ERA25FA143

The instrument-rated private pilot and passenger were departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight. The weather conditions that preceded and persisted until the time of the takeoff consisted of low ceilings (300 ft), mist, and fog with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) through most of the area. After departure, the pilot flew the runway heading and climbed briefly before turning right and descending to about 200 ft. The right turn then stopped and the airplane flew a relatively straight ground track and resumed the climb. While flying at an altitude of about 600 ft, with the airplane climbing at a vertical speed of about 1,800 feet per minute, the airplane continued for about a mile before entering another turn to the right. The airplane stopped climbing during this turn after it reached a peak altitude of 1,000 ft. Shortly after, the right turn progressively tightened as the airplane began a descending spiral. A witness observed the airplane rolling as it descended out of the clouds before impacting terrain. The airplane impacted the terrain at high-speed in a nearly 50° nose down, and steep right wing low attitude. Postaccident examination of the wreckage was limited by the level of impact-related damage and significant fragmentation. Within the wreckage that was examined, there was no indication of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engine. Additionally, witness statements and impact signatures observed on the airplane’s propeller blades were consistent with the engine producing power at impact. The instrument-rated pilot had completed an instrument proficiency check about 2 months before the accident. Since then, he had accumulated additional experience that included flight in simulated and actual instrument meteorological conditions, and had conducted several instrument approaches, all in the accident airplane. While his flight logs suggested that he had some familiarity operating the airplane and its newly installed electronic flight instrumentation under instrument flight rules, the pilot’s overall level of proficiency could not be determined from available information. The airplane’s erratic flight track on the accident flight, which included arrested climbs, descents, and low altitude turns that culminated in a tightening turn and high-speed descent was indicative of the known effects of spatial disorientation, specifically the somatogyral illusion (graveyard spiral). During the initial climb, once the pilot entered the clouds and lost all outside visual cues, it would have been difficult to recognize and respond to spatial disorientation unless he was confident and assertive in his use of the airplane’s avionics package and flight instrumentation. The aortic plaque observed a postaccident autopsy of the pilot indicated some increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event, although the magnitude of this risk was uncertain fromthe limited autopsy evidence. The limited qualitative toxicology results in tissue indicated that the pilot had used the sedating antihistamine medication diphenhydramine, but did not indicate the precise timing of his last use or whether he was experiencing associated impairing effects at the time of the accident. While the pilot had defective color vision, he had been approved for flight and there was no evidence to suggest that color vision played a role in the accident.

The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute's publication, "Introduction to Aviation Physiology," defines spatial disorientation as a “loss of proper bearings; state of mental confusion as to position, location, or movement relative to the position of the earth.” Factors contributing to spatial disorientation include changes in acceleration, flight in IFR conditions, frequent transfer between visual flight rules and IFR conditions, and unperceived changes in aircraft attitude. The FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook? (FAA-H-8083-3C) describes some hazards associated with flying when the ground or horizon are obscured. The handbook states, in part, the following: The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular can and will confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in airplane attitude, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated, leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when, in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation. A review of the airplane’s maintenance records showed that on March 4, 2025, at 1,175.8 total hours of operation, the engine was serviced with 10 quarts of oil and a subsequent engine run was successfully completed. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on July 3, 2024. At the time of the inspection, the airframe and engine had accrued about 1,085 total hours of operation; the spark plugs were cleaned and gapped, the magnetos were inspected, and an engine compression check was performed yielding normal results. The airframe flight control cables were inspected and all fluids were serviced. The Airworthiness Directives were checked and the propeller was inspected. No mechanical irregularities were noted, and the airplane was returned to service in an airworthy condition. A review of FAA airworthiness records revealed that on August 7, 2024, about 7 months before the accident flight, a new autopilot and avionics package was installed on the airplane. This included but was not limited to the Garmin G3X system and a Garmin GFC 500 Autopilot. The pilot’s previous airplane, a Mooney M20, had a Garmin 530W installed. On March 14, 2025, at 0749 eastern daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company A36, N566C, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident in Greenville, North Carolina. The private pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The flight departed from Pitt-Greenville Airport (PGV), Greenville, North Carolina and was destined for Vero Beach Regional Airport (VRB), Vero Beach, Florida, about 580 nautical miles away. According to air traffic control communications and ADS-B flight track data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), thepilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) and stated he was on the ground at PGV and requested an instrument flight rules clearance to VRB. After receiving the clearance, the airplane departed from PGV at 0746. Shortly after departing runway 2, the initial climb appeared normal as the airplane climbed through 400 ft mean sea level (msl) at a groundspeed of 93 knots (see figure 1). The airplane’s transponder beacon code changed from 1200 to 3672. The airplane turned to the right to a track of about 135° magnetic and descended to about 250 ft msl; the airplane’s descent rate was about -1,700 ft per minute (fpm) before the descent was arrested and the airplane resumed its climb. Upon reaching about 650 ft msl, while on a track of about 180° magnetic, the climb rate was about +1,800 fpm. The airplane continued turning to the right. By 0748:12, the airplane had climbed to an altitude of 1,050 ft msl, which was the highest altitude attained during the flight. It was flying at a groundspeed of 109 knots and was on a ground track of about 270º magnetic. Shortly after, the airplane’s turn had significantly tightened and its descent rate increased to -3,648 fpm while the groundspeed increased to 130 knots before flight track data ceased. There were no radio transmissions made by the pilot during the final portion of the flight. Figure 1 - Flight track overview (red) with annotations for altitude, ground track direction, groundspeed, and vertical rates from takeoff through loss of track data. According to a witness who was near the approach end of runway 26 at the time of the accident, he observed the airplane descend out of the clouds, complete a 360º roll to the right, before it briefly leveled off and rolled to the right again. When the roll was about halfway completed, the airplane impacted the ground. Several witnesses also described hearing the accident airplane during the takeoff, as it maneuvered in the vicinity of the airport, or during its final descent. The witnesses consistently stated that the engine sounded as it were at a high power setting. An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the East Carolina University Division of Forensic Pathology, Grenville, North Carolina. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma, and the manner of death was accident. The pilot’s last aviation medical examination was November 18, 2023. At that time, he reported no active medical conditions and no medication use. He was noted to have a 2009 Statement of Demonstrated Ability for defective color vision. He was issued a third-class medical certificate limited by a requirement to use corrective lenses to meet vision standards at all required distances. Due to the extent of the pilot’s injuries, his autopsy was markedly limited for evaluation of natural disease. Structural evaluation of the brain, heart, and lungs was not possible. Aortic plaque was present. Postmortem toxicological testing by the FAA Forensic SciencesLaboratory in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma detected diphenhydramine in brain tissue and kidney tissue. Propranolol was detected in brain tissue and was not detected in kidney tissue. No blood was available for testing. At 0730, the PGV reported weather conditions included wind from 040° at 5 knots, visibility of 10 statute miles or greater, ceiling overcast at 500 feet above ground level (agl), a temperature of 8°C, a dew point temperature of 8°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.08 inches of mercury. A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh model 01-hour forecast sounding valid for near the accident site at 0800 was retrieved from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Air Resources Laboratory and analyzed by the RAwinsonde OBservation (RAOB) program. Clouds were identified by RAOB from about 200 feet through 1,600 feet. The freezing level was at about 9,400 feet. The wind below 2,000 feet was generally from the northeast at magnitudes of about 10 knots or less. Above this level the wind was from the north through 9,000 feet at magnitudes of less than 10 knots. No significant wind shear was identified below 10,000 feet. A temperature inversion was noted between about 900 and 2,000 feet. At 0140, a Terminal Aerodrome Forecast was issued for PGV that covered the time of the airplane’s departure and indicated a wind from 040° at 4 knots, a visibility of 3 statute miles in mist, and an ceiling overcast at 200 feet agl. A Graphical-Airmen’s Meteorological Information advising of instrument meteorological conditions in mist and fog was issued about 0445 and valid between 0500 and 0800 for the area surrounding PGV. According to FAA airman records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. According to the pilot’s logbook, as of March 7, 2025, the pilot had accumulated 2,034 total hours of flight experience, of which 159.5 hours was in the accident airplane make and model. Between the pilot’s logbook entries on July 6 and August 11, 2024, “New Avionics” was annotated in the margin of one of the pages. Between August 11, 2024, and the last entry on March 7, 2025, the pilot logged 48.2 total hours of flight experience, of which 8.4 hours were operated in simulated IMC, and 1.8 hours of which were operated in actual IMC. Between the time of the pilot’s most recent instrument proficiency check on January 12, 2025, and the accident, he logged 1.9 hours in simulated IMC, 1.8 hours in actual IMC, and 4 instrument approaches, all of which were in the accident airplane. At the time of the accident, the pilot had applied for BasicMed. His BasicMed course date was September 2, 2024, and his Comprehensive Medical Examination Checklist (CMEC) date was August 19, 2024. The accident was nonsurvivable to severity of impact. Examination of the accident site and wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted a parked flatbed trailer and a gravel-covered storage lot in a right wing, nose down attitude.The right wingtip fuel tank damaged the trailer and came to rest below a hole that it had made in the trailer. The propeller, engine, and instrument panel were lodged in the impact crater approximately 3 ft deep. During the impact sequence, the right wing and forward fuselage had fragmented. An approximate 80 ft-long debris path existed that started at the area of the impact crater and ran from the crater on a 260º magnetic heading to where the aft cabin, left wing, and empennage (which was inverted) came to rest at the end of the debris path. There was no evidence of an inflight or postimpact fire. Flight control cable continuity could not be established due to the heavily fragmented nature of the wreckage. Several unidentified cables displayed tensile overload signatures that consisted of a “broomstraw” appearance. Additional unidentified cables were found with cuts made by first responders. The aileron trim cables had pulled through the wing, and the actuator pushrod was bent, making the reading unreliable. The fuel strainer (which was integral to the fuel selector valve), contained a small amount of fuel. The fuel selector mounting plate was deformed around the handle due to impact forces. The handle was observed to be between detents. The selector position had rotated past its most counterclockwise position (right fuel tank). After disassembly from its deformed mounting plate, the selector operated as designed when air was blown through the ports. The left and right main landing gear trunnions were found loose in the debris field with each respective wheel and brake assembly separated from them. The landing gear actuator was found loose in the debris field, and its housing was impact damaged. The drive gear inside the housing was found at an intermediate position between the landing gear up and gear down position. Environmental and icing controls were not observed on the crush-damaged instrument panel. The autopilot system was a Garmin GFC500, and the instrument panel had been updated with digital touchscreen primary displays. The displays and the rest of the instrument panel were destroyed. The propeller hub was separated from the engine and remained attached to a portion of the crankshaft that had impact-separated from the engine. The three blade bases had remained seated in the hub. All three blades displayed varying degrees of S-bending, leading edge damage, tip damage, and chordwise scratching, with one of the blades having been sheared off near the root. The engine was subjected to extreme impact forces and was heavily damaged. The crank case, oil sump, and accessory cases displayed multiple cracks and were missing pieces. Cylinder No. 6 was separated from the crank case but remained in place due to the intake and exhaust tubing. The crankshaft was impact-separated forward of the No.5 connecting arm journal.