FTW03MA160

The Board's full report is available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/FTW03MA160.pdf

On May 24, 2003, about 2136 central daylight time, a Boeing 737-300 (737), N343SW, registered to and operated by Southwest Airlines Company (Southwest) as flight 2066, veered off the left side of runway 4 during landing at Amarillo International Airport (AMA), Amarillo, Texas. The flight crew steered the airplane back toward the runway, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to a stop on the runway. The 63 passengers and 5 crewmembers were not injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The scheduled domestic air carrier flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 with an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan filed; visual meteorological conditions prevailed with thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport. The flight originated from McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, about 1945.

The Board's full report is available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/FTW03MA160.pdf

On May 24, 2003, about 2136 central daylight time (unless otherwise indicated, all times in this report are central daylight time based on a 24-hour clock), a Boeing 737-300 (737), N343SW, registered to and operated by Southwest Airlines Company (Southwest) as flight 2066, veered off the left side of runway 4 during landing at Amarillo International Airport (AMA), Amarillo, Texas. The flight crew steered the airplane back toward the runway, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to a stop on the runway. The 63 passengers and 5 crewmembers were not injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The scheduled domestic air carrier flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 with an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan filed; visual meteorological conditions prevailed with thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport. The flight originated from McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, about 1945.

The flight was the second and final leg during the second day of a 3-day trip sequence for the crew, which included the captain, the first officer, and the three flight attendants. The trip sequence began on May 23, 2003, about 1500 when the crew departed Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois, en route to Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX), Phoenix, Arizona. The crew then flew to Portland International Airport (PDX), Portland, Oregon, arrived about 2210, and remained overnight in Portland. The next day, they departed PDX about 1730 for LAS. The flight to AMA was scheduled to depart about 1920 but was delayed because of late connecting passengers.

During post-accident interviews, the captain and the first officer stated that they checked the weather before departure and that they were aware that thunderstorms were expected in the AMA area. Their planned alternate destination was Love Field (DAL), Dallas, Texas.

According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information, during the airplane's descent, the captain contacted Southwest operations at AMA about 2125 for weather information. The captain stated, "looking up here on the radar it doesn't look very happy." The operations personnel replied, "we've got frequent, lot of lightning, ah light to moderate rain." About 2127, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) approach controller told the flight crew that winds were "quite variable" between 290º and 010º. The controller also advised the flight crew that automatic terminal information service (ATIS) Kilo was in effect. The flight crewmembers had advised the controller that they had ATIS information Juliet. The controller stated, "ceilings are still at five thousand five hundred five thousand five hundred broken and nine thousand five hundred overcast." ATIS information Juliet included an advisory that stated, "notice to airmen: hazardous weather information available on HIWAS [hazardous in-flight weather advisory service] or from Fort Worth flight service." The controller advised the flight crew to expect a visual approach to runway 4. The captain responded, "okay copy and ah this storm is moving ah?" The controller replied, "south south east." The controller advised the flight crew to "descend at your discretion and maintain six thousand and ah looks like the main cell is southwest of the airport ah just about to pass the final approach for runway four."

At 2128:00, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, began briefing the procedure for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 4. At 2128:45, the first officer briefed the procedure for the missed approach. He stated, "if we have to do the missed we go to forty one hundred feet [mean sea level (msl)] then climbing right turn. That kinda looks like that might be where the weather's heading, so we might need something different than that." At 2128:58, the captain responded, "alright if it looks real [expletive deleted] on the way in then I'll ask them what to anticipate on the way out."

At 2130:53, as the flight crew completed the Approach Descent checklist, the captain stated, "radar's aw, well," adding, 9 seconds later, "aw you've seen worse." The first officer responded, "hah. Absolutely." At 2131:22, the captain stated, "man you're gonna be a god out of this whole thing I can tell, a hero," which was followed by the sound of laughter.

At 2132:02, the captain suggested that the airplane descend the airplane to avoid lightning. Seven seconds later, the captain stated, "little bit of distance eh I'll take two thousand feet below it." At 2132:20, the captain stated, "he should be turning us here any minute but, no sense being a lightning rod." At 2132:39, the first officer responded, "oh [expletive deleted] keep my hands off anything metal," which was followed by the sound of laughter.

The approach controller, who was also working the tower controller position, cleared the flight for the ILS runway 4 approach at 2132:45. At 2132:59, the captain told the controller, "we're just skirtin' the very edge of the storm right now." The controller responded, "that's what I'm showin also." The captain replied, "rather be lucky." The sound of laughter was recorded at 2133:08. At 2133:10, the captain said, "holy [expletive deleted], good luck." At 2133:33, the controller stated that the winds were from "two four zero variable to two nine zero at five knots or less" and that "there is a thunderstorm light and light rain at the airport." The captain replied, "alright, so we still got the field in sight but visibility starting to deteriorate we're just getting into rain now." According to airport surveillance radar-8 data, the flight intercepted the runway 4 localizer about 8.8 miles from the runway threshold.

At 2134:13, the captain said to the first officer, "why don't you fly this one [the approach and landing]," and the first officer acknowledged the captain's statement. Two seconds later, the captain stated, "glideslope's alive." (The glideslope provides vertical guidance on the ILS approach.) At 2134:26, the captain stated, "gear down. Wow. This is really gonna be gusty." Twenty seconds later, the controller stated the winds were "switching southwest now it's two two zero at niner." The flight crew continued the approach, lowered the flaps, and completed the Final Descent checklist. At 2135:35, the captain stated, "okay checklist complete I think it's a good call," followed by a sound similar to trim wheel movement. The captain stated, "holy [expletive deleted]" at 2135:40, "wow" 5 seconds later, and then "okay airport in sight." At 2135:48, the captain asked the controller to "keep the lights up for southwest ah twenty sixty six." (The tower controller stated, during a postaccident interview, that the approach lights were turned up to the highest setting and that the runway lights were turned to the second-highest setting.) The controller replied, "winds right now one niner zero now at eight."

At 2135:55, the first officer stated, "approaching minimums," and the captain responded, "going outside." At 2136:02, the first officer called for windshield wipers, and a sound similar to windshield wiper operation was recorded 2 seconds later. At 2136:05, the captain stated, "keep it comin'" and "landing" 4 seconds later. At 2136:11, the CVR recorded the sound of the autopilot disconnect warning tone, and, 3 seconds later, the captain stated, "do it you can do it." Seven seconds later, the captain stated, "ten feet, put her down." At 2136:27, a sound similar to touchdown was recorded on the CVR.

According to the flight data recorder (FDR), thrust reversers were deployed at 2136:30. (Thrust reversers redirect engine exhaust to help slow the airplane.) At 2136:31, the controller began a 4-second transmission, stating that the wind direction