a postaccident interview, the local controller at BCT did not recall the details of the accident. Based on information provided during the interview, he surmised that he did not observe the airplane as it transitioned through the BCT airspace. The BCT air traffic control tower staff were not aware of the event until family members reported the airplane overdue. On February 26 (2 days after the accident flight),family members of the pilot reported that the airplane was overdue. In response, the FAA issued an alert notification about 1022 that day and coordinated with the US Air Force Rescue Coordination Center and the US Coast Guard for search and rescue efforts. Surface vessels and aircraft began searching about 1240, and the search effort was suspended about 1937 on March 1 with “no findings” regarding the airplane and pilot. According to the FAA’s flight plan service provider, no flight plans from the pilot were on file or activated on the day of the accident. According to FAA airman records, the 87-year-old male pilot’s last aviation medical examination was in July 2010. At that time, he reported a history of high blood pressure treated with medication, and he was issued a third-class medical certificate limited by a requirement to wear corrective lenses. However, in September 2010, the FAA sent the pilot a letter requesting information regarding a history of heart pain, coronary artery disease requiring an angioplasty procedure, and high blood pressure requiring medication; the pilot had not reported a history of heart pain or coronary artery disease at his last aviation medical examination, nor had he disclosed that he had previously had an authorization for Special Issuance medical certification that had expired in 2001. The pilot responded to the FAA's September 2010 letter but declined to provide the requested information. As a result, the FAA revoked the pilot's medical certificate on March 30, 2011. Generally, revocation of a pilot’s most recently issued medical certificate disqualifies that pilot from exercising privileges requiring medical certification, as well as from exercising sport pilot privileges. The pilot’s airman certificates (commercial and private pilot) were subsequently revoked in February 2015 after the FAA determined that he had previously operated an airplane without a valid medical certificate. According to friend of the pilot, he had been visiting in the DeLand area for a couple of days. She had flown with the pilot several times. He did not mention any recent problems with the airplane but noted that a navigation system had been “checked out” about 1 month before the accident flight and that one of the wingtip lights had been replaced a few months before the flight. The pilot’s friend reported that the pilot had fueled the airplane at DED. (Fuel records indicated that the pilot purchased 14 gallons on the day before the accident flight.) She reported that the pilot seemed healthy and had undergone a heart procedure about 3 years before the accident. Weather radar records showed an area of precipitation along the airplane’s track about 1057:00; however, ceilings likely remained at or above 1,500 ft msl and the flight was below 1,500 ft msl during the last 7 minutes of the flight. There was no evidence of wind shear, outflow boundaries, or other convective wind phenomena near the accident site at the accident time.