IAD05LA135

NTSB accident investigation · Sikorsky S-76B · Linden, NJ · September 13, 2005

Accident · Serious injuriesLimited investigationFinal report
Date
September 13, 2005, 12:45 local (16:45 UTC)
Place
Linden, NJ
Injuries
1 serious, 2 uninjured; on the ground: 1 serious
Damage
No damage
Phase of flight
Standing
Aircraft
N14CSSikorsky S-76B
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report April 25, 2006
Report
Approved by Office Director
Parties
FAA/FSDO
FAA report
20050913030769A
Case key
62445

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

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Probable cause

The lineman's failure to maintain adequate clearance from the main rotor system. A factor was his lack of familiarity with the accident helicopter make and model.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

Propeller/rotor contact to personStanding
Clearance - not maintainedFbo personnelCause
Lack of familiarity with aircraftFbo personnelFactor

Analysis

The helicopter was taxied to the fixed fuel pump, and engine power was reduced to idle. As the main rotor continued to turn, a lineman approached the helicopter from the 11 o'clock position. He initially bent down as he proceeded toward the helicopter, but suddenly stood upright, and was struck by the helicopter's rotor. The fueling operator conducted no formal training of lineman, and what "on-the-job training" was conducted, was not documented. On the lineman's application for employment he stated that he had previous experience operating in a military aviation environment. According to the accident helicopter's flight manual, "Some persons may have prior experience with helicopters for which approach from the front is preferred. Approach from the front of an S-76 is not permitted. It is essential that all persons are properly informed regarding the safe approach/departure angles of the S-76."

Factual narrative

On September 13, 2005, about 1245 eastern daylight time, a parked Sikorsky S-76B, N14CS, operated by ExcelAire Service Inc., was undamaged when a lineman was struck by its turning main rotor at Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey. The lineman was seriously injured, and the certificated airline transport pilot and certificated commercial co-pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, destined for Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York.

The pilot and co-pilot each submitted written statements, which contained similar information.

The helicopter was taxied to the fixed fuel pump for service, and engine power was reduced to idle. The lineman then arrived, retrieved the aircraft grounding cable, and began pulling it toward the helicopter, approaching from about the 11 o'clock position, as viewed by the pilot. As he proceeded toward the helicopter, the lineman was bent down and was looking at the grounding cable attachment clip. He then suddenly stood upright, was struck by the helicopter's rotor, and knocked to the ground. The crew then shut down the helicopter's engines, stopped the rotor blade, and called for emergency assistance.

The weather reported at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, about 5 nautical miles northeast, included winds from 190 degrees at 9 knots, 7 statute miles visibility, and few clouds at 4,500 feet.

Examination of records from the fueling operator that employed the lineman revealed that he applied for the position of line technician on August 11, 2005. In the blank on the application labeled "Do you have special skills, experience or qualifications related to the position applied for," the lineman wrote "military experience for 8yrs [on] carriers and naval air stations."

Several requests were made of the fueling operator to provide the training records and guidance provided to linemen. As of the date of this report, no response has been received.

An interview of another lineman revealed that when an employee was hired to be a lineman, they received "on-the-job training" with a senior employee. They were then released to perform refueling operations on their own when the senior employee, or the manager, believed that they were able to perform the job. The employee stated that he had received no formal training, and that there were no records documenting the training that he had received. The employee added that there was no supervisor onsite to oversee refueling operations on a daily basis.

The S-76 flight manual states the following with relation to ground operation:

"Turning rotors represent considerable hazard to any persons in their vicinity. The best method for prevention of rotor strike incidents are training of flight and ground crew and effective briefing of passengers. Because of well-trained and briefed persons can become preoccupied and helicopter operations may involve areas where access control is limited, special attention must be given to the particular capabilities and characteristics of the S-76 whenever the engines and/or rotors are turning."

The manual also gives the following warning:

"Some persons may have prior experience with helicopters for which approach from the front is preferred. Approach from the front of an S-76 is not permitted. It is essential that all persons are properly informed regarding the safe approach/departure angles of the S-76."

The "Recommended Personnel Exit and Approach" diagram contained in the flight manual depicted a "Danger Area" consisting of the radius of the main rotor from about the pilots 10 o'clock position to the 2 o'clock position.

Aircraft

Registration
N14CS
Reported as
Sikorsky S-76B
Category
Helicopter
Serial number
760312
Airframe hours
3,504
Engine
Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6B-36, 900 lbs thrust, turbo shaft
Damage
No damage
Flight
Positioning · Part 91
Operator
ExcelAire Service Inc.
Registered owner
CS Helicopter LLC
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Transport
Last inspection
AAIP · August 1, 2005 · 69 hours before
Departed
LDJ · Linden, NJ
Destination
HPN · White Plains, NY
Airport
LDJ · Linden Airport

Flight crew · 2

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
42
Injuries
None
Certificate
Airline transport
Instrument ratings
Helicopter
Medical
Class 1, Without waivers/limitations
Seat
Right
Flight hours
7,950 total · 180 in this make and model
Role
Co-pilot
Age
32
Injuries
None
Certificates
Commercial, Airline transport
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane, Helicopter
Medical
Class 1, With waivers/limitations
Seat
Left
Flight hours
1,192 total · 68 in this make and model · 930 as pilot in command

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
190° at 9 knots
Visibility
7 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
90 °F, dew point 61 °F
Altimeter
30.01 inHg
Observed at
EWR, 5 nm away

Docket · 5

The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 3, 2006, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 639 KB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.