ERA26LA102

The pilots were performing a visual flight rules, cross-country flight at night. The pilots coordinated with air traffic control to perform an instrument approach to the destination airport’s runway 19 that would terminate in a circle to land maneuver to the opposite direction runway 1. The airport was equipped with three runways, two of which had been closed with an accompanying NOTAM issued due to snow and ice that was covering them. Both pilots were aware of the runway closures prior to the flight. During the subsequent right circling maneuver, the left seat (flying) pilot inadvertently aligned the airplane and began a landing approach to runway 32, whose runway edge lights were illuminated despite the runway being closed. The airplane was high on the final approach, so the pilot transitioned into a forward slip. The pilot further described being task saturated while she tried to focus on maintaining airspeed and alignment with the runway using external visual cues and did not recognize that the airplane was approaching the wrong runway. The right seat pilot described that during the left seat pilot’s turn to final approach, he had been looking inside at an electronic device for indications of nearby traffic, and when he looked out, he recalled seeing that the airplane was approaching a runway surrounded by bright lights, including an approach lighting system. Neither pilot recognized the snow-covered runway surface until after the airplane had touched down. During the landing, the airplane’s wings and propeller contacted the ground, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage. The manager of the airport’s air traffic control tower stated that all the runway’s lights, including those surrounding the closed runway, had been illuminated at the request of airport operations personnel in order to help melt snow and ice around the lights. The airport’s operations manager stated that the airport had requested that air traffic control tower personnel leave the runway 1/19 runway edge and taxiway lights on, but did not request that the closed runways’ lights be left on. Neither the air traffic control tower manager nor the airport operations manager was able to provide documentation of any lighting requests that had been made. According to FAA order JO 7110.65BB Air Traffic Control, “Do not turn on the runway edge lights when a NOTAM closing the runway is in effect.” Additionally, the airport operations manager reported no lighted “X” markings had been placed on the closed runways, as those markings were typically only placed during temporary closures due to construction. Had the pilots verified the airplane’s heading during the final approach and recognized that it was more than 50 degrees different than that of the intended landing runway, it is likely that the accident could have been avoided. It is also likely that had the closed runway’s lights not been illuminated, consistent with FAA guidance to air traffic controllers, thepilots would not have misidentified and attempted to land on the closed runway.