IAD05FA023

NTSB accident investigation · CASA 212-200-CC · Bamiyan, Afghanistan · November 27, 2004

Accident · FatalClass 1 · FieldFinal report
Date
November 27, 2004, 03:50 local (03:50 UTC)
Place
Bamiyan, Afghanistan
Injuries
6 fatal
Damage
Destroyed
Phase of flight
Enroute
Aircraft
N960BWCASA 212-200-CC
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report December 4, 2006
Report
Board-adopted at Board Meeting
Investigation class
Class 1
Parties
U.S. Army Safety Center, AAI-100, U.S. Air Force Safety Center, Presidential Airways, Inc.
Safety recommendations
Yes
Case key
60698

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

the captain's inappropriate decision to fly a nonstandard route and his failure to maintain adequate terrain clearance, which resulted in the inflight collision with mountainous terrain. Factors were the operator's failure to require its flight crews to file and to fly a defined route of flight, the operator's failure to ensure that the flight crews adhered to company policies and FAA and DoD Federal safety regulations, and the lack of in-country oversight by the FAA and the DoD of the operator. Contributing to the death of one of the passengers was the operator's lack of flight-locating procedures and its failure to adequately mitigate the limited communications capability at remote sites.

The Board's full report is available on: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0607.pdf

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

In flight collision with terrain/waterClimb
Terrain condition - mountainous/hilly
Altitude/clearance - not maintainedPilot in commandCause
In-flight planning/decision - delayedPilot in commandCause
Preflight planning/preparation - inadequatePilot in commandCause
Condition(s)/step(s) insufficiently definedCompany/operator managementFactor
Inadequate surveillance of operationFaa(organization)Factor
Dispatch procedures - inadequateCompany/operator managementFactor
Inadequate surveillance of operationOther govt organizationFactor
Condition(s)/step(s) insufficiently definedCompany/operator managementFactor
Dispatch procedures - inadequateCompany/operator managementFactor

Analysis

The Safety Board has adopted the final report of this accident investigation, including the analysis and probable cause. The Board's full report is available on: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0607.pdf

On November 27, 2004, about 0820 Afghanistan time, a Construcciones Aeronauticas Sociedad Anonima C-212-CC (CASA 212) twin-engine, turboprop airplane, N960BW, registered to Aviation Worldwide Services, LLC, and operated by Presidential Airways, Inc., of Melbourne, Florida, collided with mountainous terrain in the vicinity of the Bamiyan Valley, near Bamiyan, Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DoD) contract flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, with a company flight plan filed. Daylight visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed. The captain, the first officer, and the mechanic-certificated passenger, who were U.S. civilians employed by the operator, and the three military passengers, who were active-duty U.S. Army soldiers, received fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The flight departed Bagram Air Base (OAIX), Bagram, Afghanistan, about 0738.

Factual narrative

------------ Factual report of investigation ---------------

History of flight

On November 27, 2004, about 0820 Afghanistan time [1], a Construcciones Aeronauticas Sociedad Anonima C-212-CC (CASA 212) twin-engine, turboprop airplane, N960BW, registered to Aviation Worldwide Services, LLC, and operated by Presidential Airways, Inc., of Melbourne, Florida, collided with mountainous terrain in the vicinity of the Bamiyan Valley, near Bamiyan, Afghanistan.[2] The Department of Defense (DoD) contract flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, with a company flight plan filed. Daylight visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed. The captain, the first officer, and the mechanic-certificated passenger, who were U.S. civilians employed by the operator, and the three military passengers, who were active-duty U.S. Army soldiers, received fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The flight departed Bagram Air Base (OAIX), Bagram, Afghanistan, about 0738.

Presidential Airways provided transport services for U.S. military personnel and cargo within Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan under an Air Mobility Command (AMC) contract with the DoD.[3] According to Presidential Airways' program site manager, he briefed the captain on the mission itinerary about 0700. The purpose of the mission was to transport military cargo [4] to Farah, Afghanistan (OAFR), and the three military passengers were traveling in a "space available" status.[5] The flight was to depart OAIX and fly to OAFR, and then fly to Shindand, Afghanistan (OASD), for fuel before returning to OAIX. The briefing included the expected cargo and passenger loads, as well as military intelligence information that there were no significant threats for the mission. The program site manager and the captain discussed the area weather forecast, which primarily consisted of VMC with the possibility of blowing dust at OASD, and they agreed that Kandahar, Afghanistan (OAKN), would be an appropriate alternate destination if the flight were unable to land at OASD.

According to the program site manager, he was not aware if route planning was performed for the mission. The accepted visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan contained destination information but did not indicate the specific route of the flight. The program site manager stated he assumed the crews followed certain typical routes between destinations; the pilots were to fly the routes "GPS [global positioning system] direct" while maintaining flight in VMC and clearance from terrain.

According to OAIX air traffic control transcripts, during initial radio contact with the ground controller, the crew announced an intended flight altitude of 10,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and a departure heading to the south; this departure heading was consistent with the operator's typical route from OAIX to OAFR, which involved a departure and flight to the south for approximately 32 nautical miles (nm) to avoid the mountains west of OAIX, then a turn to the west direct to OAFR.

The crew taxied the airplane for takeoff but then stopped it briefly on the taxiway and boarded an additional passenger.[6] The controller then cleared the flight for takeoff from runway 3, and the flight departed. At 0738, the OAIX controller instructed the crew to contact the departure controller, and the crew acknowledged. There was no record of radio communication between the flight crew and the departure controller, and no further known radio communication was received from the flight. A review of ground-based radar data revealed the airplane did not depart on the southerly heading but, instead, departed to the northwest. Radar contact was lost approximately 9.5 nm northwest of OAIX, consistent with the normal expected limit of radar coverage for the area. The last recorded radar position showed the flight on a westerly heading at an approximate altitude of 10,000 feet msl; the position and heading were consistent with the flight entering the Bamiyan Valley.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0748:37.[7] The flight was airborne, and the first officer stated, "cruise check is complete." Initial conversation indicated that the crew had never flown the selected route to OAFR and the mechanic [8] noted that the valley they had chosen to fly through was not the direct route to OAFR. At 0753:28, the captain stated, "we'll just have to see where this leads." The CVR then recorded the captain, the first officer, and the mechanic discussing a topographical map, outside visual references, their current position coordinates (obtained from a GPS as they navigated), and their route over the mountains to OAFR. At 0756:12, the captain stated, "well normally we'd have time to on a short day like this we'd have time to play a little bit do some explorin' but with those winds comin' up I want to [expletive] get there as fast as we can." At 0800:12, the captain stated, "with this good visibility it's as easy as pie. you run into somethin' big you just parallel it until you find a way thru [sic]. this is the first good visibility day I've had in the Casa. It's not just good it's outstanding."

An unidentified passenger asked about the route of flight at 0802:25, and the mechanic stated, "I don't know what we're gunna see, we don't normally go this route."[9] The captain stated, "all we want is to avoid seeing rock at twelve o'clock." At 0803:21, the first officer stated, "yeah you're an x-wing fighter star wars man," and the captain replied, "you're [expletive] right. this is fun."

At 0803:34, the captain stated, "okay it's about time we're gunna start climbin' we're comin' up to a box up here. yeah I think this valley might peter out right up here." The first officer and the captain then discussed some of their previous mountain flying experiences. At 0812:45, the captain stated, "I swear to god they wouldn't pay me if they knew how much fun this was," and the first officer replied, "yeah, yeah, this is what we do flyin' jumpers we always do this. as low as we can get," and the captain stated, "yeah that's the way I use to do it." At 0813:06, the captain added, "it takes an extraordinary day that you can actually get down in and do some [expletive] like this."

At 0815:47, the first officer stated that the ridgeline off to their left had a minimum elevation of approximately 14,000 feet msl. The captain replied that he wanted to look for a notch to fly through. At 0818:26, the first officer stated, "boy it's a good thing we're not too heavy today I guess," and the captain replied, "yeah oh I wouldn't have done this if we were at gross. we can always turn around up in here." At 0819:04, the mechanic asked, "okay you guys are gunna make this right?" The captain replied, "yeah h h [sic] I'm hopin'."

About 10 seconds later, the cockpit area microphone (CAM) recorded a sound similar to a stall warning tone single beep, and the mechanic immediately asked if there was a way out. At 0819:16, the captain stated they could execute a 180º turnaround, and he instructed the first officer to "drop a quarter flaps." At 0819:25, the first officer stated, "yeah, let's turn around," and the captain again requested, "drop a quarter flaps." The mechanic then stated, "You need to ah make a decision." At 0819:44, the CAM recorded a sound similar to a stall warning that continued to the end of the recording. The mechanic stated, "call off his airspeed for him," and the first officer stated, "you got ninety five." Eight seconds after the first officer's statement, the recording ended.

The accident site was approximately 80 nm west of OAIX and approximately 25 nm north of the operator's typical route between OAIX and OAFR. The operator was notified by military personnel, about 1415, that the airplane had never arrived at OAFR. Search and rescue operations were initiated by the milita

Aircraft

Registration
N960BW
Reported as
CASA 212-200-CC
Category
Airplane
Serial number
231
Airframe hours
21,489.6
Engines
Garrett TPE-331-10R, 900 horsepower, turbo propGarrett TPE-331-10R, 900 horsepower, turbo prop
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Part 135
Registered owner
Presidential Airways Inc
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Transport
Last inspection
100 hour · November 1, 2004 · 4.8 hours before
Departed
OAIX · Bagram
Destination
NONE · Farah
Flight plan
VFR

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew · 2

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
37
Injuries
Fatal
Certificates
Airline transport, Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine sea, Multi-engine land, Single-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1, Valid Medical--w/ waivers/lim
Last flight review
November 1, 2004
Seat
Left
Flight hours
5,720 total · 685 in this make and model · 4,930 as pilot in command · 88 in the last 90 days · 66 in the last 30 days
Role
Co-pilot
Age
35
Injuries
Fatal
Certificate
Airline transport
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1, Valid Medical--no waivers/lim.
Last flight review
October 13, 2004
Seat
Right
Flight hours
2,228 total · 67 in the last 90 days · 65 in the last 30 days

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
Variable at 3 knots
Visibility
4.97 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
43 °F, dew point 28 °F
Altimeter
30.37 inHg
Observed at
OAIX, 81 nm away

Docket · 35

The files NTSB released with the investigation on May 6, 2024, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 308 MB in all.

Medical records informationItem 1 · PDF · 1 page · 11 KBPaw company history provided by pawItem 2 · PDF · 1 page · 7 KBPaw pilots overview statement provided by pawItem 3 · PDF · 1 page · 7 KBWitness statements and interviewsItem 4 · PDF · 10 pages · 79 KBPilot-operator aircraft accident report NTSB form 61201Item 5 · PDF · 6 pages · 121 KBNew zealand mountain flying handbookItem 6 · PDF · 24 pages · 989 KBPreaccident aircraft photographItem 7 · PDF · 1 page · 732 KBDelegation accept N960BWItem 8 · PDF · 1 page · 45 KBDelegation request N960BWItem 9 · PDF · 1 page · 1.1 MBCaptain's company recordsItem 10 · PDF · 16 pages · 12.8 MBFirst officer's company recordsItem 11 · PDF · 19 pages · 13.8 MBMechanic rated passenger's company recordsItem 12 · PDF · 8 pages · 5.1 MBMilitary letter regarding AR-15-6 redactionItem 13 · PDF · 2 pages · 1.5 MBMilitary AR-15-6 report of proceedingsItem 14 · PDF · 4 pages · 2.3 MBMilitary AR-15-6 legal reviewItem 15 · PDF · 1 page · 255 KBMilitary AR-15-6 acronyms-abbreviationsItem 16 · PDF · 3 pages · 73 KBMilitary ar 15-6 report excerptsItem 17 · PDF · 22 pages · 17.5 MBMilitary AR-15-6 investigation tabs a-c excerptsItem 18 · PDF · 17 pages · 7.1 MBMilitary AR-15-6 investigation tabs d-f excerptsItem 19 · PDF · 117 pages · 9.0 MBMilitary AR-15-6 investigation tabs g-i excerptsItem 20 · PDF · 62 pages · 45.3 MBMilitary AR-15-6 investigation tabs j-l excerptsItem 21 · PDF · 24 pages · 13.1 MBMilitary AR-15-6 investigation tabs m-o excerptsItem 22 · PDF · 76 pages · 26.8 MBMilitary AR-15-6 investigation tabs p-r excerptsItem 23 · PDF · 98 pages · 50.6 MBMilitary AR-15-6 presentationItem 24 · PDF · 37 pages · 39.7 MBCockpit voice recorder 12-factual report of group chairmanItem 25 · PDF · 27 pages · 1.0 MBMemorandum for record regarding FAA oversightItem 26 · PDF · 1 page · 40 KBCompany FAA operation specificationsItem 27 · PDF · 72 pages · 2.2 MBAircraft performance informationItem 28 · PDF · 28 pages · 55.0 MBUpdated witness statement from mr lance careyItem 29 · PDF · 1 page · 53 KBPresidential airways submissionItem 30 · PDF · 56 pages · 374 KBStatement of party representatives to NTSB investigationItem 31 · PDF · 3 pages · 138 KBPost-accident correspondenceItem 32 · PDF · 11 pages · 347 KBOperator post accident activitiesItem 33 · PDF · 1 page · 18 KBComments from the united states air force on a petition for reconsideration that was filed by presidential airwaysItem 34 · PDF · 7 pages · 380 KBResponse to petition for reconsiderationItem 35 · PDF · 4 pages · 43 KB