IAD01FA070

The instrument rated pilot obtained weather briefings for his destination, which reported instrument meteorological conditions, including fog, mist, low visibilities and ceilings. The pilot then departed and flew to his destination, where he was cleared for an ILS approach. The airplane flew along the localizer course, and about a 1/2-mile from the approach end of the runway, the airplane initiated a climb and made a left turn toward the east. The airplane continued to turn left and flew north. It then began a series of left and right hand ascending and descending turns to various altitudes. During the last 3 minutes of flight, the airplane made 18 ascents and descents, with vertical speeds varying between positive 4,600 and negative 6,000 fpm, and it's altitude varied between 600 and 1,800 feet msl. Two witnesses heard the airplane fly loudly overhead before it collided with terrain, and reported that the weather was very foggy. At the time of the accident, weather reported at the airport included zero visibility, fog, vertical visibility 100 feet. According to FAA Flight Training Handbook Advisory Circular (AC) 61-21A, "If neither horizon or surface references exist, the airplane's attitude must be determined by artificial means - an attitude indicator or other flight instruments. Sight, supported by other senses such as the inner ear and muscle sense, is used to maintain spatial orientation. However, during periods of low visibility, the supporting senses sometimes conflict with what is seen. When this happens, a pilot is particularly vulnerable to spatial disorientation." Two independent toxicology reports detected chlorpheniramine, a sedating antihistamine, in the pilot's blood and urine.

History of flight

On June 22, 2001, at 0858 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-301, N13VH, was destroyed when it collided with wooded terrain in Greenwich, Connecticut, while executing the missed approach for ILS RWY 16 at Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York. The certificated private pilot was fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that originated at Atlantic City Municipal/Bader Field (AIY), Atlantic City, New Jersey, at 0751. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the business flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

Prior to departure, the pilot made two separate telephone calls to the Millville Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS), Millville, New Jersey, and obtained weather information.

The pilot made the first call at 0705, where he indicated that he was in a taxi cab on the way to the Atlantic City Airport. He told the weather briefer that he intended to fly from Atlantic City to White Plains, and would be leaving in about 15 minutes. The pilot then asked what the weather conditions were in White Plains, and the weather briefer responded, "zero zero."

The pilot asked, "Is it really?" The weather briefer replied, "Yes sir, I don't think you want to go right now."

The pilot then obtained the weather prognosis for White Plains. The prognosis, until 1000, included variable winds at 3 knots, 1/2-mile visibility, fog, mist, vertical visibility of 100 feet. It also included a temporary visibility of 1/4-mile visibility, fog, mist with a vertical visibility of 200 hundred feet.

The weather prognosis between 1100 and 1300 included wind from 110 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 3 miles, fog, mist, rain showers, a broken ceiling at 700 feet, and an overcast ceiling at 1,500 feet.

The pilot then stated his intentions to divert to Albany, New York, and obtained weather information for Albany. However, after receiving the weather information, the pilot said that he did not want to go to Albany. Instead, he wanted to go to an airport near Albany, but could not recall the name of the airport. After a brief search, the airport could not be located and no additional weather information was obtained.

The pilot then informed the weather briefer that he had just arrived at the airport and would have to terminate the briefing. However, he told the weather briefer that he would call back shortly.

The pilot made the second telephone call to the Millville AFSS at 0724, and was connected to a different weather briefer. The pilot asked what the weather was "going to look like" around 0900 and 1000 at White Plains. The briefer told the pilot, "Okay they're looking for up until ten a.m., two miles visibility, mist, ceiling five hundred overcast, then after ten a.m., seven hundred broken, one thousand five hundred overcast, three miles visibility."

The pilot then said, "okay, so we can get in there all right...", and filed an IFR flight plan from Atlantic City to White Plains. He selected Albany as the alternate airport.

Review of air traffic control (ATC) communications revealed that the pilot departed Atlantic City at 0751. While en route, he communicated with several ATC facilities and learned that the ILS RWY 16 approach was in use at White Plains.

At 0838, an approach controller from New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) provided the pilot with the current altimeter setting. He also asked the pilot if he was aware of the weather conditions at White Plains, and informed him that the runway visual range (RVR) there was 800 feet. The approach controller also asked the pilot if he had obtained current airport and weather information via the airport's automated terminal information system (ATIS). The pilot responded that he was in the process of obtaining that information.

About two minutes later, the pilot asked the approach controller if any airplanes had "gotten into" or had tried to get into White Plains that morning. The controller said that no one had tried or had landed there that morning. However, a business jet flew in a holding pattern for awhile, but decided to leave the area.

At 0842, the pilot requested the approach into White Plains and stated he would proceed to his alternate if he was unable to land. The approach controller then informed the pilot that the current RVR was 1,400 feet, and the pilot acknowledged.

The approach controller informed the White Plains tower controller that the pilot would attempt the ILS RWY 16 approach.

At 0846, the approach controller informed the pilot that the RVR at White Plains was 1,000 feet "touchdown and roll-out." The pilot acknowledged.

The approach controller cleared the pilot for the approach at 0847, and informed the White Plains tower controller that the airplane was established on the approach. Additionally, he provided the tower controller with missed approach instructions, which included a left turn to 090 degrees and climb to 2,000 feet.

The approach controller then instructed the pilot to contact the White Plains Control Tower, and the pilot acknowledged.

At 0849, the pilot contacted the White Plains Control Tower, and was cleared to land on runway 16.

At 0854, the tower controller asked the pilot twice if he was "going around." The pilot replied, "that's affirmative." The tower controller then directed the pilot to "turn left heading zero nine zero, climb and maintain two thousand." The pilot did not respond, and the tower controller again instructed the pilot to "turn left heading zero nine zero, climb and maintain two thousand." Again, the pilot did not respond, and the tower controller queried his intentions. The pilot responded, "I am going zero nine zero, but zero nine zero is to the right." The tower controller then instructed the pilot to, "fly heading zero nine zero, climb and maintain two thousand." The pilot did not respond.

The departure controller queried the tower controller about the airplane's position. The tower controller stated that she didn't "know what he was doing," and she thought that the pilot was "a little confused."

At 0855, the tower controller instructed the pilot to contact departure control on 126.4. The pilot responded, "out of control, we're gone."

Shortly after, the departure controller informed the tower controller that the pilot had not contacted departure control. The tower controller again instructed the pilot to contact departure control. There was no response from the pilot.

The tower controller followed up with the departure controller to see if the pilot had contacted departure control. The departure controller had not established communications with the pilot, but received an "ident" signal from the airplane.

The tower controller then made several attempts to contact the pilot.

At 0857, the pilot broadcasted, "flight director is outta control." The tower controller immediately responded, but was unable to obtain a response from the pilot. She then informed him that his position was just northeast of the airport.

The departure controller then reported to the tower controller that the airplane had disappeared off his radar scope. The tower controller stated, "I think he is disorientated, we're rolling the trucks."

The tower controller made several more attempts to contact the pilot, but there was no further communications with him.

Shortly thereafter, a sound similar to an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was heard in the control tower.

A witness, who lived directly across the street from the accident site, reported that he was in his home when he heard a low flying airplane. He went outside to his front steps to see if he could see the airplane, but it was "very foggy." The witness said that he heard the airplane circling overhead and that the engine was loud and operating smoothly. He then heard the airplane hit the gr