ERA22FA223

The pilot had recently purchased the airplane and wanted to fly with an instructor to familiarize himself with it before flying home to Texas. In the days before the accident, the pilot began two flights with a flight instructor in North Carolina in the accident airplane; however, both flights were cut short because the airplane was not producing full power and the engine was backfiring. On the day of the accident, the instructor contacted the accident pilot to inquire about the troubleshooting. The pilot reported, and logbook entries confirmed, that the spark plugs were cleaned and the fuel servo was adjusted, and that the airplane was returned to service. The pilot also stated to the instructor that he planned to depart to Texas that afternoon. When the instructor suggested that the pilot wait and get more experience in the airplane, the pilot stated that he “felt capable” and was departing in order to “beat the weather.” The accident occurred on the first leg of the pilot’s return flight to Texas. Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that, about 2 hours and 20 minutes after departure, the pilot performed two 360° turns before proceeding toward a nearby airport, where he contacted the tower controller and received a landing clearance. About one mile from the runway, the pilot declared mayday and reported a loss of engine power. No further transmissions were received; the airplane impacted terrain and a postimpact fire ensued. Examination of the engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures; however, the examination was limited in scope due to impact damage and thermal damage sustained in the postcrash fire. Recorded engine data revealed that the oil pressure briefly dropped to zero about 11 to 15 minutes before the reported loss of engine power, which corresponded with the two circles the pilot performed before contacting the tower controller; however, the pilot did not communicate any engine issues before the mayday call. Review of maintenance records revealed several entries regarding loss of manifold pressure or backfiring, starting several years before the accident. During the six years before the accident, the airplane accumulated about 22 hours. The most recent engine overhaul was completed almost 33 years before the accident. The manufacturer’s recommended time between engine overhaul was 12 calendar years. Given the repeated, documented maintenance issues before departure and for years before the accident, it is likely that the loss of engine power occurred due to an undiagnosed engine issue that the investigation was not able to identify.

According to the maintenance logbooks, the engine was originally installed in 1971 and was overhauled on June 7, 1989. In the 6 years before the accident, the airplane had accumulated about 80 hours of flight time. The first logbook entry regarding the engine backfiring was in June 2018. The backfiring was noted again in entries for the prebuy inspection, and on the day of the accident. Between June 2018 and the date of the accident, the engine accumulated about 22 hours tachometer time. Six days before the accident, new engine mounts were installed and the spark plugs were cleaned, gapped, tested, and reinstalled. The fuel injectors were removed and cleaned, and seals on two cylinders were replaced. The fuel line on the No. 2 cylinder was replaced. An engine runup was performed and the airplane was returned to service. According to Lycoming Service Instruction No. 1009BE, “All engine models are to be overhauled within twelve (12) calendar years of the date they first entered service or of last overhaul. This calendar year time period TBO is to mitigate engine deterioration that occurs with age, including corrosion of metallic components and degradation of non-metallic components such as gaskets, seals, flexible hoses and fuel pump diaphragms.” A review of the data downloaded from the airplane’s Electronics International R-1 tachometer revealed that, during the accident flight, the engine rpm remained in normal operating range until the loss of power. The data from the Electronics International OPT-1 oil pressure and temperature gauge revealed that the oil temperature remained within normal range. About 11 minutes before the loss of power, the oil pressure briefly dropped to zero. The gauge records data every 236 seconds, about 4 minutes. On May 11, 2022, about 1853 Eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-24-250, N8007P, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Athens, Georgia. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to a flight instructor, the pilot had recently purchased the airplane and wanted to fly with an instructor to familiarize himself with the RayJay turbocharger system before flying home to Texas. The pilot told him that he had completed a checkout in a Piper PA-24 in Texas, but it was not equipped with a turbocharger. Two days before the accident, they departed and planned to climb to 10,000 ft and familiarize the pilot with the turbo system, but the engine was not developing full power and the manifold pressure was low. They returned to the airport and maintenance personnel found a loose wire that was grounding one of the magnetos and they replaced the wire. The next day, the engine’s performance had improved, but it was still not producing adequate manifold pressure and maintenance personnel subsequently made “a couple of adjustments.” During the next flight, maintenance radioed the pilots and told them that theengine was backfiring, so they landed and returned the airplane to maintenance. The instructor stated that they could not hear the backfiring, nor did they receive any indications in the cockpit. A maintenance logbook entry on the date of the accident stated, “engine running rough and backfire low manifold pressure.” The spark plugs were cleaned, gapped, tested, and reinstalled. The entry also stated, “engine diagnosed running very rich”; the fuel mixture was adjusted at the fuel servo to obtain a 50 rpm rise and manifold pressure of 26 inches. An engine runup was performed and the airplane was returned to service. The instructor was unavailable to fly with the pilot on the day of the accident, but he called him to find out how the engine was running. The pilot told him maintenance had made some adjustments and the airplane was making adequate manifold pressure and power. The pilot told him he planned on leaving that afternoon to fly back to Texas. The instructor suggested that the pilot wait a couple days and get more experience in the airplane and not feel rushed, but the pilot told him he, “felt capable and would be departing to beat the weather.” A review of air traffic control information and flight track data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration revealed that the airplane departed Triangle North Executive Airport (LHZ), Louisburg, North Carolina, about 1619. The airplane flew on a generally southwest heading between about 4,000 to 5,000 ft mean sea level (msl) for about 2 hours 20 minutes. About 15 minutes before the loss of engine power, about 21 nautical miles east of the Athens/Ben Epps Airport (AHN), Athens, Georgia, the airplane completed two 360° turns to the right and then continued on a southwesterly heading in a gradual descent toward AHN. At 1844, about 10 miles east of AHN the pilot contacted air traffic control and was instructed to land on runway 27. At 1848, about 1 mile from the runway, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that he had “lost” the engine; there were no further transmissions from the pilot. The last track data was observed at 1852, as the airplane descended through 925 ft msl, about 200 ft above ground level. The pilot did not advise air traffic control of any engine issues before the mayday call. An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Division of Forensic Sciences at the request of the Clarke County coroner. The autopsy report was reviewed by the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA’s Forensic Sciences Laboratory found rosuvastatin in the pilot’s blood and urine. Rosuvastatin is a prescription medication used to treat high cholesterol. According to a flight instructor who flew with the pilot in February, about 3 months before the accident, his “flying and communication skills were rusty.” They flewtogether for about 10 hours and, based on the pilot’s performance, he did not endorse the pilot’s flight review. He stated, “he acted with little sense of urgency when practicing emergency procedures, was slow to respond with proper control inputs.” The pilot “lacked a good situational awareness. Furthermore, he seemed not to understand the importance of getting the proper training after not flying for such a long time.” The pilot then initiated flight training in April with a local flight school seeking high performance and complex endorsements. The pilot stated that he intended to purchase a turbocharged Piper Comanche 250, and he “needed a certain number of hours in that airplane for insurance purposes.” The airplane did not have autopilot and the flight instructor told him “everything happens faster and with more to manage” and that the workload would be increased. The pilot told his instructor that he planned to hire a ferry pilot to fly with him from North Carolina to Texas. The instructor urged the pilot to continue training to stay proficient, to receive training in a turbocharged airplane, and reiterated using a ferry pilot to get the airplane to Texas. They accrued about 3 hours of ground instruction and 4.5 hours of flight time the month before the accident. From February to May, the pilot accumulated about 15 hours of flight time. The pilot’s logbook was not recovered. His private pilot certificate was issued in 2003. On the application for his most recent medical certificate, dated January 31, 2022, he reported 78 total hours of flight experience. The airplane impacted a wooded area on a residential property about 3/4 miles from the approach end of runway 27 at AHN. The wreckage debris path was about 50 ft long and oriented on a magnetic heading of 070°. There was an extensive postimpact fire. All major structural components of the airplane were located within the debris field. Flight control cable continuity was established from the control inputs to the bellcranks and control surfaces. About 10 gallons of fuel were recovered from the left wing. The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange, and minor scratches were present along the leading edges of the blades. The fuel flow divider and fuel injector nozzles were all intact, unobstructed, and contained fuel. The engine-driven fuel pump and fuel lines contained fuel, and the fuel pump was removed for disassembly; however, when the pump was opened, it fell apart. Further examination of the fuel servo revealed an initially rich test result; however, it operated within normal range during a subsequent test. Both magnetos were removed and manually rotated. The left magneto produced spark at all leads. The right magneto failed to produce spark and the hold-down nuts would grind when rotated; when disassembled, the shaft was off-center due to impact damage. The engine was manually rotated, and internal continuity was confirmed. The cylinders were examined with a lightedborescope and did not display any anomalies. The turbocharger system remained attached: the left turbocharger vane spun freely but the right turbocharger vane was impact damaged.